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General Order 325 of 6 October 1884, drafted by
Stephen B. Luce and signed by the Secretary of
the Navy, William E. Chandler, establishing the
Naval War College and making Commodore
Luce its first president.
GENERAL ORDER, NO. 325.
October 6, 1884.
A college is hereby established for an advanced course of professional study for
naval officers, to be known as the Naval War College. It will be under the general
supervision of the Bureau of Navigation. The principal building on Coasters’ Har-
bor Island, Newport, R.I., will be assigned to its use, and is hereby transferred, with
the surrounding structures and the grounds immediately adjacent, to the custody and
control of the Bureau of Navigation for that purpose.
The college will be under the immediate charge of an officer of the Navy, not below
the grade of commander, to be known as the President of the Naval War College.
He will be assisted in the performance of his duties by a faculty.
A course of instruction, embracing the higher branches of professional study, will
be arranged by a board, consisting of all the members of the faculty and including
the president, who will be the presiding officer of the board. The board will have
regular meetings at least once a month, and at such other times as the president may
direct, for the transaction of business. The proceedings of the board will be recorded
in a journal.
The course of instruction will be open to all officers above the grade of naval cadet.
Commodore S. B. Luce has been assigned to duty as the president of the college.
WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.
This year the institution marked its 120th anni-
versary with ceremonies on 6 October (including
an “appearance” by the Commodore) and a
commemorative coin—as well as with a highly
successful visit in September by the Commission
on Institutions of Higher Education of the New
England Association of Schools and Colleges.
That visit completed the on-site evaluation phase
of a process (the ten-year comprehensive evalua-
tion required for all NEASC-accredited colleges)
that, we are confident, will ultimately continue
the College’s accreditation, originally granted in
1994, to confer the master of arts degree in na-
tional security and strategic studies.
“The principal building on Coasters’ [sic] Harbor
Island” was the poorhouse and asylum for the
deaf and dumb of Newport, Rhode Island. Built
in 1819 and renamed Founders Hall in 1976, it
now houses the Naval War College Museum, the
Maritime History Department, and the Naval
War College Press.
For background and further information, see
Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History
of the Naval War College (1984), by John B.
Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson III, and John R.
Wadleigh, sold at the Naval War College Foun-
dation Museum Store.
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:07 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/25
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI  02841-1207
Winter 2005
Volume 58, Number 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
3
War College: Winter 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW ADVISORY BOARD
Professor Inis L. Claude, Jr.
Dr. Norman Friedman
Professor Colin Gray
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy, Ret.
Professor Paul M. Kennedy
Professor James R. Kurth
The Honorable Robert J. Murray
Professor George H. Quester
Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, U.S. Navy, Ret.
Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor,
U.S. Marine Corps, Ret.
Professor Russell F. Weigley
The Honorable G. William Whitehurst
PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, U.S. Navy
PROVOST AND DEAN OF ACADEMICS
Professor James F. Giblin, Jr.
DEAN OF NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES AND
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Professor Kenneth H. Watman
Professor Peter Dombrowski, Editor
Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor
Phyllis P. Winkler, Book Review Editor
Lori A. Almeida, Secretary and Circulation Manager
Frank Uhlig, Jr., Editor Emeritus
EDITORIAL OFFICES
Naval War College Review
Code 32, Naval War College
686 Cushing Rd., Newport, RI  02841-1207
Fax: 401.841.1071
DSN exchange, all lines: 948
Website: www.nwc.navy.mil/press
Editor, Circulation, or Business
401.841.2236
press@nwc.navy.mil
Managing Editor
401.841.4552
managingeditor@nwc.navy.mil
Newport Papers, Books
401.841.6583
associateeditor@nwc.navy.mil
Essays and Book Reviews
401.841.6584
bookreviews@nwc.navy.mil
Other Naval War College Offices
401.841.3089
The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 as a forum for discus-
sion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The thoughts
and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are
not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or
the Naval War College.
The journal is published quarterly. Distribution is limited generally to com-
mands and activities of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; regu-
lar and reserve officers of U.S. services; foreign officers and civilians having a
present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; selected U.S. gov-
ernment officials and agencies; and selected U.S. and international libraries,
research centers, publications, and educational institutions.
Contributors
Please request the standard contributors’ guidance from the managing editor
or access it online before submitting manuscripts. The Naval War College Re-
view neither offers nor makes compensation for articles or book reviews, and it
assumes no responsibility for the return of manuscripts, although every effort is
made to return those not accepted. In submitting work, the sender warrants
that it is original, that it is the sender’s property, and that neither it nor a similar
work by the sender has been accepted or is under consideration elsewhere.
Permissions
Reproduction and reprinting are subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and ap-
plicable treaties of the United States. To obtain permission to reproduce ma-
terial bearing a copyright notice, or to reproduce any material for commercial
purposes, contact the editor for each use. Material not bearing a copyright
notice may be freely reproduced for academic or other noncommercial use;
however, it is requested that the author and Naval War College Review be
credited and that the editor be informed.
The Naval War College Review is listed in Ulrich’s International Periodicals
Directory, Military Media Database, Free Magazines for Libraries, and by
Oxbridge Communications; it is microformed by UMI® (Bell & Howell Infor-
mation and Learning); it is abstracted in International Political Science Abstracts,
in the Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature, and in the
Joint Warfighting Center Futures Database. It is indexed in the Air University
Index to Military Periodicals, in Historical Abstracts and America: History and
Life (both ABC-CLIO), the International Bibliography of Periodical Literature,
the International Bibliography of Book Reviews, and selectively in the American
Foreign Policy Index and INFO-SOUTH. An index of articles and essays from
1948 through the last complete publishing year is available on compact disc
from the editorial office; an annual index is printed in each Winter issue. A
current index is also available online. Book reviews (beginning with Spring
1994) are indexed in the Gale Research, Inc., Book Review Index and online for
recent years.
The Naval War College Press is listed in the Gale Research, Inc., Directory of
Publications and Broadcast Media. A catalog of Press offerings is available
online.
Periodicals postage paid at Newport, R.I. POSTMASTERS, send address
changes to: Naval War College Review, Code 32S, Naval War College, 686
Cushing Rd., Newport, R.I.  02841-1207.
ISSN 0028-1484
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/25
CONTENTS
President’s Forum .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5
Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11
Philip G. Cerny
The reliability of interstate balances of power is declining; the capacity of the “states system” to
provide security is deteriorating; the state itself is coming under increasing centrifugal pressure
from both outside and inside, from above and from below; and the reshaping of the wider political
environment in reaction to complex globalization remains rudimentary and uneven. We can
expect substate and cross-border destabilization and violence, including but certainly not confined
to terrorism, to become increasingly endemic.
From Conscripts to Volunteers
NATO’s Transitions to All-Volunteer Forces .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 35
Cindy Williams
Like the United States after the Vietnam War, European militaries are seeking creative solutions to
recruit, retain, and motivate the high-quality volunteers they need. But the demographic,
economic, social, and labor environments within which the militaries compete for employees are
different, and Europe is likely to find the task more difficult, costly, and lengthy than did the
United States.
Grand Strategies for Dealing with Other States
in theNew,New World Order.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 63
James F. Miskel
Three broad strategies for maximizing the benefits the United States receives from state-to-state
assistance programs are current today—the pivotal, buffer (or “seam”), and failed-state strategies.
Examination of the assumptions and conceptual approaches imbedded in them shows that none
represents an adequate strategy for dealing with the security threats of the present day and age.
Medical Support of Twenty-first-Century Warfare
The Mosquito Can Be More Dangerous than the Mortar Round
TheObligations of Command .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 77
Arthur M. Smith and Craig Hooper
Flesh and blood are critical elements of all weapon systems. Absent the will and physical capability
to fight due to uncontrolled disease, any equation for victory is doomed. As the painfully high rate
of malaria infection among unprotected Marines in Liberia recently demonstrated, the global war
on terrorism, and especially expeditionary warfare in the underdeveloped world, may be
completely paralyzed without a wholesale commitment of leadership “from the top” to
environmental protection of troops under their command.
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
5
War College: Winter 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
Hospital Ships in the War on Terror
Sanctuaries or Targets? .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 89
Richard J. Grunawalt
The immunity of hospital ships from attack is firmly established in international law; they have
long enjoyed a “safety in vulnerability” rooted in their humanitarian purposes, universally
respected by principled belligerents. But to a terrorist their white paint, red crosses or crescents,
and special signals simply make them conspicuous and attractive “soft” targets. It is time to
consider effective defensive armament for them—or failing that, abandoning their protected
status.
World War II Carrier Warfare
Midway
Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine? .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 121
Thomas Wildenberg
The American and Japanese navies in the interwar years both acknowledged the transformative
nature of the aircraft carrier, but they made strikingly different choices in implementing that naval
revolution. The contrasting carrier doctrines and force structures these choices produced were
tested decisively at Midway, in ways that speak to the nature of military technological innovation.
Race for the Decisive Weapon
British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942–1943 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 137
James P. Levy
It is popularly understood that after the spectacular American victory at the battle of Midway the
aircraft carrier reigned supreme. However, it was not until 1944 that in fact carriers ruled the
waves. Why the delay?
Review Essay
ANew Standard for the Use of Force? .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 151
The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century,
by Thomas P. M. Barnett
reviewed by Lawrence J. Korb
Book Reviews
Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations,
Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, and
NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative
Study in Civil-Military Relations, by Jeffrey Simon
reviewed by Rachel Epstein .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 155
NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict and the
Atlantic Alliance, by Joyce P. Kaufman
reviewed by Tom Fedyszyn .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 158
A Time of Our Choosing: America’s War in Iraq, by Todd S. Purdum
reviewed by D. L. Teska .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 160
At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942, by Richard C. Bush
reviewed by Bruce Elleman .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 161
The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas,
edited by Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason
reviewed by George H. Quester.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 163
Making War, Thinking History, by Jeffrey Record
reviewed by Jan van Tol .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 164
2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/25
Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America,
and the New Face of American War, by Evan Wright
reviewed by Reed Bonadonna .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 166
Negotiating with North Korea, by Richard Saccone
reviewed by Xavier K. Maruyama .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 168
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of
Michael J. Handel, edited by Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken
reviewed by Efraim Inbar .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 170
Battle Ready, by Tom Clancy, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Koltz
reviewed by Henry Bartlett .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 172
All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves
and the Origins of Carrier Airpower, by Thomas Wildenberg
reviewed by Chris Madsen .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 174
A Rage for Glory: The Life and Times of Commodore
Stephen Decatur, USN, by James Tertius de Kay
reviewed by Wade G. Dudley .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 175
John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy,
by Evan Thomas
reviewed by Alan Cate .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 177
Of Special Interest .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 178
From the Editors.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 179
Index of Volume 57
Articles and Essays .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 181
C O N T E N T S 3
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
7
War College: Winter 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979,
following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for
Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds
master’s degrees in public administration (finance)
from Harvard and in national security studies and
strategy from the Naval War College, where he
graduated with highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he com-
manded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washing-
ton included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and per-
sonal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to com-
mand USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet oper-
ating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he di-
rected the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Fol-
lowing this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Mis-
sions Organization. He finished his most recent Penta-
gon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure,
Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint
Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense
mission areas. His most recent Washington assignment
was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of
Senate Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Com-
mander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution.
Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of Cruiser
Destroyer Group 3 in August 2003. He became the fifty-
first President of the Naval War College on 12 August
2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
THESE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL VERY BUSY MONTHS since I was installed as
the President of the Naval War College. To be serving in a position
once held by Admirals Alfred Thayer Mahan, Raymond Spruance,
and Stansfield Turner (among others) is very humbling but also
exciting. I return to the College at a time when the need for mili-
tary leaders able to think critically and shape the future has never
been greater. Because the Naval War College is perhaps the finest
professional military education institution in the world, I see the
College playing an increasingly important role in preparing our students to as-
sume leadership roles in the uniformed services, in government agencies in the
national security arena, and in friendly and allied nations around the world.
There have been a number of changes here since I was a student over a decade
ago, but the essence and the thrust of the College’s education are the same. The
demanding program still consists of four core elements: Strategy and Policy, Na-
tional Security Decision Making, Joint Military Operations, and a robust and
varied electives program. Likewise, our research, analysis, and gaming efforts re-
main focused on helping the Chief of Naval Operations to define the future
Navy. We seek and receive a great deal of feedback about our programs and ef-
forts from our accrediting bodies, our Board of Advisors, uniformed and civil-
ian leaders within the Department of Defense, and our growing population of
alumni. All indications are that we have the basics about right! But while the
fundamental elements of our mission as the Navy’s intermediate and senior-
level professional military education institution are in place, the context within
which we must accomplish our work continues to evolve rapidly.
Taken together, the political, economic, and technological developments in
the international security environment represent a genuine sea change in the
way we think about, shape, plan, and employ our naval forces. Over the College’s
long history, I suspect, every president, faculty, and student body has sought to
grasp the significance of the changes around them. I am convinced, however,
that the scope and pace of change today are extraordinary. Thus, the challenges to
our College community—faculty, staff, students, and alumni—are as great as
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they have ever been over the 120 years of the institution’s existence. New strate-
gic and operational challenges to our nation’s security have emerged that de-
mand bold, innovative approaches. The security threats confronting the United
States and its allies are unconventional, created by an array of wily foes empow-
ered by advanced technology. Many of the time-honored rules for dealing with
other nations do not apply when dealing with nonstate actors such as interna-
tional terrorist groups, pirates, and organized-crime syndicates.
Along with these asymmetric threats come the political perils of being the
world’s lone superpower and a demand to nurture better our relationship with
friends and allies as we also compete for hearts and minds throughout the world.
We must find ways to apply the nation’s seapower and military might in greater
concert with our diplomatic and informational instruments of power. As Walter
Russell Mead said in Power, Terror, Peace and War, “We are going to have to rein-
vent some of the ways we think about power and influence.”
In the months and years ahead, the College must act as a prudent mariner, re-
acting appropriately and decisively to changes in the international security envi-
ronment. We will play a pivotal role in dealing with the emerging challenges of
this new century. As a first step, we have begun a far-reaching internal analysis of
all of our resident and nonresident professional military education programs
and a thorough review of all our research, analysis, and gaming initiatives. We
cannot yet know what these reviews will yield, but the fundamental measures of
effectiveness for our efforts are clear: our academic programs and research prod-
ucts must remain relevant and focused on key issues of the day; and our case
studies, war games, and exercises must address the issues of transformation,
change management, risk analysis, the evolving international security environ-
ment, and the defeat of terrorism. Finally, our students must leave here prepared
to play immediately key roles in the joint command and control architecture.
The continued interest of our Congress and recent policies established by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and by our CNO are unmistakable votes of trust
and confidence in what we are doing at the Naval War College. Together, they
underscore as well the expectation that the College will be a source of thoughtful
answers in a world of tough questions. Many of the issues under debate relate to
the increasing recognition of the unique value and capabilities of naval forces in
a world of decreasing overseas bases and less-assured access. Naval forces have
emerged as a key element of the joint future in the form of the joint sea base and
other evolving concepts. With the objective of ensuring a range of flexible re-
sponses to the president and commander in chief, we must apply the College’s
considerable intellectual capital and operational expertise to exploiting capabil-
ities unique and inherent in naval modes of operation.
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We have a truly extraordinary advantage here in Newport to meet our na-
tion’s and our Navy’s expectations.
• A highly capable and motivated faculty and student body.
• A commitment to research and analysis absent parochial interests.
• Complete naval “ownership”—we are “inside the lifelines.”
• A close and complementary relationship with the Navy Warfare
Development Command and the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group here in
Newport and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
In light of the factors outlined in the previous paragraphs, we have identified
our three top goals for this flagship institution:
The first is to ensure that all our professional military education programs re-
main current, rigorous, relevant, and accessible to the maximum number of
students. This requires full-time resident programs that are skillfully crafted to
focus on the issues most critical to future leaders, and nonresident programs tai-
lored to the needs of this very diverse student body. We need to educate our offi-
cers so they are competent for the age, relevant to the times, and prepared to help
shape the future.
The second is to ensure that our research, analysis, and gaming efforts sup-
port the needs of the fleet, the combatant commanders, and the Chief of Naval
Operations. The Naval War College is a unique asset that “lives outside the belt-
way” and “thinks outside the box.” We need to focus on delivering analytical
products that matter to our service and impact key decisions.
The third is to develop and provide the education necessary for officers to op-
erate and lead effectively and efficiently in joint maritime command and staff
positions, on combatant commander staffs, and in joint task forces. There is no
question that virtually all military operations in the future will be accomplished
with joint and multinational forces, led by officers from all services who are first
and foremost experts in their own warfare community. But these officers must
also be educated and acculturated to work in a joint, interagency, and multi-
national environment, where the pace and complexities of modern combat op-
erations do not permit the luxury of on-the-job-training—naval officers must
arrive ready to fight. The Naval War College must become the educational center
of excellence for joint command and control in the maritime domain.
In the final analysis, with regard to our educational responsibility, I want to
assure you that the College continues to educate our students effectively in joint
warfare from a maritime perspective. We have a long and proud heritage as the
intellectual center of the Navy, and we want to ensure that we focus on the strate-
gic and operational challenges in the maritime domain while being actively
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:11 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
11
War College: Winter 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
involved in developing naval strategy for the future. With regard to our research,
analysis, and gaming function, we must continue to bring our unique advan-
tages to bear on projects of significant importance to our regional commanders,
our fleet and numbered fleet commanders, the Navy Staff, and the CNO. Our
criterion for success is insight into military conflict of such accuracy and pene-
tration that current and future leaders can say of their own circumstances, as did
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz at the end of World War II, “The war with Japan had
been re-enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people, and in
so many different ways, [with the exception of kamikaze tactics] nothing that
happened during the war was a surprise.”
I will keep you informed as we conduct our internal reviews and as we
sharpen the focus of our activity and accelerate our advantages. I am thrilled to
be aboard, to be associated with this nation’s preeminent national security fac-
ulty, and to be on the bridge at such a vital moment for our College and the Navy.
I am certain we are up to the task.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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TERRORISM AND THE NEW SECURITY DILEMMA
Philip G. Cerny
Since 11 September 2001, the primary focus of American foreign policy has os-tensibly been the “war on terror,” although the George W. Bush administra-
tion has also given priority to other objectives, such as Iraq and national missile
defense. This emphasis on the threat of terrorism is extremely valuable for ana-
lytical purposes, because it draws attention to key aspects of security today—in
particular the central paradox of how to deal with the increasingly diffuse char-
acter of threats with the means available to state actors, in what is still to a large
extent an interstate system. There are at least two aspects to this problematic.
The first is assessing the appropriate or most effective role of states and great
powers in reacting to and dealing with terrorism and other direct forms of vio-
lence. The second is the relationship of contemporary forms of violence to wider
social, economic, and political issues characteristic of the twenty-first century—
issues that themselves are becoming increasingly transnationalized and
globalized.
GLOBALIZATION AND INSECURITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
With regard to responding to threats of terrorist violence, on the one hand, ter-
rorism is portrayed as a phenomenon unlike previous generalized threats. Al-
though specific instances of terrorism in history are legion, they have been
sporadic and geographically circumscribed. However, terrorism, like other secu-
rity issues, has in the twenty-first century become a more and more transna-
tional form of violence or warfare. Today it involves networks and patterns of
violence that do not resemble the kind of “international” warfare among states
that has dominated the international system since the seventeenth century. In
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particular, the quasi-random targeting of civilians rather than military forces is
widely seen as a fundamental, bottom-line element of the very definition of terror-
ism.1 The development of terrorism as a cross-border, nonstate, network-based
phenomenon goes contrary to the general perception in “realist” international rela-
tions analysis that the most significant threats to international security come from
states rather than from nonstate actors. On the other hand, American policy makers
today still see terrorism as depending crucially on states for its spread and impact—
a perspective that fits with realist preconceptions and is seen to call for traditional
national, great power–based military responses. As a recent authoritative analysis
of contemporary American foreign policy has argued, the “link between terror-
ist organizations and state sponsors became the ‘principal strategic thought under-
lying our strategy in the war on terrorism,’ according to Douglas Feith, the
third-ranking official in the Pentagon.” Thus “while terrorists might be de-
scribed as ‘stateless,’ they ultimately depended on regimes like the Taliban [in
Afghanistan] to operate.”2
At the same time, the underlying causes and principal motives of terrorist vi-
olence are framed by the identification by American policy makers of terrorists
themselves as “evil,” motivated only or primarily by a hatred of freedom and of
America’s role in spreading freedom.3 Its state sponsors are seen to form an “axis
of evil” and to have become the chief threats to world order. Therefore the un-
derlying structure of the threat that terrorism embodies for international secu-
rity is believed by key policy makers in the Bush administration to be
fundamentally mediated through and determined by the structure and dynam-
ics of the states system. Indeed, the “hegemonists” (as they have been called) in
the Bush administration have integrated terrorism into a state-centric view of
international relations and have prescribed unilateral, state-based American
leadership as the appropriate response.4
In contrast, this article argues that terrorism is merely one dimension of a
wider phenomenon that is transforming the international system and domestic
politics too around the world—neomedievalism, a phenomenon that is leading
to the emergence of a new security dilemma in world politics. Both of these con-
cepts will be specified in more detail later in this article. However, broadly speak-
ing, neomedievalism means that we are increasingly in the presence of a
plurality of overlapping, competing, and intersecting power structures—insti-
tutions, political processes, economic developments, and social transforma-
tions—above, below, and cutting across states and the states system. States today
represent only one level of this power structure, becoming more diffuse, inter-
nally split, and enmeshed in wider complex webs of power. This structure is fluid
and fungible, feeding back and undergoing continual adjustments and ad hoc
responses to a rapidly changing environment. In this context, the definition of
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what is a “security” issue is also becoming more and more fluid and fungible—
including the dislocations caused by economic development; the destabilizing
effect of transitions to democracy; the undermining of traditional cultures, be-
liefs, and loyalties; threats to the environmental and public health; and the like.5
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries experienced similar challenges, and
these led to two world wars and the Cold War; however, the economic and politi-
cal environment of that time actually strengthened the central role of nation-
states and of the states system as the main providers of security. Today, they are
making this role more and more problematic.
This transformation in turn gives rise to what I have called the “New Security
Dilemma.”6 The idea behind the New Security Dilemma is that states are increas-
ingly cut across and hedged around by a range of complex new structural develop-
ments and sociopolitical forces that, taken together, are leading to the
crystallization of a globalizing world order—more correctly, a “durable disor-
der”—that in crucial ways looks more like the order of late medieval society than
like the world of “mod-
ern” nation-states.7 As an-
alysts have pointed out,
many recent international
relations theorists have
argued that globalization,
“the growing economic, political, and social interconnectedness of nations that
had resulted from increased trade and financial ties and the rapid advance in com-
munications technology . . . was undercutting the authority of individual states,
with power flowing to nonstate actors such as private corporations and transna-
tional activist groups.” However, “Bush and his advisors would have none of it.”8
This article argues the converse, that the core problems of security in the
twenty-first-century world profoundly reflect these globalizing and
transnationalizing trends—and their underlying social, political, and economic
causes—and that they can be addressed only by reassessing fundamental no-
tions of security. In particular, there has been a clear shift in the dominant form
of violence and conflict from one characterized by interstate wars to one in
which civil wars, cross-border wars, and “low intensity” or guerrilla-type wars—
including terrorism—increasingly predominate and proliferate.9 Of course,
civil and cross-border wars are nothing new, and terrorism has been with us
throughout human history.10 However, their interconnectedness and the way
they are inextricably intertwined with other aspects of globalization—link-
ages that cut across states and crystallize below the level of states—is the key to
understanding the nature of contemporary security and insecurity.11 Terrorism
reflects deeper and wider structural changes. In this sense, a war on terror
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A new sense of generalized insecurity has emerged,
reflecting the fact that the provision of security itself
as a public good can no longer be guaranteed by the
states system.
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:20 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
17
War College: Winter 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
cannot be a simple war of armed forces but must be a sociopolitical process.
Rather than a “war on terror,” what is needed is to transform security itself, to
make it less like war and more like what the social theorist Michel Foucault,
writing in the tradition of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century social philoso-
phy, called “police”—not merely policing in the sense of countering violence
and imposing order but pursuing a civilianization of politics and society, stress-
ing social development, welfare, and good governance.12
This interconnectedness, of course, reflects not only transnational economic
interdependence, usually seen to be the root of globalization, but also a wide
range of other related social and political developments. New information and
communication technologies have intensified pressures resulting from the in-
teraction of previously nationally compartmentalized social and cultural cate-
gories, with an emphasis on the sheer speed of that interaction.13 The
development of Marshall McLuhan’s “global village” has been paralleled—or,
for some, superseded—by a postmodernist fragmentation of cultures and soci-
eties.14 In political terms, the reidentification of societies as “multicultural,” em-
phasizing shifting identities and loyalties, is unraveling the consolidation of
national culture societies that was at the heart of the modern nation-state proj-
ect from Bismarck’s Kulturkampf to postcolonial “nation-building.”15 Many
major social causes and “cause” pressure groups, such as nongovernmental or-
ganizations, as well as sectoral interest groups, are becoming less concerned with
negotiating direct benefits from the state and more focused on such crosscutting
transnational issues as the environment, women’s issues, land mines, political
prisoners, sustainable development, and the like.16 Furthermore, the end of the
Cold War unleashed a huge number of social and political grievances that had
previously been kept in ideological and political check through direct or indirect
superpower control.
National-territorial institutions—states—are thus being overlaid, crosscut,
and challenged by a range of less institutionally bound issues, demands, and
groups, bridging the micro level, the meso (intermediate) level, and the transna-
tional in ways the state cannot. In this context, those who believe that any one
nation-state—even one like the United States that possesses several times the
military capabilities of other major powers, let alone minor ones—is in a posi-
tion unilaterally to provide security as a public good to the global system as a
whole are living in cloud-cuckoo-land. Hegemony is not a feasible goal reflect-
ing the realities of the twenty-first century but an attempt to reconstruct the his-
tory of the 1950s without the Soviet Union. In a neomedieval world, more
complex political, economic, and social approaches are required to fill the basic
security gap that results from the multilayered, crosscutting, and asymmetric
global and transnational structures of the third millennium.
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THE NEW SECURITY DILEMMA
The central dynamic mechanism of stabilization and ordering in the traditional
realist states system has been called the “security dilemma.”17 This was the notion
that perceived external threats generate feelings of insecurity in states that be-
lieve themselves to be the targets of such threats, and that these states take mea-
sures to counteract those threats (alliances, arms buildups, etc.). These
countermeasures are in turn perceived as threatening by other states, leading to
feedback in the form of counter-countermeasures, eventually undermining ex-
isting balances of power and creating a vicious circle of ever-increasing insecu-
rity among states. The notion of the “arms race” is the best-known paradigm
case of how the traditional security dilemma works. As occurred at the outbreak
of World War I, this process can get out of hand.
But the traditional security dilemma is also what links order and change in
the realist approach. Only by creating and recreating balances of power—
whether through war, development and manipulation of power resources, or
politically effective (strong-willed) foreign policy—can this tendency to system
breakdown be counteracted and stabilized, at least for long periods, periods usu-
ally punctuated by system-rebalancing wars. The breakdown of one balance of
power must be replaced by another if conflict is to be minimized. Such an analy-
sis has been at the heart of both classical realism and neorealism.18 But that dy-
namic does not work in the same way, if at all, in a more transnationally
interconnected world. Changes in the character of the security dilemma since
the end of the Cold War have not resulted simply from the breakdown of one
particular balance of power—that is, of the bipolar balance between United
States and the Soviet Union. Rather, recent changes profoundly reflect the in-
creasing ineffectiveness of interstate balances of power as such to regulate the in-
ternational system.
The failure of large powers in the 1970s and 1980s to determine outcomes in
the Third World through traditional security means—the most salient examples
being Vietnam for the United States and the Sino-Soviet split (and later Angola
and Afghanistan) for the Soviet Union—was the first major shock to the balance-
of-power system itself. The later demise of the Soviet Union did not result just
from change in its relative overall power position vis-à-vis the United States.
More accurately, the USSR collapsed because of the evolving configuration and
interaction of both domestic and transnational pressures stemming from its
technological backwardness, international economic interdependence, aware-
ness of social and cultural alternatives by individuals and groups made possible
by international contacts and communications, the growth of consumerism and
other pressures for “modernization,” etc.—with all of which the Soviet Union
was less and less able to cope in a more interconnected world. Likewise, growing
C E R N Y 1 5
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complex interdependence in the West undermined the hierarchical alliance
structures set up in the postwar period by the United States—for example, with
the development of Gaullism in France.19 Paradoxically, both superpowers be-
came weaker in systemic terms, because traditional forms of power could not
cope with the globalizing challenges of the late-twentieth-century international
order.
Those challenges were and are particularly stark in the security arena. The
lack of utility not only of nuclear weapons, increasingly seen as unthinkable and
unusable, but also of limited, low-intensity (guerrilla) warfare—more and more
costly and counterproductive for the big powers, as demonstrated in Vietnam
and Afghanistan—means now that neither national nor collective security can
any longer be reliably based on balances of power among nation-states, and
great powers in particular, per se. A new sense of generalized insecurity has
emerged, represented not only “from above,” by the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction but also “from below,” by the rise of civil wars,
tribal and religious conflicts, terrorism, civil violence in developed countries,
the international drugs trade, etc. This sense of insecurity reflects the fact that
the provision of security itself as a public good—the very raison d’être of the
states system—can no longer be guaranteed by that system.
In the New Security Dilemma, a new range of incentives is emerging for play-
ers—especially nonstate actors but some state actors too—to opt out of the states
system itself, unless restrained from doing so by the as yet embryonic constraints
of complex, especially economic, interdependence. The costs to remaining states
are rising dramatically, as globalization increasingly enmeshes actors—and
states—in complex, crosscutting webs of wealth, power, and social relationships.
Indeed, to hijack the language of neorealist international relations theory, states
are not concerned primarily with “relative gains,” their place as states in the in-
ternational pecking order vis-à-vis other states, but increasingly (thanks to the
revolution of rising expectations linked with globalization) with “absolute
gains”—better standards of living, individual security, human dignity, and the
ability to participate freely in social life. These expectations are undermined by
war and by the imperatives of national military organization.
International relations are therefore no longer dominated by holistic, indivis-
ible national interests and collective fears for national survival but rather by di-
visible benefits pursued by pluralistic, often cross-national networks of
individuals and groups, whether peaceful, as in the context of “global civil soci-
ety,” or violent, as in the case of terrorism. In an inversion of the famous quo-
tation from President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address—“And so,
my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you
can do for your country”—people are less and less satisfied with what their
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countries can do for them. They are finding more and more alternative forms of
identity and action—from the Internet to links with diasporas and “global
tribes,” from anti-globalization protests to religious fundamentalism, and from
“epistemic communities” to terrorist networks.20
This situation has led not only to the rise of new actors and forces below and
cutting across the level of the state but also to attempts to reinforce and rebuild
state power and the interstate system, in futile attempts to turn back the clock.
One manifestation of the latter is the U.S. attempt to counteract terrorism
through a more focused
and vigorous applica-
tion of military force, as
exemplified by the Bush
administration and the
long-contemplated war
in Iraq.21 A contrasting manifestation, however, is the attempt by some Euro-
pean states, especially France and Germany, to emphasize multilateral rather
than unilateral power balancing, especially through the United Nations. Both of
these responses essentially involve a process of “catch-up,” lagging the develop-
ment of micro- and meso-level processes and therefore highly vulnerable to “de-
fection,” as the game theorists say—to players quitting the game and heading off
on their own. The postwar situation in Iraq abounds with examples of these pro-
cesses in action, as fragmented groups with contradictory aims create insecurity
for both the occupying powers and ordinary Iraqis, and as international alli-
ances shift around reconstruction contracts, potential peacekeeping participa-
tion, the role of the American-supported interim government, etc. Cases in
point include the 2004 elections in Spain and the emergence of the war in Iraq as
the most contentious issue in the 2004 American presidential election
campaign.
Perhaps most importantly, attempts to provide international and domestic
security through the state and the states system—especially the U.S. attempt to
use its power to regulate and control that system unilaterally—are becoming in-
creasingly dysfunctional. They create severe and diverse backlashes at local,
transnational, and hegemonic levels, backlashes that further weaken states and
undermine wider security. Terrorism, the most extreme example of such a back-
lash, often actually gains sympathy, adherents, and momentum from the at-
tempts of states to repress it.
Furthermore, these backlashes do not develop in a vacuum. They interact
with economic and social processes of complex globalization to create overlap-
ping and competing cross-border networks of power, shifting loyalties and iden-
tities, and new sources of endemic low-level conflict—the “durable disorder”
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mentioned earlier. Indeed, the notion of a vicious circle inherent in the tradi-
tional security dilemma is transposed into the New Security Dilemma, but at an
entirely different level. To begin with, attempts to address insecurities through
traditional forms of state power, especially hegemony, create further insecurities
that provoke backlashes. These backlashes in turn draw both states and nonstate
actors farther into the quagmires of ethnic and religious conflict, warlordism,
and tribalism, ineffective or collapsed states, and ever-increasing calls on mili-
tary, political, and economic resources. Such responses simply provoke further
resentment, frustration, and hopelessness, and breed endemic low-level conflict.
Supposedly hegemonic powers are thus sucked into a widening security gap of
their own making.
THE NEOMEDIEVAL SCENARIO
In order to understand the overall pattern and direction of these changes, it can
be heuristically useful to reframe the problem through an unusual but sugges-
tive historical analogy, an analogy that paints a wider picture. In this case, we
start from the assertion that nation-states are simply not what they used to be.
Rather than being able to make certain kinds of domestic public policy in ways
that are insulated from “external” constraints and to support commonly held
social values through centralized institutions—what neorealist theorists think
of as the essential “hierarchical” character of the state—nation-state-based in-
stitutions and processes are increasingly being transformed into transmission
belts and enforcement mechanisms for outcomes arrived at on myriad diverse
levels across the wider global system. The line between the “inside” and the “out-
side” is increasingly blurred structurally and transgressed by all sorts of actors.
At the same time, however, this global system is itself becoming more and more
institutionally diverse and complex, characterized by attributes that echo fea-
tures of a world apparently lost since the decay of feudalism and the early rise of
the nation-state in the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries.
Today we live in an era of increasing speed, global scale, and the extremely
rapid diffusion of information and technological innovation—characteristics
that seem to be outgrowing the political capacities of the existing institutional
order, just as analogous long-term trends outgrew the old order of the Middle
Ages.22 In an exercise of what is generally called “neomedievalism,” we will be
looking here at various widely noted features of the medieval world, especially
the late medieval world, in order to draw lessons for the present. These features
include:
• Competing institutions with overlapping jurisdictions (states, regimes,
transgovernmental networks, private interest governments, etc.)
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• More fluid territorial boundaries (both within and across states) and a lack
of exogenous territorializing pressures
• The uneven consolidation of spaces, cleavages, conflicts, and inequalities,
including both unevenly developing new spaces and the fragmentation of
old spaces
• Multiple or fragmented loyalties and identities
• The spread of what have been called “zones grises,” gray zones, geographical
areas and social contexts where the rule of law does not run.23
Neomedievalism as a concept is notable primarily for its metaphorical value.
In contrast to “modern” notions of statehood or sovereignty, medieval societies
were characterized by multiple, overlapping hierarchies and institutions; their
structures were multilayered and asymmetric, involving diverse types of author-
ity and social bonds, competing with each other within the same broad and gen-
erally ill-defined territorial expanse. As such societies expanded, they
increasingly interacted, intersected, and overlapped. In many ways they were
victims of their own success, as feudalism led over time to tremendous eco-
nomic growth and social development. Smaller units like village and tribal/clan
societies, unless highly isolated, were drawn into wider systems of competing
landlord/warlord relationships, in which layers of hierarchy were permeable and
territorial frontiers fluid; these were in turn pulled into wider monarchical and
imperial systems, ranging from coherent, quasi-confederal empires to tributary
and suzerain systems with little social unity from below. Religious hierarchies
frequently crosscut such systems in complex ways; trade routes and fairs sus-
tained a limited market economy, usually on the margins but with growing
structural impact; and cities increasingly provided havens for groups that found
themselves either on the periphery of, or able relatively easily to navigate across,
the complex inner boundaries (and often external frontiers too) of the
premodern world. Communications and transport systems obviously consti-
tuted a key set of technological constraints and opportunities within which such
societies could evolve.24
Although the emergence of modern nation-states—and the states system—
from this milieu was a complex (and today controversial) matter, that process
was always far more than a mere shift from fluid, overlapping structures to rigid
hierarchies inside and anarchy outside, as neorealist theory would have it. In
contrast, national economies themselves evolved in the context of growing
trade, an increasing global division of labor, and the spread of international
markets for commodities and finance;25 national societies provided the breeding
ground for both the secular Enlightenment and the spread of modern
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universalistic religions; and the emergence of the modern state gave rise to dif-
ferent yet analogous political systems based on bureaucratic rationality, eco-
nomic modernization, and indeed, competition among themselves, both
economic and military.26 The states system is by no means therefore the antithesis
of globalization but its precursor and progenitor. States—and the interstate sys-
tem—have created the very conditions for their obsolescence or transcendence
in an interdependent, crosscutting international and transnational system. The
main problem is, of course, that the very success of the state as an embedded in-
stitutional structure is also its prison. The nation-state both creates and under-
pins globalization processes, on the one hand, and prevents those processes
from effectively rearticulating governance at a “higher” level, on the other.27
In this context, states are losing their capacity to provide the public good of
security, while collective governance institutions have a long way to go before
they can develop that capacity. Several features of today’s neomedieval world
feed into this basic security deficit.
Multiple Competing Institutions
The first—and most important—characteristic of the medieval system, already
mentioned, was that of competing institutions with overlapping jurisdictions.
The early (or pre-) medieval order in Europe, often called the Dark Ages, was a
period of extreme localism. Roman-era trade routes were abandoned, imperial
legal norms forgotten, and political power fragmented and diffused. Village and
local societies exchanged obeisance and sharecropping in return for military
protection from relatively localized predators, giving rise to overlapping claims
to power and territorial lordship. These arrangements nevertheless laid the
groundwork for a basic social stability that enabled economic production to ex-
pand, trade routes and cities to grow, and political and legal institutions to de-
velop at different levels.
The Roman Catholic Church developed an extensive, complex hierarchy to
monitor and control its vast lands and activities, giving it a certain overarching
authority that often conflicted with regional and local power centers. As more
surplus goods came to be produced, expropriated, and exchanged, merchants,
financiers, artisans, and laborers created guilds and urban corporations, which
interacted with preexisting hierarchies. Territorial frontiers were overlapping
and ill defined, giving rise to endemic low-level warfare over land and other re-
sources, although the outcomes of such warfare increasingly created precedents
of control that crystallized into more formal boundaries over time. The pyramid
of wealth and control steepened, and the competing dynastic monarchies claim-
ing to inhabit the apex consolidated; significant sectors of the feudal economy
(urban production, moneylending and finance, long-distance trade, etc.) grew
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in autonomy and interdependence; and military and taxation bureaucracies be-
came institutionalized. In these ways the stage was set for the nation-state to
emerge from the creative destruction of the warfare of the fifteenth through sev-
enteenth centuries.28 The feudal nobility did not lose its power and wealth;
rather, it was absorbed into the system.29 These changes enabled more militarily,
bureaucratically, socially, and economically organized nation-states to develop.
Today, this process of state consolidation is being, if not actually reversed, at
least significantly modified and reshaped. Overlapping and competing jurisdic-
tions and socioeconomic arrangements are creating a world that looks more and
more like a medieval one. In the first place, states themselves are being trans-
formed into structures that will be better able to survive in a multilayered/
multitiered global context, that of the “competition state.”30 Monitoring and
regulating economic activities are likely to differ from sector to sector, depend-
ing upon the scope and scale of the microeconomic and mesoeconomic char-
acteristics of each sector—especially its degree of transnationalization—with
the effective purview of states limited to those sectors the organization of
which structurally corresponds to the requirements of effective promotion,
monitoring, and control at a national/territorial level.31 Nation-states will
probably look more like American states within the U.S. federal system—with
circumscribed remits but important residual policy instruments and the ability
to exploit niches in the wider system through limited taxation and regulation.
They will be analogous to what have been called “postfeudal residual aristocra-
cies” in a more and more globally integrated capitalist environment, focusing on
what is good for their own domestic estates—the benefits of globalization—
while seeking not to lose too much power and prestige to the nouveaux riches or
transnational elites and new transgovernmental bureaucracies of the global
economy.32
Further, in the international political economy, transnational regimes, new
forms of private economic organization, transnational strategic alliances, and
the globalization of financial markets are forcing a convergence and homogeni-
zation of the rules, procedures, and outcomes of public policy formulation and
of implementation across borders.33 In addition to transnational interest group
formation and the development of transgovernmental coalitions bringing regu-
lators and policy makers in overlapping spheres into regular networks that cut
across “splintered states,” this rapid but asymmetric multilayering of political
and economic institutions is leading to the emergence of quasi-public,
quasi-private dispute-settlement regimes seeking to arbitrate competing claims
for rights and privileges—the core of what has been called the “privatization of
governance.”34
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Probably the most consensual and homogenizing dimension of globalization
is the spread of Western, capitalist conceptions of property rights at both na-
tional and international levels. However, as has been argued, the lack of effective
private-property-rights regimes in developing countries not only undermines
their endogenous development but condemns those countries to continued
predatory impositions by transnational economic actors, especially where the
latter are allied to local and state elites.35 In addition, it could be said that with
regard to intellectual property rights in particular, capitalist society developed
despite rather than because of the existence of an intellectual-property-
rights regime, as the result of diffusion of ideas treated as public goods. If a
strict intellectual-property-rights regime were to be constructed, it might
actually prevent such diffusion in the future, leading to a new form of “enclo-
sure” that would reinforce other social, economic, and political asymme-
tries in a neomedieval world.36
Therefore, the fact that the state is increasingly enmeshed in crosscutting
economic, social, political, and indeed “transgovernmental” webs (where state
actors are exposed to transnational pressures and linked into transnational net-
works) and that a range of complex, asymmetric, crosscutting authoritative in-
stitutions are being created or adapted to operate in a globalizing world are, in
combination, leading to the crystallization of a global quasi-order that looks
more like the medieval world than the “modern” nation-state system of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even in the security area—the “bot-
tom line” of the modern nation-state—the intersection of economic globaliza-
tion, multiculturalism, proliferation of multilevel institutions, and the like, on
the one hand, and the fragmentation of techniques, tactics, and strategies of
warfare along the lines of low-intensity wars, civil wars, terrorism, and the “rev-
olution in military affairs,” on the other, looks more like the fragmented, multi-
level warfare of the Middle Ages than like the “total wars” of the first half of the
twentieth century. Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is the continuation of politics
by other means” refers today less to the clashes of nation-states than to the
clashes of so many different social, economic, and political forces under, over,
and cutting across the nation-state level and increasingly defecting from the
states system itself.37
Fluid Boundaries and the Lack of Exogenous Territorializing Pressures
The main causal factor missing from this process today, one that was neverthe-
less crucial for the transition from feudalism to the nation-state, is that of exoge-
nous systemic competition. Embryonic nation-states in the late and post-feudal
periods consolidated domestically to a large extent because they continually
clashed with other—comparable—pretenders to stateness, national wealth, and
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autonomy. The institutionalization of competition and conflict between and
among increasingly powerful European dynastic families in the late medieval
period led to the expansion of state bureaucracies and their growing penetration
into more and more exclusively territorialized—national—social and economic
bases. However, just as the Chinese Empire, in Paul Kennedy’s analysis, stag-
nated because it experienced no fundamental external threat for many centuries,
so today’s neomedieval international order faces no direct exogenous political
or military pressures for institutional consolidation at a global or transnational
level—unless something like a Martian invasion occurs, of course.38 The United
Nations, for example, has no external enemy to fight and therefore no way of
turning a potential outside threat into a question of survival—a situation that
constrains its capacity to institutionalize “collective security.” Thus an increas-
ingly dense, multilayered, and asymmetric set of competing institutions with
overlapping jurisdictions—including and enmeshing, not breaking up, the re-
sidual nation-state—will stumble on, untroubled by exogenous pressures to
consolidate.
In this context, nation-states will find—weaker states first, stronger states
later on—that their territorial and authoritative boundaries will effectively be-
come more fluid. Of course, legal sovereignty is not formally threatened, state
borders still appear as real lines on the map, and guarantees of diplomatic recog-
nition and of membership in certain international institutions remain. Substate
ethnic and separatist movements, however, increasingly threaten the cohesion
of collapsing states (like Lebanon and Somalia), “transnational territories”
(such as those unevenly controlled until recently by the National Patriotic Front
of Liberia), and so-called archipelago states like the former Zaire (now the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo),
at the same time that such
states cling to existing bor-
ders for dear life, in the
name of elite legitimacy and
continued control.39 Iraq in mid-2004 is an excellent example, where ethnic ri-
valries have led some actors—and even Western analysts—to call for the
breakup of the country into Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish states, yet all three groups
are aware that such a development would reduce their overall power both inter-
nally and externally. Therefore it is unlikely that the actual breakup of nation-
states per se will be as significant a development as the exogenous and endogenous
differentiation of their authority, as discussed above—especially for the older
and wealthier nation-states of the North. Nevertheless, centrifugal pressures on
“empire-states” like Russia and China are likely to grow in importance as the
penetration of crosscutting sectoral and market pressures expands within those
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territories and as groups like Chechens and Uighurs develop a sense of being
collective players in the wider game.40
At another level, the emergence of international or transnational regions is
playing an increasing role in territorial organization. However, what is most in-
teresting about these regions is not their institutional coherence or supra-
statelike structural form; indeed, the European Union is the only region with
that sort of quasi-state coherence (although even that is in doubt, with the re-
cent travails of the proposed European Constitution). What is most interesting
is that regions are themselves multilevel, asymmetric entities, with crisscrossing
internal fault lines—subregions, cross-border regions, local regions, not merely
“nested” but often conflicting, with national, transnational, and subnational ri-
valries poorly integrated—based mainly on the density of transactions that in
turn reflect the complexity and circularity of wider globalization processes.41 It
is the diversity of their internal structures and external linkages that is most
striking, not their similarity. The recent trend toward developing the concept of
“multilevel governance” simply reveals the complexity and variance inherent in
regional projects.
Finally, the main significance of the recent war in Iraq in this context is the
fact that it long formed a crucial part of a project to counteract the kind of
fissiparousness associated with globalization by militarily ratcheting up the
United States into a hegemonic empire. On the one hand, despite overwhelming
U.S. military spending and force levels—including the various technological de-
velopments usually brought together under the rubric of the “revolution in mili-
tary affairs”—a number of problems stemming from the attempt to build new
domestic structures in collapsed or defeated states, such as Somalia in 1992–93
and contemporary Afghanistan, imply the need for a strategy of reconstruction
that can only be ongoing, interventionist, and well organized.42 Other nation-
states, although increasingly enmeshed in various global and transnational eco-
nomic and social webs, are unlikely simply to cede the hegemonic ground to the
United States and will increasingly seek to counterbalance American power, es-
pecially by other means.
Probably the most interesting potential aspect of such behavior is that it will
not necessarily take the form of specifically military balancing, although there
will be a certain new willingness to reverse the decline of military establishments
in Europe, Russia, etc. Rather, we are witnessing the revival of an old idea from
the 1960s, that of the emergence of a whole new category, the “civilian super-
power,” the strength of which comes from its economy and from the political
clout that its economy brings.43 The European Union has never aspired to be a
military superpower, although military cooperation is increasing. Ameri-
can hegemonic pretensions are likely not so much to provoke further European
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military consolidation as to accelerate attempts to develop and expand Europe’s
“civilian” influence on world affairs—an influence that is likely to be far more at-
tractive in other parts of the world, too, when it comes to creating alliances and
below-the-state networks of influence. Finally, international institutions such as
the United Nations, the various international economic institutions like the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and political processes such as
G-8 meetings and trade negotiations—often lumped together under the rubric
of “global governance”—are likely to have been sidelined only temporarily by
the war in Iraq.44
The Uneven Consolidation of New Spaces, Borders, Cleavages,
Conflicts, and Inequalities
The main structural fault lines—political, social, and economic—in this com-
plex world reflect not clear territorial boundaries enclosing hierarchical author-
ity structures but rather new distinctions between different levels of economic
cleavage and urban/rural splits. The academic literature on global cities, for ex-
ample, reflects the concept that a range of “virtual spaces” in the global political
economy will increasingly overlap with, and possibly even replace, the “real”
space of traditional geographical/topological territories, in a process that has
been called “denationalization.”45 These new spaces are embodied—and in-
creasingly embedded—in transaction flows, infrastructural nodes of communi-
cations and information technology, corporate headquarters, “edge city” living
complexes for “symbolic analysts,” increasingly “dematerialized” financial mar-
kets, and cultural and media centers of activity (and identity).46 According to
Christopher May, control of new ideas and innovations will come to be increas-
ingly concentrated in such areas, protected and secured by a growing panoply of
international and transnational intellectual property rights.47
The specific spaces that people perceive and identify with are likely to become
increasingly localized or micro-level in structure—in the Middle Ages, space
was highly localized, of course. People may even lose their very perception of
space as partitioned vertically and learn over time to “navigate” between differ-
ent overlapping, asymmetric layers of spatial perception and organization, in a
process of “fragmegration”—a dialectic of fragmentation and integration.48
On the one hand, there will be continual fragmentation of old spaces, in a
process that will be both asymmetrical and episodic, giving rise to newly en-
trenched spatial inequalities. The poorer residents of such areas will find them-
selves increasingly excluded from decision-making processes. In areas where
navigation among complex structural layers is more difficult—for example,
where such nodes, infrastructure, activities, etc., do not exist within easy reach
or perception, such as across large geographical spaces—many people will
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simply be “out of the loop,” country bumpkins or even roaming, deprived bands,
“primitive rebels.”49 Consider contemporary Albania or, more starkly, Somalia
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where those people mobile enough to
escape the hinterland are forced once again to become predators or supplicants,
this time in the cities, as in the Middle Ages.
On the other hand, there may emerge new levels of social organization that
combine social identity and solidarity, common economic interests, and embry-
onic political organization—what have been called “spheres of authority.”50
However, it is unclear whether these spheres will be relatively consistent and
uniform entities, on the one hand, or highly irregular, uneven, ad hoc political
spaces, on the other. It is unclear even if they will be large and well enough orga-
nized to be effective—that is, whether they will enjoy sufficient economies of
scale to pursue effectively common interests or provide public goods. Evidence
seems to point to the increasing ineffectiveness of such entities in the face of
global and transnational pressures and structural trends, although the interac-
tion of such new spaces with each other and with older structures of governance
may serve to regularize them somewhat.
Both of these trends are likely to alter the way economic interests are articu-
lated and aggregated. Changes in institutions, the fluidity of territorial bound-
aries, and the increasing hegemony of global cities will interact with new forms
of “flexible” labor processes and economic organization to increase inequalities
and turn downwardly mobile workers (especially the less skilled, the ghetto
dwellers, etc.) into a new Lumpenproletariat, underclass, or subcaste—a process
well under way in the First World and already dominant today in large parts of
the Third World. In this context, it will not be primarily ethnic loyalties and
tribal enmities that will undermine the community represented by the nation-
state, although they have so far been the leading edge of cultural fragmentation.
It will be the development of complex new inequalities of both real class and vir-
tual geography. Such inequalities will be far more difficult to counterbalance
and neutralize without effective or legitimate state institutions, and, especially
when they are allied to other cleavages, they are likely to constitute an increasing
source of civil and cross-border violence.
Fragmented Identities
Such a situation will not merely be one of fragmentation but one of multiple loy-
alties and identities.51 As in the Middle Ages, occupational solidarity, economic
class, religious or ethnic group, ideological preference, national or cosmopolitan
values, loyalty to or identity with family, local area, region, etc., will no longer be
so easily subsumed in holistic images or collective identities. Indeed, a
neomedieval world will be one of social and political schizophrenia, with
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shifting patchwork boundaries and postmodern cultural images. National iden-
tities are likely to become increasingly empty rituals, divorced from real legiti-
macy, “system affect,” or even instrumental loyalty.52
On the other hand, the question of how such multiple identities can coexist in
a stable fashion has led some observers to attempt to develop analogies for the
unifying ideological and cultural role of the Roman Catholic Church in the
Middle Ages. These writers have attempted to identify possible successors to this
role in a neomedieval world—perhaps New Age philosophy or the environmen-
tal movement. However, any truly global cultural identity structure will have to
be not homogeneous or unifying but intrinsically multilayered and amorphous.
Paradoxically, however, this shapeless postmodernity gives identity increased
flexibility and resilience in a globalizing world, a chameleon-like adaptability to
a wide range of differentiated contexts. Identities are not overarching and
global—in the way, for example, that ecologists refer to “the planet,” or gaia—
but, like the institutions and spaces discussed earlier, seem increasingly to take a
variety of different, often conflicting, forms. Identity and a sense of belonging
have been identified throughout human history as crucial to coherent social
bonds and therefore to political stability and effectiveness. As General Charles
de Gaulle wrote in 1934, “Human passions, insofar as they remain diffused, real-
ize nothing ordered, nor in consequence effective. It is necessary that they be
crystallized in well-defined circumscriptions.”53 This implies a continual search
for identity, not a mere postmodernist fragmentation but concrete attempts to
restore old identities and to construct new ones. At one extreme, small-scale ter-
ritorially based communities seek to break away from superimposed nation-
state identities to insulate themselves and their ways of life from global trends;
the peasants of Chiapas in southern Mexico, for all their use of international rev-
olutionary slogans and images, correspond to this category (about which more
below).
At another level, non–territorially based groups, especially widespread ethnic
and religious groups, may organize in order to control territories of their own;
these irredentist elements range from national liberation movements to those
who claim the same historic territory, such as Palestinians and Israelis, or
Bosnians of different ethnic persuasions. They may also expand to form a trans-
national movement intended to extraterritorialize their very identities. Terrorist
groups usually involve some admixture of both of these characteristics, with
both a territorial base (e.g., Afghanistan under the Taliban) and an extraterrito-
rial database with extensive network connections (the original meaning of
“al-Qa‘ida”). However, there is also an increasing rediscovery of extensive
cosmopolitan connections. One scholar perceives a historical spread around
the world of “global tribes”—the Jewish diaspora, the British Empire and the
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Anglo-Saxon legacy, the overseas Chinese, the Japanese, today’s Indian diaspora,
Latinos, and many others—all on the “road to Cosmopolis.”54 Others write in
neo-Marxist terms of “transnational classes” and a newly embedded transna-
tional hegemony of capital.55 In this process of identity “fragmegration,” the
sociocultural face of a globalizing world looks very different from that of in-
creasingly crystallized “national culture societies” of the nation-state era and
more like a neomedieval one.56
The Spread of “Zones Grises”
Finally, in a neomedieval world, there will not only be “niches” for the mainte-
nance of pluralist autonomy for individuals and groups to organize into
Rosenau’s spheres of authority or to pursue policy goals at multiple levels of gov-
ernance, but there will also be increased escape routes—and organizational op-
portunities—for those operating more or less “outside the law.” Exit from
political society is likely to become a more viable option for a wider range of
actors and activities. At one level, such phenomena involve more than just inter-
national (and domestic) criminal activities like the drug trade or the (semi-
transnational) Russian mafia; they also involve the areas where excluded people
live—especially urban ghettoes, at one geographical extreme, and enclaves in in-
accessible areas (jungle, mountains, etc.), as noted earlier. Indeed, the toughest
problem in this area is the intersection of different dimensions of extralegal ac-
tivities with legal or quasi-legal ones. For example, the resources and networks
of the drug trade not only create alternative power structures and social identi-
ties for members of the underclass physically located in ghettoes but extend into
state bureaucracies and “legitimate” private firms, as mafias have always
done. Another such gray zone arises from the inevitable constitutional con-
flicts created by the assertion of indigenous rights over what is legitimately
local and what legitimately supralocal (provincial, national, regional, etc.), as in
Chiapas.57
At another level, however, it is likely that many traditionally mainstream so-
cial and economic activities will expand as much through gray zones as through
legitimate means, much as the so-called black economy has done in many parts
of the world during the modern era. A transnationalized “black” economy con-
stitutes a major challenge to the enforcement function of the competition state,
and the inclusion or integration of such areas and activities into the complex
governance structures of a globalizing world is likely to be extremely uneven. At
a third level is a specifically security-based dimension of this phenomenon that
cuts across borders and regions too—shifting the focus and locus of conflict and
violence even farther away from the interstate pattern and toward the intracta-
ble complexities of the micro and meso levels.58 The New Security Dilemma
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means that as the reliability of interstate balances of power declines and as alter-
native possibilities for global and transnational security are found wanting—
that is, as the security deficit grows—the growth of “insecurity from below” cre-
ates conditions in which increasingly intractable and complex civil and
cross-border wars will become the norm. Backlashes in turn create new insecu-
rities that states are ill suited to counter. Indeed, projects for a new American he-
gemony are likely merely to accelerate that spiral in the longer term.
DURABLE DISORDER AND THE SECURITY DEFICIT
As noted earlier, the medieval world was not a world of chaos and breakdown
but one of relatively “durable disorder.” This is also true of today’s world. In this
context, the development of some sort of coherent global security system is un-
likely to come from nation-states or the states system as such. Nation-states are,
first, too limited in the scope and scale of what they can do (especially in a
post-hegemonic world), and second, too beholden to narrow domestic interests
to be able to lead such a transformation process, despite the widespread belief in
the United States in the universality of the American ideological message. States
can, of course, play a facilitating role, especially as domestic enforcers of global
norms and practices, and—paradoxically—in pushing forward a process of eco-
nomic globalization in order to maximize domestic returns, a kind of barrier-
lowering tit-for-tat. However, such developments will merely widen the security
deficit, not fill it. The New Security Dilemma means that as the reliability of in-
terstate balances of power declines, as alternative possibilities for global and
transnational security are found wanting, and as the process of reshaping the
political environment in reaction to complex globalization remains uneven and
multidimensional in time as well as space, we can expect substate and cross-
border destabilization and violence, including but certainly not confined to ter-
rorism, to become increasingly endemic.
Nevertheless, such turbulence does not necessarily mean chaos. Indeed, the
medieval order was a highly flexible one that created a wide range of spaces that
could accommodate quite extensive social, economic, and political innova-
tions—eventually laying the groundwork for the emergence of the postfeudal,
nation-state-based international order. The twenty-first-century globalizing
world order similarly provides manifold opportunities as well as constraints. In
the world of global finance, multinational firms, multilateral regimes, and pri-
vate authority, therefore, the emerging neomedieval world order is most likely,
reflecting its medieval predecessor, to be a kind of durable yet fertile disorder—
what organization theorists today would call a “heterarchical” order.59 Nation-
states will never regain their unitary, sovereign, hierarchical, multifunctional
character, but neither will they be able to appeal to an authoritative world
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government. In this sort of neomedieval world, therefore, the fundamental
question is not whether American hegemony—or that of any other state or
grouping of states—is inherently good or, indeed, bad. There is much to debate
on that question. But no state or group of states as such are likely to meet effec-
tively the challenges thrown up by the New Security Dilemma and so fill the
global security deficit. In this environment, civil wars, ethnic wars, cross-border
wars, warlordism, terrorism, and the like must be addressed not as military
questions but rather as social, economic, and political ones. What is needed is
not so much a war on terror as a political, economic, and social war on the causes
of terror—uneven development, inequality, injustice, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, the incredible frustrations engendered by the revolution of rising expec-
tations in a globalizing world—if the vicious circle of the New Security
Dilemma is to be broken.
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FROM CONSCRIPTS TO VOLUNTEERS
NATO’s Transitions to All-Volunteer Forces
Cindy Williams
Since the Cold War ended, twelve of NATO’s twenty-six member states havesuspended compulsory military service or announced plans to phase it out,
thus joining the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg
in the family of nations with all-volunteer armed forces (AVFs). Most of NATO’s
other members are deeply reducing the number of conscripts they call up each
year, relying increasingly on volunteers to fill their military ranks.1
The national decisions to halt conscription were motivated by a variety of
factors. Whatever the paths to those decisions, however, advocates of military re-
form—including senior leaders in NATO—hold that the volunteer militaries
will be better suited to NATO’s post–Cold War missions and can deliver modern,
high-technology, expeditionary capabilities more cost-effectively than can their
conscript counterparts.2 Some hope that switching to
the “small but solid” volunteer model will free up
money in payroll and infrastructure accounts that can
be reinvested in new military equipment, thus nar-
rowing the capabilities gap that has grown up between
the United States and its NATO allies.3 Unfortunately,
as the United States discovered when it ended con-
scription in 1973, the benefits of shifting to an AVF do
not materialize immediately, and the period of transi-
tion can be more costly and difficult than anticipated.
Ultimately, within a decade, the United States got
through its transition with good pay and educational
benefits, professional recruiting, improved conditions
Dr. Williams is a principal research scientist in the
Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. She has previously served as assistant
director for national security at the Congressional Bud-
get Office; at the MITRE Corporation; in the Defense
Department directorate of Program Analysis and Eval-
uation; and as a mathematician at RAND.
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of military life, and other measures aimed at attracting and keeping high-quality
people. Like the United States at that time, European countries are seeking cre-
ative solutions to recruit, retain, and motivate the high-quality uniformed vol-
unteers they need and to encourage them to depart when their services are no
longer required. The economic, demographic, labor, and social environments
within which militaries compete as employers for qualified people differ from
country to country, however. As a result, both the appropriate solutions and the
difficulty of transition will vary, and the military benefits of AVFs may be more
difficult, more costly, and longer in coming in European countries than they
were in the United States.
This article looks at the transition to all-volunteer forces in the militaries of
NATO. It begins with a brief overview of changing conscription policies and the
factors that motivate the shift to an AVF. It then describes some of the problems
the American all-volunteer force encountered during its first decade and the ini-
tiatives the United States embraced to solve them. It continues with a look at the
problems encountered by Europe’s militaries as they shift, followed by a discus-
sion of key differences that may make U.S. solutions less effective in NATO Eu-
rope. It ends with an overview of initiatives in several European countries and a
brief summary.
THE EMERGENCE OF ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCES IN EUROPE
The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg share a decades-
long tradition of all-volunteer service. Since the end of the Cold War, six
nations—Belgium, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain—
have ended conscription. The Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Romania, the Slo-
vak Republic, and Slovenia plan to phase conscription out within the next sev-
eral years (see table 1).
The decision to end compulsory service is a national one. A look at the factors
motivating the decisions to end conscription reveals both similarities and differ-
ences among European countries and between Europe and the United States.
In the United States, the choice was rooted in domestic politics and concerns
over social and racial inequities stemming from the draft system that prevailed
during most of the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, the deliberations that preceded
the decision were informed by studies of a far richer set of issues: social and de-
mographic factors, military effectiveness, economic efficiency, the role of
women in the military, the role of and prospects for reserve forces, and other re-
lated concerns.4 The choice to end conscription was particularly favored by
economists, who anticipated that a volunteer force would be less expensive in
terms of the opportunity costs (foregone wages combined with any preference
for civilian life) of individuals who would serve. Economists also predicted that
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Country Conscription
Number in
Active Forces
(Thousands)
Number in
Reserves
(Thousands)
Term of
Conscription
(Months)
Number of
Conscripts
(Thousands)
Share of
Conscripts in
Forces (%)
Belgium Suspended in 1994 39 14 None 0 0
Bulgaria Plans to keep 51 303 9 45 88
Canada
No peacetime
conscription
60 23 None 0 0
Czech
Republic
Phase out by 2006 40 N/A 12 19 48
Denmark Plans to keep 23 65 4–12a 6 25
Estonia
Plans to keep; AVF
under
consideration
6 24 8b 1 24
France Suspended in 2001 259 100 None 0 0
Germany
Plans to keep; in-
creasing volunteers
283 359 9c 93d 33
Greece Plans to keep 178 291 16–19 98 55
Hungary
Called last con-
script in 2004
33 90 6 23 70
Italy Suspend by 2007e 200f 63 10 40 20
Latvia Phase out by 2008 5 13 12 2 33
Lithuania Plans to keep 13 246 12 5 37
Netherlands Ended in 1996 53 32 None 0 0
Norway Plans to keep 27 219 12g 15 56
Poland Plans to keep 163 234 12h 81 50
Portugal End in 2003 45 211 4 9 20
Romania Phase out by 2007 97 104 6–12 30 31
Slovak
Republic
Suspend in 2006i 22 20 6j 8 34
Slovenia Phase out in 2004 7 20 7 1 18
Spain Ended in 2001 151 328 None 0 0
Turkey Plans to keep 515 379 15 391 76
United
Kingdom
Ended in 1962 213 273 None 0 0
United States Ended in 1973 1,434 1,212 None 0 0
TABLE 1
CONSCRIPTION POLICIES IN NATO COUNTRIES
Except for dates of conscription, figures are as of 2003.
Sources: Transatlantic roundtable September 2003; IISS, Military Balance 2003–2004; U.S. Defense Dept., Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional
Area and by Country (309A) (Washington, D.C.: 30 September 2003), available at web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/M05/hst0309.pdf; NATO Parliamentary Assembly,
25–28 March 2003: Visit to Latvia and Estonia, www.nato-pa.int; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 16–19 June 2003: Visit to Poland and Lithuania by the Defence
and Security Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, www.nato-pa.int; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Invited NATOMembers’ Progress on
Military Reforms, 2003 Annual Session, 146 DSCFC 03 E, www.nato-pa.int; and others.
a. Up to 24 months in certain ranks.
b. 11 months for sergeants and reserve officers; see NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Invited NATO Members’ Progress on Military Reforms, 2003 Annual Ses-
sion,” 146 DSCFC 03 E, www.nato-pa.int.
c. May volunteer to extend service to a total of 23 months.
d. Includes some 25,000 service members who voluntarily extended their periods of conscription to total up to 23 months.
e. A government bill was presented in 2003 to accelerate the suspension of conscription to 2005.
f. Under the Professional Law, will reduce to 190,000 troops.
g. Plus refresher periods; for some, possibility of 6 months with follow-on service in Home Guard.
h. Will drop to 9 months in 2004.
i. Retain authority for 3-month conscription to fill any gaps in military specialties.
j. Beginning January 1, 2004.
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volunteers would be more cost-effective for the military, because of longer terms
of service, lower personnel turnover, reduced training costs, and the substitu-
tion of capital for labor.5
Advocates of military transformation cite the switch to an all-volunteer force
as a key enabler of the fundamental transformation in the U.S. military between
the end of the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Today, Pentagon
leaders seem united in their support for the volunteer model on military
grounds, and economic studies continue to inform policies related to the AVF in
the United States.6 Nevertheless, questions about the sustainability of the mili-
tary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, together with concerns over the social
composition of the armed forces, have sparked renewed debate.7
In Europe, economic arguments have been much less important to the na-
tional debates than they were in the United States, though budgetary consider-
ations generally have been important drivers. Furthermore, the military reasons
often have more to do with the availability of volunteers for foreign missions
and less to do with their suitability for high-technology warfare—perhaps
reflective of a European inclination toward the lower end of the military
spectrum.
Every European country that decided to adopt an AVF after the Cold War
ended did so in the context of its own political environment and for its own
unique reasons. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some common themes for
each of four groups of countries: those in Western Europe that adopted AVFs
shortly after the end of the Cold War; those in Western Europe that made the
shift around the turn of the century; countries in Central and Eastern Europe;
and the Baltic states.
Belgium and the Netherlands were the first to end conscription. For them, the
choice was intertwined with the decision to downsize their militaries. The
long-term prospect of peace in Europe undercut the Cold War motivation of a
sizable conscript army as an element of national security, and ending compul-
sory service seemed part of the peace dividend. The Dutch decision was also in-
formed by a Priorities Review in 1993 emphasizing the creation of forces that
could be deployed quickly to respond to crises, which conscripts could not do.8
Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden identify broad themes that motivated
the next four Western European nations—Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy—
to decide on the shift at about the turn of the century. The decision in those
countries generally involved a variety of factors, including the changed
geopolitical environment, economic pressures, changed military missions, and
domestic politics.9 The end of the Cold War meant an opportunity to reduce
military budgets substantially and cut back sharply on the number of people
serving in uniform (see figure 1). At the same time, conscripts—generally
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precluded by law from
deployment outside the
country—were virtually
useless for the out-of-
area missions that NATO
began to emphasize and
that increasingly repre-
sented the main missions
of Europe’s militaries (see
table 2).
In addition, the military
drawdowns in those coun-
tries set off chain reactions
that eroded popular sup-
port for conscription. For
example, in post–Cold
War Spain, as the military shrank, so did the proportion of eligible youth called to
service each year. As fewer than half of the eligible young men were required to
serve, conscription appeared increasingly unfair to those relatively few who did
have to enter the armed forces. Both draft resistance and popular sentiment
against conscription swelled. Politicians seized on the issue during an election cam-
paign and halted conscription when they gained control of the legislature.10
For the Central and Eastern European members shifting to AVFs—the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia—the consider-
ations were somewhat different. For them, the new security environment and
the prospect of collective defense in NATO made military downsizing possible;
developing affordable militaries that would be compatible with NATO made
downsizing and force restructuring necessary.11 The view of alliance leaders and
advisers that conscript forces were a vestige of the Cold War also played a role, as
did public opinion and increasing levels of draft avoidance.12
Finally, of the three Baltic states, only Latvia plans to end conscription during
this decade; in addition, Estonia is considering the shift to an AVF. Rather than
downsizing, those countries are creating new militaries from whole cloth. Their
decisions regarding compulsory service are still driven to some extent by con-
cerns for self-defense. In preparing for membership in NATO, however, they
have embraced the goal of integrating their forces into the alliance for mis-
sions in other parts of the world. The budgetary costs of new militaries and
signals from NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly about the mili-
tary structures expected of new members have also been important factors in
their decisions.13
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FIGURE 1
ACTIVE-DUTY TROOPS OF SELECTED NATO COUNTRIES
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003–2004 (Washington, D.C.: Oxford
Univ. Press for the IISS).
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IMPROVING COST-EFFECTIVENESS
Whatever a nation’s mix of reasons for suspending conscription, advocacy in-
side and outside NATO has raised expectations that AVFs will ultimately lead to
improved military effectiveness and lowered personnel costs, thus narrowing
the transatlantic capabilities gap. At first glance, the numbers seem compelling.
In 2000, the United States spent just 27 percent of its military budget on person-
nel, compared with 34 percent in 1970, before the advent of the AVF.14 Today,
countries with AVFs generally devote smaller shares of their budgets to person-
nel expenditures and larger shares to developing and purchasing new equip-
ment than do those that retain conscription. For example, taken together, the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—three NATO countries with
long-standing AVFs—devote 28 percent of their total defense budgets to
4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Country
Personnel in
Operations Outside
Country (Thousands)
Personnel in Active
Forces (Thousands)
Share of Active-Duty
Personnel in Operations
Outside Country (Percent)
Belgium 0.7 39 2
Bulgaria 0.5 51 1
Canada 2.6 60 4
Czech Republic 1.2 40 3
Denmark 1.6 23 7
Estonia Fewer than 100 6 Less than 1%
France 34.7 259 13
Germany 7.3 283 3
Greece 3.2 178 2
Hungary 1.0 33 3
Italy 9.7 200 5
Latvia 0.2 5 3
Lithuania 0.2 13 1
Netherlands 5.5 53 10
Norway 1.3 27 5
Poland 3.9 163 2
Portugal 1.4 45 3
Romania 1.6 97 2
Slovak Republic 0.9 22 4
Slovenia 0.1 7 1
Spain 4.2 151 3
Turkey 39.5 515 8
United Kingdom 47.0 213 22
United States 436.0a 1,434 30
TABLE 2
FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES OPERATING ABROAD, 2003
Sources: IISS, Military Balance 2003–2004. Transatlantic roundtable September 2003; and others. Figures for personnel operating abroad in-
clude forces based permanently abroad as well as those deployed to military operations.
a. Active duty only; substantial numbers of reservists are also serving abroad. Includes some 26,000 personnel afloat, 109,000 serving in other
NATO countries, and 104,000 deployed to the Pacific theater.
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:28 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
44
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/25
modernization. In contrast, the combined share of defense budgets dedicated to
modernization in all the other countries of NATO comes to just 16.6 percent.15
A somewhat more refined example compares NATO Europe’s three biggest
spenders: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. While the three countries’
total defense budgets are roughly similar, Germany keeps more people under
arms than the other two countries (see figures 2 and 3). Of the three, only Ger-
many still has conscripts; France ended conscription in 2001 and is still in the
throes of transition. Germany’s conscripts add to the size of the Bundeswehr and
at the same time drain
money that would other-
w ise be avai lable for
modernization, with the
resu l t that Ger many
spends only one-quarter
as much money on equip-
ment modernization per
active duty service mem-
ber as the United King-
dom (see figure 4).16
More generally, the
U.S. experience appears
to validate the arguments
made in favor of all-volunteer forces on the basis of economic efficiency and
cost-effectiveness.17 Nevertheless, both the U.S. experience of the middle to late
1970s and the early indications from Europe suggest that the transitions in Eu-
rope will be more costly and difficult than many people foresee.
THE U.S. TRANSITION TO AN AVF WAS NOT EASY
In 1973, in the United States, the idea of shifting to an all-volunteer force was op-
posed by most senior military leaders, by many in Congress, by influential aca-
demics, and even by the New York Times.18 The first decade of the new force was
rocky and marked by calls to revert to some form of national service.
During the first three years of the AVF, the services generally met their overall
requirements for staffing and quality. During those early years, however, the
number of first-term enlistees who left the service before completing their con-
tracted terms of service rose from 26 percent to 37 percent, pushing turnover
rates (the annual requirement for enlisted recruits divided by the total size of the
enlisted force) to nearly 22 percent—far exceeding the 13 percent anticipated in
studies commissioned before the change.19 The high attrition rate meant that
more recruits were needed every year than anticipated. The constant churning
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of the force translated
into lower levels of expe-
rience and expertise in
units as well as higher
costs for recruiting and
training. As a result, the
share of the military bud-
get devoted to personnel
actually rose during the
first few years of the AVF,
despite a small reduction
in the size of the force.20
The next few years
brought the AVF close to
crisis. During that period, the U.S. economy grew briskly and private-sector
wages rose sharply. Military pay raises did not keep up, and budgets for recruit-
ing and advertising were cut back. Congress suspended the GI Bill, which pro-
vided college money for military veterans and had served as an important
enlistment incentive.
During that period, overall force levels were not a big problem. The services
generally came close to meeting their targets for overall staffing; the largest pro-
portional shortfall in total end strength was just 1.2 percent, in 1979.21 Unfortu-
nately, however, the quality of entering personnel plummeted. By 1980, nearly
50 percent of U.S. Army enlistees (compared with 28 percent in 1968) fell in the
bottom 30 percent of American youth in terms of cognitive aptitude, while only
29 percent scored above the median on the military entrance test (compared
with 49 percent at the end of the draft).22 Across the four services, the proportion
of low-scoring enlistees was worse than at any time since the Korean War.23
People with higher cognitive aptitudes do better at most military tasks; peo-
ple whose aptitudes fall in the bottom 30 percent have difficulty acquiring the
skills they need to be successful in the military. Thus, the high number of en-
trants who scored at the bottom of the test meant a lower-quality force, more
work for trainers and leaders, and greater attrition for the entrants, too many of
whom grew discouraged or were pressed to leave when they could not handle
their assigned duties. In addition, that period coincided with a time of reduced
investment in military equipment, resulting, some said, in a “hollow force.”
Some experts hold that problems stemming from reduced investment translated
into morale problems that compounded the difficulties of getting the AVF
started.24
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Fixing the prob-
lems cost money, but
by the early 1980s a
combination of ef-
forts brought the U.S.
military out of its
transitional prob-
lems. Perhaps the
most important was
to raise military pay
for recruits and, later,
all ranks. Though pay
raises lagged during
the late 1970s, double-
digit increases in
1981 and 1982 brought pay levels for most military people above the seventy-fifth
percentile for people with similar levels of education and experience in private-
sector firms. Despite the widely reported “pay gap”of the late 1980s and the 1990s,
military pay continued to compare favorably with pay in the private sector
throughout the second and third decades of the AVF.25 Today, U.S. military pay
raises are explicitly linked to average wage hikes in the private sector.
In addition, the United States expanded bonus programs to entice high-quality
youth to join up and to induce people in critical occupations to reenlist. Follow-
ing the mistaken decision to reduce educational benefits, the nation developed a
new program that provides generous benefits for service members who wish to
go to college or technical school after leaving the military. The services were also
permitted to design educational bonuses of their own, an extra tool to attract
people they most want to bring in. Money for post-service education proved to
be particularly useful in attracting the high-aptitude people likely to be most
successful in the military.26
The services also worked to identify and put a stop to military traditions that
had little real value in a military sense but annoyed members greatly. Two emo-
tionally charged issues were haircuts and “KP” (kitchen police) duty, which re-
quired soldiers to handle menial tasks on a routine basis. The issues pitted
military commanders and veterans in Congress—who typically saw military
“buzz cuts” and menial tasks as rites of passage supportive of good order and
discipline—against the desires of recruits, who saw them as lifestyle detriments.27
Ultimately, the desires of recruits won out. While the services still enforce hair-
cut standards, they are more relaxed than during the draft era, and KP is largely a
thing of the past.
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Another initiative of the American transition was a focus on the quality of life
for military families. Recruiters emphasized the benefits of family housing,
health care, and cut-rate groceries, and money was added to budgets to improve
the facilities, goods, and services that families appreciate. In the late 1980s, the
Department of Defense opened its own child-development centers to provide
subsidized, high-quality child-care services on military bases. The initiative
probably paid off in improved recruiting and retention, but it also had a side ef-
fect that now raises costs for the military and complicates things both for com-
manders and for the people who serve—that is, the number of military people
with young families grew.
In addition, the United States greatly expanded the pool from which talented
recruits might be drawn by removing a 2 percent limit on the share of women in
the forces, opening numerous jobs to women and transforming the conditions
under which women serve. The proportion of women in the force rose from 1.9
percent in 1972 to 9.3 percent in 1983 and has since climbed to about 15 percent.
The proportion of minorities who serve also increased, as individuals found
better opportunities in the military than in the private sector.28
Finally, the military built a professional cadre of recruiters and invested
heavily in marketing research and mass-media advertising. The general sales
pitch emphasized the training and other opportunities the military can offer, a
rich array of family benefits, good pay, a chance for an adventurous and yet more
ordered life, as well as patriotism, a chance to be part of something important,
and other intangibles. Increased advertising and recruiting can be the quickest
and most cost-effective means to improve recruitment levels, which still typi-
cally lag when the economy heats up.
EUROPEAN MILITARIES ALSO FACE CHALLENGES IN TRANSITION
For European militaries that suspended the draft after the Cold War ended, the
transition pains are real, and costs are higher than anticipated. The problems are
compounded by the military drawdowns that preceded or accompanied the
adoption of AVFs.
Downsizing Brought Its Own Problems
Across NATO, maintaining forces with an appropriate distribution of people in
uniform with respect to rank, length of service, occupation, and ability level
during the downsizing of the past decade and a half was a challenge. The United
States managed its rank and experience profiles fairly carefully, through a system
of attrition, lowered recruitment, and financial incentives to leave. Nevertheless,
imbalances across occupations remain, with too few people in critical occupa-
tions and more than are needed in others. In some occupations, decisions made
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during the drawdown had lasting effects. For example, the U.S. Air Force man-
aged the drawdown by cutting back on the number of pilots it trained, and after-
ward found itself short of pilots.29
In Canada, much of the downsizing was accomplished through attrition and
reduced recruiting. As a result, the Canadian Forces retained more older service
members than are needed for current operations and has too few younger ones
coming up the ranks. The older members, mostly married and settled in their
lives, resist deployment. Yet shedding the older members at this point would
leave too few experienced people to train incoming cohorts.30
Across Europe, strong programs of employee protection and generous retire-
ment systems kept the armed forces from separating excess older members (see
table 3). As a result, European militaries generally are left with too many older
officers for their missions and a lack of experience in the lower officer ranks. In
Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, most members of the professional
military saw service as a lifetime career. After the downsizing, both countries
were left with marked age and experience imbalances in their armed forces. Bel-
gium has forty-seven-year-old corporals, and an average length of service of
thirty-eight years. Leaders in both countries say that older members are not
suited for current missions. In addition, Belgium faces an imbalance across oc-
cupational specialties, with too few people with the aptitudes, technical ability,
and training needed. The Slovak Republic faces similar concerns.31
Romania found that its youngest and most capable members saw good op-
portunities on the outside and volunteered to depart as the military downsized,
leaving the forces with too many high-ranking, older officers. After attempting
to balance the pyramid based only upon rank and years of service, the Romanian
armed forces are now working to improve the overall quality of the force as
well.32
Shifting to AVFs Brought Unexpected Challenges
Across Europe, countries differ in their needs for military volunteers and the de-
mographic, economic, labor, and social environments in which their militaries
compete as employers. Thus, no two countries face precisely the same transition
problems. Nevertheless, a look across NATO Europe reveals a number of shared
challenges.33
• The level of military pay necessary to make the military competitive as an
employer is typically higher than foreseen before the transition.
• Attracting high-quality recruits can be more difficult than anticipated; the
private sector puts up particularly stiff competition for information
specialists and other people with technical skills.
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Country Type of Plan
Retirement Age or Years of Service
(YOS)
Other
Belgium
Defined benefit: 75% of
salary beginning at re-
tirement age
45–61 for officers, depending on
rank and whether “flying person-
nel”; 56 for soldiers and NCOs not
flying personnel; 51 for NCO flying
personnel
Reduced benefit for those who leave
early; no pension for members in
the new contract status
Canada
Individuals and govern-
ment contribute into
pension plan; defined
benefit for service be-
yond 20 YOS; portable
contributions for fewer
than 20 YOS
Compulsory retirement recently
raised to age 60 from 55. Pensions
comparable to federal public service,
indexed for cost of living. Full pen-
sion after 28 YOS for officers, 25
YOS for NCOs; members can retire
after 20 YOS, with 5% penalty per
year short of thresholds. Before 20
YOS, members can transfer a share
of individual and government con-
tributions into another pension plan
Option for paid, reduced annuity
beginning at age 55–60 for those de-
parting before 20 YOS
Czech
Republic
Defined benefit and sev-
erance pay, with choice
of lump-sum severance
pay
Immediate annuity of 5% to 55% of
average salary after 15–30 YOS;
members revert to national pension
system after 60 years of age, receiv-
ing the difference between service
pension and other retirement pen-
sion if the service pension is higher
Members also receive severance pay
equal to 4–6 months’ salary for 15–
20 YOS; “Smart Money” option
equal to 2–18 months’ salary for 2–
26 YOS for members’ who serve for
fewer than 5 years or who opt out of
the service pension and severance
pay
France Defined benefit
Career members: retirement age de-
pends upon rank; deferred annuity
option (at retirement age) after 15
YOS for NCOs, 25+ YOS for officers
Contract members: immediate an-
nuity after 20 YOS; deferred annuity
option (at career retirement age) af-
ter 15 YOS
Germany Defined benefit
Contract soldiers: no retirement
benefit
Career personnel: lifetime annuity
equal to about 70% of last pay, be-
ginning at age 52–60 (depending on
rank)
Italy
Defined contribution
(under public employee
retirement system revised
between 1992 and 1997)
Retirement eligibility based on age
(usually 60 years) and YOS (cur-
rently in flux, consistent with re-
form of public sector retirement
system), but military contributions
of individuals who depart before
then can be credited to pension ac-
counts at the Italian Social Security
Administration
Contributions are portable to Italian
Social Security Administration for
early retirees; defined benefit and
mixed scheme retained for members
already in service at the time of the
reform; early retirement “seniority
pensions” optional until 2008
Norway Defined benefit 60
Option to retire at age 57 with 28
YOS
TABLE 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS IN SELECTED NATO MILITARIES
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• Poor working conditions and inadequate facilities can scare recruits away,
but improving such conditions usually costs more money than has been set
aside for the purpose.
• Anticipated savings may not materialize as soon as expected—because, for
example, bases made redundant by the absence of conscripts cannot be
closed, for political reasons.
• The costs to train longer-serving volunteers (thus capitalizing on a key
advantage of volunteers) are usually higher than expected.
• Unanticipated costs, tight budgets, and budget cuts typically eat into
resources needed to implement the reforms surrounding the transition.
• Initially, uniformed leaders may not be motivated to make the transition a
success. The situation is exacerbated when tight budgets and unanticipated
costs prevent the improvements in equipment, infrastructure, and training that
were touted as benefits to be gained from the shift to all-volunteer forces.
W I L L I A M S 4 7
Country Type of Plan
Retirement Age or Years of Service
(YOS)
Other
Romania Defined benefit
Men: Age 55 (somewhat later for
flag officers) with 30+ years of work,
including 20+ YOS in military
Women: Age 55 with 20+ years of
work, including 10+ YOS in military
Partial pension for younger retirees
Slovak
Republic
Defined benefit and sev-
erance pay
Immediate pension equal to 30–
60% (depending on YOS) of average
pay of the best year from the final 10
years, after 15 or more YOS. In addi-
tion, retirement allowance equal to
2% of average pay of the best year
from the last 10 years, paid monthly
for a number of years depending on
YOS, for members with 5+ YOS
In addition, members with 5 or
more YOS receive severance pay
equal to Gross Pay + .5 x GP x
(YOS − 5)
Spain Defined benefit
Permanent members may stay to age
58; pension possible after 8 years as
temporary and 15 years as perma-
nent member
No pension for temporary volun-
teers, who must leave after 12 years
if they do not become permanent
soldiers
United
Kingdom
Defined benefit
Possibility of pension beginning at
age 55 with 15–20 YOS; pension
based on YOS and age at retirement,
up to national retirement age
Some limited pensions before age 55
United
States
Defined benefit
Immediate annuity for 20+ YOS;
annuity indexed to cost of living,
beginning at 50–75% of basic pay
near end of military career
Some members may choose a
lump-sum payment at 15 YOS, with
a lower annuity. Severance pay for
members separated involuntarily
before 20 YOS
TABLE 3 CONTINUED
CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS IN SELECTED NATO MILITARIES
Source: Transatlantic roundtable September 2003.
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The resulting lack of high-quality recruits, high turnover rates, and unantici-
pated costs are reminiscent of the difficulties the United States encountered dur-
ing the first decade of its AVF.34 It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that
by adopting U.S. strategies, Europe’s militaries could get through their own
transition pains and bring about circumstances conducive to narrowing the mil-
itary capabilities gap within a decade.
IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES LIMIT THE TRANSFERABILITY
OF LESSONS
Unfortunately, the U.S. lessons may not apply to European militaries. Funda-
mental differences in demographics, social programs, educational systems, and
labor models mean that initiatives that worked in the United States may be less
effective in European countries.
For example, population growth in most of northern Europe is very low; in
southern, Central, and Eastern Europe, populations are declining.35 To maintain
a force of its current size through 2020, Spain would need every year to recruit
2.5 percent of the cohort between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight years,
compared with just 1.6 percent in 2001 and 2002.36 In contrast, the United
States, where immigration makes up for relatively low birthrates, will need only
about 1.5 percent of its annual cohort to keep a force of a similar size. High rates
of conscientious objection may also dampen the success of recruitment efforts;
by the time the draft ended in Spain, for example, 75 percent of draft-age men
had identified themselves as conscientious objectors.37 Europeans may also balk
at joining the military with the prospect of being deployed in American coali-
tions that lack popular support.
While Europe’s immigrant minorities are often disadvantaged, they may also
come to their new homes with a negative image of the military.38 Moreover, if
immigrants perceive that they will not be welcomed by military leaders or that
opportunities for advancement that are open to others will not be open to them,
European militaries may find it more difficult to attract talented disadvantaged
youth and minorities than do the U.S. armed forces. Concepts of pay equity
across society, and between the military and other public employees, can also
make it difficult to improve military pay without raising political charges that
members of the armed forces have become mercenaries or are robbing other
public servants of their due.
In the United States, recruiting and retention surge during economic down-
turns, when jobs on the outside are not as plentiful as they are during boom
times. Because Western European nations typically offer more extensive public
programs for the unemployed, including cash benefits, health care, and other
social services, such economic cycles and high unemployment rates may not
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advantage their militaries as much. In general, Western European social safety
nets may catch people who in the United States would see military service as an
alternative to unemployment or part-time employment. Strong social
protections may also water down the appeal of family benefits offered by the
military.
Models of youth training and education also differ sharply between the
United States and most European countries. In the United States, vocational/
technical education can seem like a last resort for high school students in trou-
ble. In Western Europe, however, vocational schools and apprenticeships can be
engines of the trades. As a result, learning a skill in the military may not provide
the same opportunity to a European youth as to an American. Also, of course, in
countries where college is virtually free, U.S.-style college bonus programs hold
little attraction.
The immobility of European labor presents another striking difference.
Strong employee protections typically apply to the military as well as the private
sector, and many members of European militaries are represented by associa-
tions that amount to quasi–trade unions.39 Members of the professional forces
often expect to serve for a lifetime, whether or not the services need them that
long. In addition, even young people resist the moves that a military career can
entail. In the Bundeswehr, for example, it is not uncommon for service members
to keep their families at home and commute several hours daily or on weekends
because they prefer to live in the communities where they grew up. Such immo-
bility can make it difficult for the military to attract qualified people. Lower em-
ployee turnover rates in private firms may also make it more difficult for service
members to find new jobs when they leave the military.
For the countries new to NATO, the transformation from authoritarian rule
and centralized, command economies to transitional democracy and market-
based economies also makes for fundamental differences. The transformation is
utterly altering relationships between political authorities and the military, as
well as the role of the military in society. As recently as fifteen years ago, for ex-
ample, political officers in most Central and Eastern European militaries still ex-
ercised substantial influence within military units. Promotions based upon
Communist Party membership and ideology were not uncommon. Militaries
consisted primarily of officers and conscripts, with very few longer-serving non-
commissioned officers. The armed forces were called upon routinely as sources
of free labor for the agricultural sector.
Reforms in the new and invited member states call for depoliticization of the
armed forces, merit-based promotions, establishment of noncommissioned of-
ficer corps, and transformation of the roles and tasks of the armed forces. But
the communist legacy may translate into political resistance to initiatives, such
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as market-based pay and bonuses and merit-based promotions, that can appear
inequitable to those raised in the former system.40 On the other hand, the fact
that the new member states are working from clean slates may make some
changes easier and cheaper for them than for either the United States or Western
Europe.
Finally, countries that are experiencing economic problems or working to
meet the limits on national budget deficits imposed by the European Stability
and Growth Pact may find it difficult to boost budgets for military pay and re-
cruiting resources as the United States did during the late 1970s, when it faced
mounting problems in transition to its AVF.41
EUROPEAN INITIATIVES TO SPEED THE TRANSITION
NATO nations seeking to expand the ranks of volunteers are undertaking initia-
tives to improve their capacity to recruit, retain, and motivate the high-quality
members they need and to encourage them to depart when their services are no
longer required. While the details are geared to the circumstances each country
faces, in broad outline the initiatives are generally consistent with those the
United States pursued during its transition period. But the measures differ in
their details, and they may result in longer and more costly transitions than
envisioned.
Improve Military Pay. Like the United States during its transition, European
countries in transition hope to make military pay more competitive and to use
bonuses or other supplements to basic pay to attract and keep people with key
skills and offset the negative impact of frequent deployments. For example,
France increased starting pay for privates. Belgium raised pay, introduced
changes that would allow for overtime compensation, and expanded allowances
for some occupational specialties. Spain added generous bonuses for volunteers
who renew their contracts and hopes to fund a large basic pay raise this year, de-
spite severe budgetary pressures. The Czech Republic instituted bonuses for
serving in some operations.42
While they recognize the importance of boosting military pay, however, Eu-
ropean countries generally have not moved to link military pay or pay growth
explicitly to the private sector (see table 4). In contrast, the United Kingdom,
with decades of AVF experience, benchmarks military pay directly against that
of the private-sector professions; the United States links its military pay raises to
average wage hikes in the private sector. Over time, the nations of continental
Europe may find it necessary to develop such explicit links. Doing so may cost
substantially more than their leaders currently anticipate.
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W I L L I A M S 5 1
Country
Link to Other Public
Employees
Link to Private Sector Variation by Occupation or Duty
Belgium
No automatic link, but
General Staff works to
keep pay comparable by
education level to pay in
public sector
Through public-sector link; public-
sector pay is tied to average pay rates
in private sector
Differential pay for pilots, medical,
civil engineers, graduates of staff
colleges; skills-based special pays
for, e.g., pilots, divers, paratroopers;
special pays for operations
Canada
Not officially tied, but
tracks salaries in federal
civil service
No systematic tie, but salaries and
bonuses in some trades have been
boosted to be competitive with pri-
vate sector
Special pays for combat, deploy-
ment to theater, living abroad or in
the Far North
Czech
Republic
Yes No
Bonuses for hazardous positions,
missions abroad
France
Basic pay tied to public-
sector pay
No
Special pays, bonuses for, e.g., pilots,
submariners; living in Paris or
abroad; deployed to interventions
Germany Yes No
Bonuses in specified occupations;
daily bonus for service abroad, up to
92 euros per day
Italy
Pay is set separately for
defense and security-
sector employees
No
Operational allowance depending
on grade and assignment: people in
deployable units earn up to 50%
more than in administrative units;
elite units (e.g., airborne) up to 80%
more
Norway
Pay is negotiated for
public sector as a whole,
military included
No Special pay for pilots
Romania Yes No
Special pays for merit, based upon
recommendation of supervisor
Slovak
Republic
No No
Bonuses for hazardous conditions
from 1% to 6%
Spain
No explicit tie, but pay is
comparable with that of
other public-sector
employees
No
Special pays for, e.g., parachute, ma-
rine, pilot, submarine, units with ex-
peditionary capacity
United
Kingdom
No
Independent military pay review
body monitors pay in “equivalent”
private-sector professions to bench-
mark its pay recommendations;
adds an “X factor” to help offset the
difficulties of military life
Extra pay for some skills, e.g., pilots,
submariners
United
States
Annual pay raise often
linked to raise for federal
civilian workers
Current law requires pay raise in ex-
cess of average wage rise in private
sector; earlier law called for raise
somewhat lower than in private sec-
tor; law can be rewritten through
new defense legislation each year
Numerous special pays and bonuses
for specific occupations and duties
TABLE 4
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASH PAY IN SELECTED NATO MILITARIES
Source: Transatlantic roundtable September 2003.
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:30 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
55
War College: Winter 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
In some European countries, military pay is tied directly to the compensation
of other public-sector workers, and public-sector/military-pay equity is deeply
ingrained in national politics. In Germany, the linkage is so strong in the popu-
lar mind that people in uniform often call themselves “bureaucrats in uniform,”
which most American soldiers would find unflattering. The public-sector link
can make it difficult to raise military pay without also raising pay for all civil ser-
vants, whose rights are often protected by powerful unions. As a result, some
countries are seeking ways to boost military rewards through substantial non-
cash benefits, which they hope to justify based upon the military mission. In
France, for example, where the government currently provides very little housing
for service members, leaders are considering a sizable investment in housing, in
the hope that the new benefit will satisfy military people without raising equity
concerns for other public-sector workers.43 New government-provided housing
will greatly increase the cost of transition; unfortunately, providing it will almost
surely cost the government substantially more than it is worth to the members.44
Provide Incentives for Redundant Senior People to Leave the Service. Like the
United States in recent years, some European countries used financial incentives
to encourage members to leave the armed forces during the post–Cold War
downsizing. In France, for example, career officers were offered forty-five
months of basic pay, tax free, to resign.45 Romania provided a generous lump-
sum payment and retraining for civilian employment, while the Czech Republic
provided retirement allowances and retraining for civilian professions through
the military education system.46 While technically not a cost of transition to an
all-volunteer force, the large costs of separating redundant people seriously
complicate the budget picture for countries that adopted an AVF simulta-
neously with deep force reductions.
Improve Working Conditions. European militaries are also working to eliminate
traditions that annoy service members but do not improve military outcomes,
as well as to improve facilities and infrastructure. The Belgian military is review-
ing staff regulations with an eye toward adopting more flexible procedures and
improving morale.47 Spain’s Ministry of Defense has established a hotline for
soldier complaints.48 The Czech Republic is investing in infrastructure at its mil-
itary garrisons.49 For Germany, the modern equivalent of the U.S. “haircut war”
of the 1970s is a body-piercing jewelry war; the Bundeswehr has undertaken a
study to determine whether jewelry rules should be relaxed, as a symbol of a life-
style more attractive to today’s potential volunteers.50 Improving working con-
ditions by eliminating annoying traditions and regulations can be virtually cost
free from a budgetary point of view and a net win for everyone. Improving
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infrastructure is expensive, however, a fact that may seriously delay and under-
mine the benefits of AVFs in Europe.
Improve Career Paths. Especially in NATO’s new member states, where a decade
ago the armed forces were made up almost exclusively of officers and junior-
ranking conscripts, militaries are working to create new corps of noncommis-
sioned officers with good prospects for careers in the military. Romania, the
Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic are investing substantial sums in tech-
nical training and leadership development for these new senior enlisted person-
nel.51 In addition, the new member states plan to develop merit-based, more
transparent promotion systems.
In an attempt to make military careers more flexible, France has opened new
positions for specialists, who will be allowed to rise in rank and pay without tak-
ing up the duties of command. Romania is working to attract more officers with
civilian academic backgrounds.52 All of these initiatives are important to the
technologically capable militaries that NATO leaders hope will emerge with
all-volunteer forces.
Improve Quality of Life for Service Members and Their Families. Like the United
States during its transition, European countries are striving to provide family
benefits and other quality-of-life features to make military life more attractive
for volunteers. The U.S. slogan “recruit the soldier, retain the family” has be-
come popular among military personnel managers across Europe (see table 5).53
For example, France has expanded such family assistance programs as aid in
searching for schools, and it is considering new family housing. Romania also is
building new housing. The Czech Republic is working to improve family sup-
port; in addition, Prague has established a housing allowance and now permits
service members to rent on the open market. Germany and Belgium are opening
child-care centers for military families, and the Netherlands is considering it.
Several countries are working to reduce family separations.54
Family-friendly policies can provide important extra leverage in attracting
and keeping volunteers, but they have their drawbacks. The incentives they pro-
vide to marry and have children at an early age may not operate in the best inter-
est of the service member or the military. Because their costs do not appear in
the pay accounts, they may not be visible to decision makers or the public. More-
over, when family benefits are delivered as subsidies or as goods and services
provided directly by the government, as they often are, their value to recipients is
typically less than their cost to the government.55 To the extent that raising cash
pay raises insurmountable equity concerns with respect to other public employ-
ees, however, expensive family benefits may provide needed tools for Europe’s
militaries seeking to attract qualified volunteers.
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Country Military Housing Child Care Other Family-Friendly Benefits
Belgium
Housing generally not
provided; a few govern-
ment-owned houses
available for rental;
members abroad receive
cash allowance
Limited services available in 7 loca-
tions until age 3
Subsidized hospitalization insurance
for families
Canada
Government is getting
out of the housing busi-
ness; Canadian Forces
Housing Authority main-
tains housing, disposes of
it for government; mem-
bers get location-
dependent housing al-
lowance and are charged
prevailing local rents for
CFHA housing
Family resource centers include sub-
sidized child care
Counseling and other services at
on-base family resource centers; the
centers are new, and members com-
plain they are underresourced and
ignored
Czech
Republic
New, generous, location-
dependent housing
allowance; housing no
longer provided in-kind
for career officers
Not available Family support programs planned
France
Government provides
shared rooms on base for
privates; low-cost studios
or apartments on base
for NCOs; MOD estate
agency owns some apart-
ments for rent by officers
at below-market rates.
Not provided
Higher pay for members with fami-
lies; military holiday centers; family
assistance centers; health care for
family members; subsidized insur-
ance; discounts on rail travel; special
pays to offset strain of military du-
ties on families
Germany
Some government hous-
ing available to members
at below-market rates
Creating child-care centers Government pays cost of relocation
Italy
Government housing
available for officers,
NCOs; may be provided
to volunteer career
soldiers
Reimbursement of crèche expenses
Government pays costs of reloca-
tion; tax reduction based upon fam-
ily size
Norway
Government provides
housing for up to four
years (longer in rural ar-
eas) at new posting
Government assisted local commu-
nities in establishing child-care cen-
ters open to military and
nonmilitary families
None described
Romania
Government provides
housing in garrison for
members and families; if
unavailable, member re-
ceives housing allowance
equal to 50% of monthly
wage; recently launched
program to build new
houses for members and
their families
Low-cost child-care centers in larger
garrisons
Free medical care and medication
provided through military medical
facilities; free or discount access to
military sports areas and recre-
ational facilities; reimbursement of
transportation during vacations
TABLE 5
FAMILY-FRIENDLY BENEFITS IN SELECTED NATO MILITARIES
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Seek Recruits from Nontraditional or Underrepresented Sources. Like the United
States during the 1970s, Europe’s militaries are seeking to expand the pool of
prospective volunteers by opening more jobs to women. The German
Bundeswehr, for example, which just a few years ago permitted women only in
the music corps and the medical profession, now opens all jobs to women.56 In
addition, some of Europe’s militaries are placing more emphasis on recruiting
less-advantaged and minority citizens, immigrants, and even foreigners. Spain
is actively recruiting service members from South America and Guinea; it cur-
rently limits to 2,400 the number of service members from those regions, but it
is considering raising that figure.57 The Bundeswehr is particularly attractive to
volunteers from eastern Germany, even though military pay is lower for those
born in the East than for West Germans.58 The Royal Netherlands forces are
looking to tap into the “unused potential” of the ethnic minority population.59
Belgium’s strategic plan recommends opening military recruitment to all Euro-
pean citizens, thus raising the specter of an east-west migration within Europe’s
W I L L I A M S 5 5
Country Military Housing Child Care Other Family-Friendly Benefits
Slovak
Republic
Government-provided
accommodation for con-
scripts and students of
military schools; apart-
ments or military hostels
for all members, or al-
lowance to rent nearby;
soldier pays for family
members in hostels
Summer camps in military facilities
for children of members
Recreation in military facilities; dis-
counts for foreign travel
Spain
After 5 years of service,
cash bonus to offset costs
of housing transition at
every change of post;
some military housing
Child-care centers in some units
Some scholarships available for chil-
dren; access to medical care for
families
United
Kingdom
Housing provided for all
members, with type of
housing based on rank
For officers, cash allowance toward
private education for children
Allowances for relocation; child wel-
fare assistance, family support ser-
vices, and medical treatment for
families posted overseas; confiden-
tial support telephone line for mili-
tary members and families.
United
States
Government provides
housing for majority of
single members and
about 30 percent of
members with families;
others receive housing al-
lowance based on rank,
family status, and
location
Government provides on-base
child-care centers at subsidized cost
that varies by family income (lower
cost for lower income)
On-base family assistance centers;
access to military recreation facili-
ties; subsidized on-base grocery and
department stores; health care for
family members provided directly
by government or through insur-
ance at no cost to member; others
TABLE 5 CONTINUED
FAMILY-FRIENDLY BENEFITS IN SELECTED NATO MILITARIES
Source: Transatlantic roundtable September 2003.
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militaries.60 Unfortunately, however, many of Europe’s immigrants may find
military service unattractive, and Europeans may find that their efforts in this
aspect of the transition are not as fruitful as the successful U.S. model of attract-
ing minorities and other youth who see the military as a good opportunity.
Improve the Post-service Employment Prospects of Service Members. Like the United
States, European countries hope to attract a share of their recruits through the
prospect of a good future “on the outside” after they serve for a few years in the
military. However, differences in educational systems and labor mobility make
for substantial differences in the mechanisms for improving post-service pros-
pects. While initial training in a skill valued outside the military, combined
with money for college, can be crucial in the U.S. case, the prevalence of
high-quality trades training in the high schools in some European countries
means that many European youth are more likely to be attracted by transition
assistance and training as they depart service, and by the guarantee of public-
sector jobs afterward.
Thus, for its twelve-year enlisted volunteers, Germany provides a full year of
training at the end of service, followed by a full year of government pay in a tran-
sitional job in the private sector. Spain offers its volunteers two to ten months of
training in an occupational specialty at the beginning of their careers and addi-
tional training for the return to the private sector. In addition, Spain’s volunteers
now have the opportunity to receive degrees as “military technicians,” which the
Ministry of Defense hopes will help soldiers and sailors as they return to civilian
life. The Netherlands also plans to invest in training courses where needed to
help service members transition to civilian employment. Romania is establish-
ing a career-assistance program for veteran volunteers. The ministries of defense
of Italy and the Netherlands have established new offices to tap into the private
sector and help volunteers find jobs as they leave the military. In addition, the
Italian Ministry of Defense will now pay for six months of training as volunteer
members depart service. Belgium is considering new programs to provide retrain-
ing for volunteers at the end of their contracts and to award diplomas and other
skills accreditation that will be recognized in the private sector.61
In some countries, perhaps the most important transition initiative is to re-
serve a substantial share of public-sector jobs for military volunteers. Italy guar-
antees a job at the end of military service for every volunteer. The Italian
government reserves 60 percent of Carabinieri, 50 percent of national police
force, and 45 percent of national forest police and firefighting jobs for
short-term military volunteers; eventually all national police posts will be re-
served for them. Spain reserves 60 percent of Guardia Civil posts for veterans;
the Spanish Ministry of Defense is negotiating agreements with other ministries
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to hold jobs for separating soldiers and sailors. In addition, the Spanish govern-
ment is reaching out to private-sector employers’ organizations in the hopes
that they will set jobs aside for veteran volunteers. Belgium has opened its civil-
ian jobs in ministries to former service members. In other European countries,
ministries of defense are making arrangements with employer associations, la-
bor associations, and other public agencies to assist former service members
with placement.62
The European model of substantial end-of-service training, government-
paid post-service jobs, and nearly guaranteed post-service employment may
cost more than the American system of money for college and training necessary
for duties in the military. The high costs of post-service training and placement
will likely eat into national resources that might otherwise be available for mili-
tary equipment.
Improve Recruitment Efforts. Finally, as in the United States during the 1970s,
European militaries are working to boost recruiting through professional re-
cruiting teams, mass-media advertising, and other measures.
In summary, the countries in transition are working to develop creative solu-
tions to the specific challenges they face. Some of the steps they are taking resem-
ble those the United States found beneficial during its transition phase.
Nevertheless, profound differences in the demographic, social, economic, and
labor settings of Europe and the United States may make the European transi-
tions take longer and cost more than the American one, or than NATO’s leaders
currently hope.
MODERN, EXPEDITIONARY, HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
NATO’s member states rely increasingly on volunteers to fill their military ranks.
A growing number of European countries suspended compulsory service dur-
ing the past decade or are now phasing it out. American and NATO leaders be-
lieve the all-volunteer model is more consistent with a modern, expeditionary,
high-technology military.
Military personnel policies vary across NATO countries. Views of the appro-
priate balance between military capability and equity for individuals within a
military also seem to vary. For example, what sounds to a Western European like
reasonable equity and career stability can sound to an American like a jobs pro-
gram. Conversely, suggestions by U.S. experts that European militaries should re-
duce the number of people in uniform and change their personnel policies to free
up money for high-technology weapons can strike Europeans as self-serving
attempts to develop partners for a style of war they would prefer not to fight, and
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to drum up customers for weapons they would rather not buy. Similarly, to
Americans, the quasi–trade union associations that represent many European
service members can seem antithetical to a strong military, while to Europeans
such organizations can seem central to protecting the rights of military mem-
bers as “citizens in uniform.”
Across the alliance, the military drawdowns of the past fifteen years created
personnel management challenges. In some countries, they resulted in severe
staffing imbalances that will take years or even decades to reverse. Moreover, the
transition from conscription to an all-volunteer force creates its own challenges.
Among other problems, nations that have undertaken it recently are finding the
costs higher than they planned for.
The United States faced similar problems, but efforts along multiple fronts
brought success within a decade. European militaries are undertaking similar ef-
forts, tailored to their own national environments. But demographic, social, and
other realities in most of Europe are different from those of the United States.
Unfortunately, the differences are likely to make it more difficult and expensive,
not less so, for Europe’s militaries to attract, retain, and motivate high-quality
volunteers and to induce them to leave when their services are no longer needed.
As a result, AVF transitions in Europe may take longer and be more difficult and
more costly than the American experience of the 1970s and early 1980s.
The implications of all this for narrowing the military capabilities gap are not
good. Even a transition period as brief as that of the United States could mean
that the expected improvements would not be evident for a decade after an
armed service said good-bye to its last conscript. If the transitions take longer,
the high cost of personnel will continue to drain resources from equipment ac-
counts. More fundamentally, if the quality of recruits does not improve within a
few years, troops will lack skills and cognitive aptitudes necessary to operate and
maintain the high-technology equipment required to narrow the gap.
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GRAND STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH OTHER
STATES IN THE NEW, NEW WORLD ORDER
James F. Miskel
The art of statecraft has often involved efforts to improve the security of onestate by taking advantage of the power and influence of other states. This is,
for example, why a state typically seeks to forge military alliances with others. It
is also why some states provide economic and military support to client or de-
pendent states and why some advocate the formation of multistate trading
blocs. The theory behind the trading-bloc strategy is that cooperation on secu-
rity matters is more likely when there are strong economic and other mutually
beneficial connections among the members of the bloc. Among the tools that
have been and are being used to influence other states are trade preferences,
loans, loan guarantees, concessionary pricing for military sales, export-import
financing, technical assistance, foreign aid, and international disaster relief.
While humanitarian altruism is a major factor in for-
eign aid and disaster relief, statesmen often see the re-
duction of suffering as a method of improving the
stability of a recipient state or as an inducement for a
recipient state to cooperate more fully on security
matters.
Many ideas for making American foreign policy
more effective have been offered in recent years. Some
of them involve ways of prioritizing all forms of offi-
cial, state-to-state assistance on those states whose sta-
bility or cooperation will most benefit the national
interests of the United States. Obviously, there are
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many states that are already stable and already do generally cooperate with the
United States. Canada, Japan, and the states of Western Europe (disagreements
over the second war with Iraq notwithstanding) fall into this category. Certainly
the economically advanced and politically stable states of the collective “West”
have a common interest in suppressing the signal threat—global terrorism—of
the new, new world order that sprang from the rubble of the World Trade Center
and Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Thus the real focus of foreign policy re-
form proposals is on the large number of states that are neither as economically
advanced nor as stable as Japan, Canada, and Western Europe.
Three general approaches have been proposed for identifying the states out-
side the “winner’s circle” of economically advanced and stable states whose co-
operation and stability contribute most to the national interests of the United
States. Each of these approaches—as should be expected, because of the empha-
sis of all on state-to-state relations—is realist in its assumption that the state is
the most important actor in world affairs and thus that working through and
with other states is an effective way for the United States to further its national
interests. The general approaches would respectively devote the lion’s share of
state-to-state assistance to one of the following groups of states:
• Lever, or pivotal, states through which the United States can promote
stability in a region and thus tamp down the threat of terrorism
• Buffer states that can be strengthened to become more effective insulators
against terrorist attacks upon the United States and its interests
• Failed or failing states, the restoration of which to functionality would
eliminate platforms from which terrorists might plan, prepare, or launch
attacks upon the United States or its overseas interests.
Each of these options is based on distinctly different assumptions about the
role that other states can play on the world stage and about the type of contribu-
tions that they can make in the global war on terror. This article examines these
assumptions and finds that they are in some important respects inconsistent
with security threats that will face the United States in the early twenty-first
century.
PIVOTAL STATES
In the late 1990s, after the Cold War but before the global war on terrorism—
that is to say, during the original new world order and before the new, new world
order—the notion of pivotal states enjoyed considerable support, because it rec-
ognized something that should have been, even if it was not, intuitively obvious.
That something was that it made sense for the United States to organize its
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foreign policy priorities so as to ensure that states that deserved a lot of attention
got a lot of attention, and conversely that states that deserved less attention got
less. The approach, proposed by Professor Paul Kennedy and other authors, may
appear somewhat dated now, but it is based upon an enduring principle—that
state-to-state assistance would be most effective if it were targeted at states that
would then exert favorable (to American interests) influence regionwide. The
general rule for determining whether a state deserved a good deal of attention
boiled down to the following: if a state’s successes and failures had major ripple
effects on neighboring states, that state was ipso facto a pivotal state.1
The pivotal-states strategy calls to mind the saying, “When Brazil [or any
dominant state] sneezes, Argentina [or any smaller neighboring state] catches
cold.” Brazil was, indeed, desig-
nated by Paul Kennedy and his
coauthors as a pivotal state by vir-
tue of the size of its population
and economy relative to neigh-
boring states, and Argentina’s
economy did indeed actually
“catch cold” when Brazil devalued its currency in 1999. Obviously the piv-
otal-states strategy aims at the positive effects that a pivotal state can have on its
neighbors.
According to the strategy, the United States should target its foreign aid, eco-
nomic preferences, concessionary military sales, and technical assistance on the
“Brazils” of the world and at the same time reduce its aid and assistance to other
states, including their nonpivotal neighbors—for example, Argentina. Ex-
tending the health analogy, the strategy called for the United States to give vita-
mins to Brazil in order to promote rosy cheeks in both Brazil and Argentina. To
do otherwise, Kennedy and his coauthors argued, would spread state-to-state as-
sistance so thinly among a large number of recipient states that no single one
would get enough aid to make a real difference.
The image projected by the pivotal-states strategy is proactive. The strategy
seeks to influence regionally dominant states precisely because those states are
regionally dominant. They are pivots because they extend muscular tentacles of
economic, cultural, political, and ideological influence into their respective hin-
terlands. Perhaps because of this focus on relatively powerful states, this strategy
implies a high level of respect for the sovereignty and national interests of the re-
cipient states.
Like all of the strategies discussed here, the pivotal-states strategy is easier to
describe than to execute. It assumes that decisions about import quotas, tariffs,
and foreign aid will actually be made (or perhaps only wishes they would be
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made) on the basis of foreign policy considerations alone. The reality is, of
course, often quite different. Such decisions are political judgments and will al-
ways be heavily colored by estimates about their likely effects on domestic con-
stituencies. Higher quotas and lower tariffs are inevitably evaluated and voted
up or down on the basis of their impact on the U.S. economy and, more particu-
larly, on domestic American industries—often with only scant regard for their
potential effects on a pivotal state in a distant region of the world. President
George W. Bush’s March 2002 decision on steel import tariffs is a good case in
point. Although it has since been rescinded, the tariffs were very clearly designed
to support the domestic steel industry regardless of its effects on foreign trading
partners. Similarly, decisions about where to invest foreign aid or even sell mili-
tary hardware at concessionary prices are always influenced by political pres-
sures from constituency groups, be they individuals who want to extend the
helping hand of foreign aid to whoever needs it regardless of the overall foreign
policy, or industry representatives and labor lobbyists who want to maximize
sales whether the opportunities are in high or low-priority markets.
Moreover, circumstances change, often in ways that disrupt the best-laid
plans of strategists. For example, Afghanistan was never considered a pivotal or
even moderately important state until after the Taliban refused to turn over the
11 September terrorists. Nevertheless, the country is getting a considerable share
of American nation-building and peacekeeping resources. This seems to indi-
cate that it would be impossible for the United States to adhere to any spending
priority list over time.
On the other hand, a truly rigorous concentration of foreign aid, trade prefer-
ences, and intensive technical assistance, etc., on a very small number of pivotal
states can have profoundly positive effects on a region. This was the case in postwar
Germany and Japan, and it appears to be the strategy the United States is following
with respect to Iraq. The objectives of the very heavy investment in postwar re-
construction in Iraq clearly include the stabilization of the Middle East region as
a whole and the promotion of political and economic reform in neighboring
states—including, of course, states with unrepresentative regimes that have
been sponsoring terrorism or at least not acting effectively to suppress it.
Focusing on only one or two pivotal states (for example, Iraq and Afghani-
stan) amounts to a pivotal-regions strategy (or in this instance, region), a sub-
stantially different approach in that it does not identify pivotal states in every
major region or focus aid on them as levers for the promotion of American na-
tional interests around the world. For the time being, considering the Greater
Middle East as the pivotal region may make good strategic sense. The Middle
East is, in fact, a crucially important region at this point, because it is the ideo-
logical and financial wellspring of Islamic extremism, and because its oil
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resources play such an important role in the world economy. Nonetheless, the
reconstruction project in Iraq will one day be completed, internationalized, or
abandoned, and when that day comes questions about whether state-to-state aid
should be concentrated on pivotal, buffer, or failed states will reemerge.
BUFFER STATES
Buffer-states strategies also envision that the United States would provide
greater amounts of economic, political, and military support to some states than
to others, but in this strategy the priority traditionally has been states that can
solidify the local status quo, rather than states with resources that can be lever-
aged into greater influence over events in distant regions.
For example, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact in order to pro-
vide a “cordon sanitaire” between the motherland and the West. Stalin’s cocoon-
ing strategy clearly viewed the Eastern European satellites as insulators between
the core of the Soviet empire and the sources of economic, cultural, and ideolog-
ical contagion in the West. He saw the satellites also as shock absorbers that
could contribute to the preservation of his hard-won empire by serving as first
lines of defense in the event of a military attack by NATO. Ironically, before
World War II some Western European leaders had viewed the very same Eastern
European states as buffers against Bolshevism. Until the dawn of the nuclear age
and now the global war on terrorism, the oceans were thought to constitute all
the buffers that the United States needed, although there have occasionally been
arguments for prioritizing aid to Mexico so that it could better protect the
United States against infiltration and mass migration from Central America.
The image projected by buffer-states strategies is reactive. Buffer-states strat-
egies aim at local, not widely dispersed, states. Their contributions are defensive,
and their ability to project economic, cultural, political, and ideological influ-
ence over other states is immaterial.
Lately there has been interest in a strategy that appears to combine aspects of
both the buffer and pivotal-states strategies. This “seam states” strategy was for-
mulated and effectively articulated by a Naval War College colleague, Dr.
Thomas P. M. Barnett.2 As envisioned by Barnett, the seam-states approach
forms part of a larger strategy involving improvements in homeland security
and proactive interventions in nonseam states. Barnett’s seams resemble the
fault lines between civilizations or cultures that were envisioned by Professor
Samuel Huntington in the early 1990s;3 however, Barnett’s lines in the sand are
fewer in number, more fluid, and more heavily based on secular phenomena than
were Huntington’s cultural fault lines.
The seams represent the dividing line between two figurative tectonic plates.
One plate contains the states that are connected with, or are attempting with at
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least some success to connect with, the “West” through globalization. This plate
accounts for approximately two-thirds of the world’s population, and it repre-
sents, in Barnett’s schema, an economic and political winners’ circle of relatively
stable and prosperous states. The other plate represents the remaining one-third
of the world’s population who reside in states that are disconnected, or are delib-
erately disconnecting themselves, from the evolving norms, practices, and insti-
tutions of globalization. Barnett argues that in the new, new world order this is
where the main security threats originate. The threats may be from a state
(North Korea), a terrorist group sponsored by a state (Hizbollah), or terrorists
acting completely independently of a state (al-Qa‘ida), but in each instance the
threat is assumed to emanate from an entity based on the second tectonic plate.
According to this strategy, states along the seams between the tectonic plates
are potentially important because they can serve collectively as a barrier inhibit-
ing the ability of terrorist networks on the second plate to attack states on the
first plate—but not every state on the seam is equally important.
Twelve of the most important seam states are designated by Barnett for prior-
ity attention. The twelve would get more economic, political, and military assis-
tance from the United States; other advanced countries and other seam states
would get less. Of the twelve most important seam states, Professor Kennedy and
others earlier identified seven as pivotal states.
• States (seven) on both the pivotal and seam-states lists: Algeria, Brazil,
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey
• States (five) on seam-states list only: Greece, Malaysia, Morocco, the
Philippines, Thailand
• States (two) on the pivotal states list only: Egypt, India.
Although the focus of this essay is on the overall strategies, rather than
nuts-and-bolts decisions about which states warrant higher priority, the list of
key seam states does invite comment. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines
share maritime borders primarily with each other and land borders with only
four states: the first-plate states of Singapore and Brunei, the second-plate—but
nonthreatening—state of Papua New Guinea, and Thailand, which is designated
as another key seam state. In effect, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines do
not actually abut any significant segment of the seam between the first tectonic
plate and the second. This suggests that these three states are designated for pri-
ority attention for some reason other than their status as seam states, which in
turn may raise questions about the assumptions upon which the strategy was
built. It seems clear that the region as a whole is what is strategically impor-
tant—the vast expanse of ocean, a huge number of islands, and heavily
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trafficked sea-lanes that Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines individually
govern—not the ability of the three states to serve as buffers between the first
and second tectonic plates.
Despite the high degree of overlap between the seam-states and pivotal-states
lists, the seam-states strategy is, in fact, more closely aligned philosophically
with the buffer-states approach. The seam and buffer-states strategies concen-
trate state-to-state assistance on a selected number of states that have primarily
defensive functions and may or may not be able to project economic, cultural,
political, or ideological influence at the regional level. In this strategy, influence
is projected beyond the seam by the state that provides the assistance in the first
place—the United States.
In concluding that the key seam states could function as effective barriers
against terrorist networks, the strategy makes two important assumptions. One
is that the seam states actually provide some sort of physical barrier between the
first and second plates; the second is that terrorist networks would actually have
to transit the barrier in order to
attack the United States or one of
its neighbors on the first tectonic
plate. Both of these assumptions
are questionable, given the nature
of modern transportation net-
works and the relatively small volume of men and materiel that terrorist organi-
zations would actually have to move from one location to another in order to
attack a state in the winners’ circle. As long as commercial airlines fly to places
like Kabul and Khartoum and ships dock at ports in South Asia and West Africa,
terrorist organizations will be able to fly over or sail around whatever barriers
the seam states provide.
The strategy also assumes that the key seam states are now or soon will be (af-
ter having received state-to-state assistance) physically capable of controlling
their borders and exerting on-the-ground control over remote internal regions.
This indeed would seem to be the sine qua non of the strategy, for if a state can-
not control its own territory, it can hardly serve as an effective barrier against in-
trusion or movement between the second and first plates.
At least four (Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brazil) of the twelve
key seam states long ago demonstrated the inability to assert control over remote
internal areas or effectively police their land and sea borders. Terrorists having
already established bases of operation in three of them—Pakistan, the Philip-
pines, and Indonesia—it is clear that none has presented a major barrier to ter-
rorist networks in the past. Enough incidents of terrorism continue to occur in
each of these countries (a March 2003 bombing in the Philippines’ second
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biggest airport, the August 2003 hotel bombing in Jakarta and the October 2002
bombing of a Bali resort in Indonesia, and the intermittent terrorism in Kashmir
conducted or supported by Pakistani groups) to raise doubts that any of the
three will become effective barriers any time soon. Although there are as yet no
signs that the fourth, Brazil, is home to anti-American terrorist base camps,
there are serious questions about the extent of Brazil’s effective control over its
remote interior sections, in particular near the western borders with Colombia
and Peru and the southern frontier with Paraguay and Argentina.
The seam-states strategy envisions a robust program of state-to-state assis-
tance (military sales, military advisers and trainers, foreign aid, technical assis-
tance on law enforcement and government reforms, and favorable trade
agreements) to help key seam states improve and extend their governing capaci-
ties so as to prevent second-plate terrorists from attacking first-plate targets.
A program of this magnitude is daunting, to say the least, and unlikely to be
resourced adequately. Moreover, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Brazil,
and perhaps other key seam states ultimately lack sufficient incentives to exert
themselves seriously in underpopulated rural zones; all face more direct chal-
lenges in their overcrowded cities. Demographic trends suggest that the urban
challenges will get worse, not better. Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines,
and also Malaysia have vast land or maritime borders that are virtually impossi-
ble to control without unaffordable increases in their security budgets. For ex-
ample, the coastlines of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines total about
sixty thousand miles—five times the length of the coastline of the United States.
It is hard to envision Indonesia, Malaysia, or the Philippines ever being able to
control effectively more than a tiny percentage—that is, ever being truly effec-
tive at the role that the seam strategy envisions for them.
FAILING STATES
Failing-states strategies are of a completely different order than pivotal, buffer,
or seam-states strategies. Theoretically, pivotal and buffer-states strategies target
other states as being relatively capable of either projecting influence regionally
or acting as barriers against intrusion by third parties. Failing states are capable
of neither, and it is their very incapacity that causes some strategists to believe
that they warrant high priority in state-to-state assistance.
Failed states have been variously defined. Some definitions include states that
have simply ceased to exist and have been succeeded by others. For example, un-
der some definitions the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be a failed state, be-
cause the geography and population centers once administered as one entity by
the Hapsburgs are now administered by successor states. By this yardstick, the
term “failing state” could have applied to the Soviet Union during the late
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Gorbachev and early Yeltsin eras. For the purposes of strategies for dealing with
current and future security issues, such inclusive definitions are useless; a state’s
failure is often positive in terms of U.S. national interests, as for example when a
state that sponsors terrorism fails or, as in Iraq, is made to fail. A state’s failure
can also leave behind successor states that are politically stable, administratively
competent, or connected with the norms of the economically advanced states on
the first tectonic plate. Some of the Soviet Union’s successor states (Russia, Lith-
uania, Estonia, Latvia) fall into this category, as do a number of Hapsburg suc-
cessor states (Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary).
A more pertinent definition focuses on sovereign states that exist on paper as
members of the United Nations and thus are candidates for state-to-state assis-
tance but that have ceased to provide basic government services to their citi-
zenry, often because of internal strife—as in Somalia in the early 1990s and
Liberia in 2003. Initially of concern because of the humanitarian consequences
of civil wars, forced starvation, and human rights abuses, failed states have come
to be seen by some as launching pads for terrorists and major criminal organiza-
tions as well as wellsprings of destabilizing refugee movements and breeding
grounds for virulent diseases.4
Quite a few scholars and government officials have burned a good deal of
tread off their tires trying to devise taxonomies for failing states. This veritable
cottage industry attempts to identify warning signs that might enable the inter-
national community to intervene early enough to prevent other states from fail-
ing. The theory behind these efforts is that concentrated state-to-state assistance
for states in danger of failing will prevent failure and thereby:
• Eliminate opportunities for terrorist and criminal organizations to
establish bases of operations
• Remove the incentive for refugees to flee into other countries
• Enable law enforcement, humanitarian, and public health agencies to
expand their operations and thereby gradually improve living conditions
and prevent the spread of crime and disease.
It is clear that the internal chaos and anarchy of failing states do indeed create
fertile breeding grounds for crime, human rights abuses, disease, and starvation.
But notwithstanding the assumptions of this strategy, it is much less clear that
the conditions in failed states actually offer better opportunities for terrorists
than do conditions in certain functional states.
For example, states that actively sponsor terrorism with money, police pro-
tection, or weapons and that share intelligence reports about impending antiter-
rorist operations tend not to be failing. Such “services” may simply not be
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reliably available in a failing state. States that are genuinely failing are not typi-
cally well connected with Western intelligence sources and are thus usually not
in a position to obtain or leak advance warning to terrorists. Further, they often
exert little control over the internal security forces that might be expected to
provide protection to terrorist base camps. Moreover, failing states may be
viewed by terrorists as being unable to provide more than token resistance to
antiterrorist incursions by neighboring states or special operations units from
Western states. Failing states may even be seen by terrorist organizations as inca-
pable of distinguishing between antiterrorist incursions and indigenous vio-
lence—and thus as unable or unwilling to offer even stout legal defenses of their
sovereignty.
This is not to say that terrorists do not operate or establish base camps in fail-
ing states. They do. However, the issue for strategists seeking to prioritize the in-
vestments in state-to-state assistance is not whether there are terrorist
organizations in failing states. For strategists the issue is whether the terrorist or-
ganizations and operations in failing states are more dangerous to the United
States than terrorist organizations and operations in functioning states.
Fund-raising by terrorist orga-
nizations is one aspect of this is-
sue. It has been noted that
terrorist organizations finance
their operations through criminal
activity in failing states. For ex-
ample, there have been reports that al-Qa‘ida has been trafficking in diamonds
smuggled from the failing states of Liberia and Sierra Leone.5 The profits that
al-Qa‘ida earns from reselling diamonds apparently help finance the group’s op-
erations and enable it to maintain its communications network and purchase
weapons. Obviously, anything that enables groups like al-Qa‘ida to finance their
operations ought to be of substantial concern to strategists, but it should be re-
membered that the problem is hardly unique to failing states. While smuggling
is considerably easier in a failed state that cannot control its borders, goods are
also smuggled out of functioning states (e.g., diamonds from Tanzania, drugs
from Colombia, small arms from Russia), and the profits from these enterprises
can also finance terrorist groups. In fact, criminal enterprises inside functioning
states can also generate funds for terrorists. Even in the United States, terrorist
operatives or their sympathizers have engaged in illegal activity (such as smug-
gling cigarettes from low-tax states like North Carolina for resale in high-tax
states like New York, embezzling from charities, extorting money from legiti-
mate businessmen and families) in order to raise funds for terrorism.
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Another factor to consider is that the most serious recent terrorist attacks on
first-plate states have been based either in the first-plate state itself or in a state
that was not considered to have failed. The bombings in Indonesia were report-
edly undertaken by an Indonesian terrorist group, and the 11 September attacks
on the United States sprang from a complex of headquarters, training camps,
and weapons caches in Afghanistan. On 10 September 2001 most observers felt
that Afghanistan under the Taliban suffered from too much government, not
too little. The Taliban might have failed to improve the living conditions in Af-
ghanistan, but it did control enough of the country to make al-Qa‘ida view the
Taliban government as a sound strategic partner—one that would be able to
assert state sovereignty and provide protection to al-Qa‘ida operations. None
of the individuals indicted for the March 2004 terrorist bombing in Spain was
from a failing state—in fact, most were from one of the designated seam states,
Morocco.
Events in Afghanistan and Indonesia strongly suggest that in terms of the war
on terrorism, the threat posed by groups in failing states is no more serious than
the threat posed by groups operating in lightly governed (or ungovernable)
zones inside functioning states. As noted above in connection with the
seam-states strategy, the phenomenon of remote and only nominally adminis-
tered rural or coastal zones inside functioning states is already a serious problem
in some parts of the world. As urbanization continues to deplete rural popula-
tions and force national governments to concentrate on governing cities, the
phenomenon may become more widespread.
THE LURE OF ELEGANT CATEGORIZATIONS
This article has sought to compare and contrast the assumptions and conceptual
approaches embedded in three broad strategies for maximizing the benefits the
United States receives from state-to-state assistance programs. None of the three
represents an adequate strategy for dealing with the security threats of the pres-
ent day and age.
Each of the three depends heavily upon the ability of strategists to perform
two functions well: first, to decide which states are more important than others
in terms of their contributions to the “bottom line”; and second, to adhere to the
designated priorities over extended periods of time, not just a single fiscal year.
The difficulty of actually performing both tasks well should not be underesti-
mated. Judgments about where the United States should invest its time and
money are inherently and inescapably political, and in practice they are likely to
reflect domestic considerations as much as strategic calculations. Political pres-
sures from domestic interest groups and unanticipated developments overseas
will not only shape the original priority list of recipient states but cause our
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investment patterns to diverge from whichever strategy is officially adopted. In
the unlikely event that an elegant game plan were actually adopted, it would not
be long before we began to violate it.
Moreover, each of the general strategies reflects assumptions about the role of
other states that may be inappropriate for the security threats posed in the new,
new world order. Indeed, it may well be that the very idea of categorizing states
according to the role that the United States would assign them (extending a sta-
bilizing influence over a region, serving as a barrier against external threats, rees-
tablishing stability over the territory of a failing state) is misguided, because
of the quicksilver nature of the terrorist threats emanating from “beyond the
seam.” As we have seen, at least some terrorist groups seem able to disperse and
reorganize (perhaps under different names), relocate at great distance
(al-Qa‘ida’s relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan is the best example), and
quickly form partnerships of convenience with groups in other countries, in-
cluding first-plate states like Great Britain and France. The pivotal states, buffer/
seam-states and failed-states strategies plod in comparison. By the time
state-to-state assistance has had its hoped-for effects on a pivotal, key seam or fail-
ing state, the terrorist organizations will have moved on to other locations from
which they could base operations, devise new routes for attack on the “West,” or
forge new alliances with dissident groups inside first-plate or seam states.
The pivotal, buffer, and seam-states strategies each more or less assumes that
all states that are categorized as high priority will play roughly the same role. For
example, a seam-states strategy assumes that once having received state-to-state
assistance, all of the key seam states will at least attempt to serve as effective bar-
riers to third-party threats. If this assumption were not made, there would be no
logical reason to pursue the strategy in the first place. It is also assumed that a
state could be a pivot or a nonpivot, but not both—a seam state or a nonseam
state, but not both.
The problem is that at least some of the states that would be designated as piv-
otal and key seam states have characteristics of failing or beyond-the-seam
states. That is to say, several of the pivot or key seam states contain zones where
they have simply failed to exert effective control. These ungoverned or very
lightly governed zones (such as the fastness of Pakistan’s mountainous border
with Afghanistan, where Osama Bin Laden has reportedly been managing
to avoid capture and orchestrate terrorist actions in first-plate states),
out-of-the-way islands in Indonesia, dense patches of jungle in the Philippine
archipelago, and the isolated interior of Brazil are already home to terrorist or-
ganizations and could provide bases of terrorist operations in the future. Many
of these pivot or seam states have pressing social problems in overpopulated cit-
ies and are not highly motivated even to attempt to play the role scripted for
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them in the pivot and seam-states strategies—to assert control over remote and
dangerous regions. In some of these states, governance is a delicate balancing act
among ethnic minorities or religious factions. Their rulers may well see their
own interests as being best served by lip service to the role of pivot or buffer.
Given these considerations, the lure of grand strategies based on elegant cate-
gorizations of states should be resisted. A more effective approach would be to
do more of something we do not do enough of today—allocate security-related
assistance to other states on the basis of that state’s potential contribution to
specific high-priority projects or functions in the war on terrorism. Examples
are the collection and sharing of intelligence information about terrorist organi-
zations, law enforcement action against indigenous terrorist groups with affilia-
tions to al-Qa‘ida, suppression of illegal fund-raising activities by terrorist
organizations, and effective regulation and monitoring of financial transfers
that support terrorist organizations.
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THE MOSQUITO CAN BE MORE DANGEROUS THAN
THE MORTAR ROUND
The Obligations of Command
Arthur M. Smith and Craig Hooper
We must be prepared to meet malaria by training as strict and earnest
as that against enemy troops. We must be as practiced in our weapons
against it as we are with a rifle.
FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT SIR ARCHIBALD WAVELL
These words, penned in 1943 by the commander in chief of British forces inBurma during World War II, underline the reality that losses to malaria and
other preventable diseases among Allied forces operating in the China-Burma-
India theater far exceeded the number of casualties inflicted by enemy action.1
Today, as the global war on terrorism evolves, a similar failure to appreciate
noncombat environmental threats—including mosquitoes and other disease-
carrying insect vectors—will once again degrade combat effectiveness of
deployed forces. The significance of Field Marshal Wavell’s caveat was amply
demonstrated in August 2003, when a U.S. Marine Corps team, while conduct-
ing stabilization operations in Liberia, was hit by a surprise disease outbreak.
Almost 30 percent of the deployed military personnel contracted malaria, dis-
tracting military medical assets already committed
to supporting combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
DEPLOYMENT RISKS
Disease and illness will likely generate more casualties
than combat during military operations along the Af-
rican littoral, in South Asia, or on East Asian shores.
Up to 75 percent of the casualties suffered in previous
conflicts in these regions resulted from disease.2 Ex-
amination of U.S. Marine casualty data from Vietnam
alone reveals that only a third of hospital admissions
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were for wounds incurred as a result of combat action; two-thirds of hospital-
ized personnel suffered from diseases and, in lesser numbers, nonbattle injuries.
Malaria is a particular risk. Though the mosquito-borne disease has long
been eliminated from the United States, it remains, according to the World
Health Organization, one of the most significant health threats in the world.
Plasmodium falciparum, the most severe and life-threatening form of malaria-
causing parasite, kills more than a million people a year. The danger to American
military personnel is twofold. Malaria victims who have never been previously
exposed to malaria-causing parasites are at high risk of suffering acute infec-
tions. Symptoms of acute infection begin nine to fourteen days after an infec-
tious mosquito bite; they are characterized by rapid onset of debilitating fever,
headache, vomiting, or other flu-like symptoms that can be accompanied by
life-threatening complications. If the victim survives a first bout of malaria with-
out treatment, the infection then becomes a persistent health problem. Chronic,
longer-term malaria infection causes successive bouts of severe fever that, if still
left untreated, results in progressive deterioration and possible death.
The malaria threat is tied to the rate of transmission, and in most cases the
transmission rate depends on the local mosquito population. During operations
in sub-Saharan Africa, where mosquitoes are very effective malaria “vectors,”
malaria infection rates among unprotected troops may be expected to approach
100 percent, and if the infected soldiers are American, without prior exposure to
tropical diseases, a high percentage will likely suffer acute infections and experi-
ence life-threatening complications that require immediate medical evacuation.
These realities could easily render a U.S. military force ineffective without a
combat engagement ever taking place.
But malaria and other insect-carried diseases are not the only threats. Mili-
tary medical-care responsibilities for indigenous civilian populations bearing
other communicable diseases unique to their regions could further impact the
military medical-evacuation chain. Likewise, although it is not an acute phe-
nomenon, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) has profoundly altered
the medical risk to troops deployed worldwide. Disease is a constant battlefield
threat that, if command engagement and interest are lacking, will endanger
America’s ability to project military power.
THE MARINES ENTER LIBERIA
Despite long international experience with expeditionary military engagements
in Africa and a thorough understanding of the malaria threat, a significant pro-
portion of Joint Task Force personnel inserted into Liberia in August 2003
(eighty out of 290 who had been ashore) experienced symptoms of malaria. The
actual malaria “attack rate” will never be known, since the entire contingent
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began anti-malarial treatment soon after medical authorities determined the
causal agent. A number of latent, “incubating” infections probably went unde-
tected as asymptomatic soldiers rushed to take anti-malarial medication. At any
rate, the outbreak was a blow to combat effectiveness, and though there were no
fatalities, several victims developed a dangerous complication, cerebral malaria.
In cerebral malaria, the blood vessels that carry blood to the brain are clogged,
and victims require mechanical lung ventilator support, intensive-care units,
and rapid medical evacuation to survive.
What could explain this debacle? Why did most deployed participants—pri-
marily Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Quick Reaction
Force from the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)—be-
come infected?
Investigators focused on a number of questions: Was the outbreak due to fail-
ure of commanders to ensure that members of the landing force took the pre-
scribed anti-malarial medication, Mefloquine, for the necessary duration of time
prior to their insertion into Liberia? Were the deploying forces properly trained to
operate in a nation where insect-
and water-borne diseases are
everyday occurrences? Did the
Defense Intelligence Agency’s
Armed Forces Medical Intelli-
gence Center fail to warn commanders of the Iwo Jima ARG about the locally
high rate of malaria transmission? Did Marines, having heard about a rumored
association of Mefloquine with violent psychiatric reactions in returning Army
Afghanistan veterans in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, willfully avoid their anti-
malarial medication? Finally, could the prophylactic (preventive) agent have
been manufactured incorrectly?
A consensus conference at the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery on Oc-
tober 9, 2003, revealed that the major contributory factors to the outbreak in-
cluded insufficient intake of anti-malarial medication and a wholesale failure to
employ protective measures.3
Blood samples taken from the 26th MEU showed that only 5 percent of af-
fected personnel regularly took Mefloquine. Blood samples from 133 Marines
were tested for Mefloquine levels at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). Seventy percent contained breakdown products of the drug,
itself evidence that some Mefloquine had been taken in the preceding month,
but only 14 percent had levels high enough to be effective at the time of insertion
into Liberia. Only 5 percent of the samples indicated that the medicine had been
taken every week. Analysis of Mefloquine taken from Marines’ pockets revealed
that the potency and formulation of the drug were adequate.
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Logistical problems were responsible for some of the other failures. For ex-
ample, the 26th MEU had ordered bulk Permethrin insecticide for uniform
treatment before deployment, but the unit did not receive the Permethrin prior
to departure from the United States. Instead, the unit received spray cans of the
insecticide, which were then used to treat the desert-camouflage uniforms that
the troops had worn in their earlier deployment to the Middle East. In Liberia,
however, woodland-camouflage uniforms were worn, and only 12 percent of the
troops treated those. Only 27 percent reported using the time-released insect re-
pellant issued to them, and, making matters worse, none slept under insecticide-
treated mosquito nets. The Liberia expedition was a “man-portable mission,” in
which each individual had to carry everything he needed from the transport to
the deployment site. Permethrin-treated sleeping nets—a low-tech item previ-
ously shown to dramatically cut malaria mortality in West Africa—were not
even taken ashore. In addition, many troops were reluctant to use the long-
acting insect repellant DEET on the grounds that the repellant was too greasy
for hot-weather operations.
The epidemiologic investigation concluded that better malaria-awareness
training and wider access to anti-malaria equipment are the best ways to prevent
future malaria outbreaks during deployments. Ironically, identical historical les-
sons, emphasizing the importance of individual, group, and command disci-
pline, have been learned repeatedly since malaria was identified as a major
degrading factor in military operations; all appear to have been forgotten. The
Navy and Marine Corps have neglected the war fighter’s long and proud disease-
fighting legacy.
BURMA 1943
The Burma campaign in 1943 was a particularly brutal sideshow of World War
II. But here, fighting under terrible conditions and at the end of a dauntingly
long supply line, soldiers served in what can be seen now as a battle laboratory.
Their experience laid the tentative foundations for today’s joint, combined, and
special warfighting strategies. Unfortunately, the innovative tactics explored in
the China-Burma-India theater were ignored for years after the war, and few
looked to exploit the innovative warfighting strategies pioneered in this margin-
ally successful theater of operations, much less recognized that the ravages of
preventable disease had bogged down the pace of operations.
Wingate’s “Chindits”
Major General Orde Wingate, a commander of the “Chindit Special Force” (and
a British military innovator) pioneered a brutal training regimen that quickly
shaped soft, poor-quality infantry into a cohesive counterinsurgency-capable
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force. Since the Chindits were expected by their commanders to endure all phys-
ical challenges, disease prevention was deemphasized.
Even during training, fundamental rules of sanitation and basic anti-malaria
precautions were ignored. That neglect caused serious losses; within a period of
six weeks one brigade lost over 70 percent of its soldiers to malaria-related hospi-
talization. Wingate,
a survivor of cere-
bral malaria, used
his experience to
downplay the im-
portance of anti-
malarial measures.
One soldier recalled, “In one respect we had the wrong attitude to Malaria; we
looked on it as inevitable; we believed that we were all bound to get it every so
often. . . . [W]e never treated Malaria as a disease meriting evacuation.”4 This
prejudice ultimately became a self-fulfilling prophesy.
In some respects, the training befitted the Chindits’ difficult mission. The
Chindit Special Force operated as a commando unit, tasked to infiltrate Japa-
nese lines and conduct hit-and-run attacks against exposed railroads and
bridges essential to enemy operations. The soldiers were expected to be con-
stantly on the move, fighting without a base and supplied largely by air. The
troops were initially provided with anti-malaria equipment—full green battle
dress, anti-mosquito cream, head veils, arm-covering cotton gauntlets, and the
anti-malarial medicine of the day, Mepacrine—but these force-protection mea-
sures crumbled under the extreme operational conditions and because their lead-
ers believed that disease could be overcome by endurance rather than prevention.5
Full, extremity-covering uniforms were discarded, offering ample opportu-
nity for malaria-carrying mosquitoes to bite and transmit malaria. The men
preferred shorts to long trousers, especially when maneuvering in Burma’s broken
terrain; some cut most of the trouser legs from their battle dress. Sleeves were
rolled up and uncomfortable arm-covering gauntlets discarded. Anti-mosquito
veils were both ineffective and dangerous, offering little protection to sleeping
soldiers and restricting vision during night operations.
Chindits rarely had organized and insect-free sleeping quarters. For malaria,
this was a critical oversight, since most mosquito bites occur at night, when the
insect can feed upon unaware and unresisting hosts. Jungle hammocks provided
good shelter from rain and a measure of protection from flies, mosquitoes, and
other jungle pests. The mere fact that the hammocks were raised off the ground
reduced bites from typhus-carrying ticks and mites. Soldiers recognized that
hammocks reduced the rate of typhus and malaria, but again, operational
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drawbacks discouraged universal use. The hammock, when enclosed by a porta-
ble mosquito net, was difficult to exit in an emergency; further, the jungle ham-
mock and net weighed seven pounds and was bulky. In general, the jungle
hammocks, when available, were reserved for the injured and seriously ill.
The principal anti-malarial medication for World War II was Mepacrine
(known among American forces as Atabrine). Though it was relatively effective,
it was not fully supported at either the command or field level. Mepacrine had
to be pressed into service to replace quinine, a time-tested and accepted
anti-malarial medication, because by 1943 the Japanese had seized the quinine-
producing areas of Java
(Indonesia) and the Phil-
ippines. Military medical
authorities in India and
Burma were initially cautious about using Mepacrine as a prophylactic or sup-
pressive (symptom-reducing) anti-malarial, fearing that the drug’s potential to
conceal infection would encourage combat leaders to keep men on duty when
they were afflicted with the disease. Some medical leaders were also concerned
that overreliance upon Mepacrine would lead troops to neglect other aspects of
anti-malarial discipline. But the Chindits’ failure to adopt basic habits that usu-
ally prevent exposure to malaria-carrying mosquitoes put Mepacrine to the test.
Unfortunately for the troops, suppressive treatment with Mepacrine was not
carried out with complete efficiency even when the drug was available. No regular
formations and inspections were held to ensure that men took the anti-malarial
medication at the times and in the dosages necessary to prevent malaria. Many
personnel, in fact, refused to take Mepacrine. A myth that Mepacrine produced
sexual impotence or sterility was rampant among all Allied forces. In one battal-
ion the administration of the drug was suspended before troops went into ac-
tion, because its officers believed the drug would reduce fighting efficiency. Such
fallacies had a tendency to spread rapidly, become exaggerated, and gain credi-
bility during circulation.
Deliberate failure to take Mepacrine on a regular and consistent basis led to
confidence-eroding “breakthrough infections” when the level of Mepacrine in
the blood became too low to control the proliferation of the malaria parasite.
One medical officer discovered that the Mepacrine containers of two of his pa-
tients who had just died of cerebral malaria still contained the original quota of
thirty tablets at a time when they should have been almost empty.
The enormous amount of labor required to reduce local hazards of contami-
nated water, insect bites, and fungus infections of the skin—indeed the impossi-
bility of preventing them entirely during a long campaign—produced further
laxity, bordering upon hostility, toward medical discipline. The admiration of
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the line community for its own medical assistants was evidently counterbal-
anced by indifference and even resentment toward medical advice from the rear.
Command indifference to disease prevention denied soldiers the opportunity
to exploit incremental improvements in malaria-prevention technology. Mos-
quito repellent, oil of citronella, was initially issued in an ineffective and greasy
formulation. The uncomfortable repellant fell out of favor, and the Chindits re-
sisted later nongreasy and more effective counterparts. Command elements
failed to instill confidence in the new formulation, and no organized inspections
were held to demonstrate or ensure proper and regular use of the mosquito
repellant.
With the passage of time, the incidence of malarial fever attacks rose steadily;
few men experienced less than three attacks. The majority had as many as seven
malarial episodes—and many had to endure malaria attacks while actively en-
gaged with enemy fighters. The fighting efficiency and morale of personnel who
had experienced three or four attacks of malaria diminished rapidly. Dysentery,
diarrhea, lung infections, and skin diseases were more likely to infect, and after
infection to disable completely, a malaria-ridden soldier, compared with a soldier
who had not suffered repeated bouts of malarial fevers. Deaths from cerebral
malaria and typhus increased during operational deployments. The Special
Force, as a result of its aggres-
sive training and counterinsur-
gency mission, broke medical
discipline, exposing itself to
these preventable parasitic dis-
eases. Compounding the failure of disease-prevention measures, members of
the Chindit force gave up the suppressive benefits of Mepacrine. The medical of-
ficers, facing a situation that appeared insurmountable, gave up, allowing them-
selves to fall to the low standard set by the men. The casualty rate was enormous.
Just two-thirds of the Chindit troops who embarked upon Operation
LONGCLOTH in February 1943, a marginally successful four-month incursion
into Burma, returned. Ultimately, only six hundred of the three thousand troops
who commenced that operation were ever fit for military service again.
From a clinical viewpoint, the Special Force was more severely injured by ma-
laria than by bullets and grenades. Considered tactically, unit battleworthiness
was determined more by its state of medical discipline than by courage.6 It has
been said that the Chindit Special Force met a more dangerous enemy in disease
than in the Japanese army. Disease did more damage than the enemy. Even
Wingate’s substantial legacy of innovation was diminished by his failure in
Burma to ensure the health of his men.
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Merrill’s Marauders
U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater had similar problems. Like the
British, the Americans relied primarily upon Atabrine (Mepacrine) to suppress
and control malaria. The members of Brigadier General Frank Merrill’s 5307th
Composite Unit (Provisional)—known as “Galahad,” or “Merrill’s Ma-
rauders”—self-administered their anti-malarial medication. Each soldier was
expected to take a Mepacrine tablet on a daily basis, conforming to a system al-
ready developed for the Pacific theaters. But again, many soldiers failed to follow
precisely the protocol required if the medicine was to prevent malaria. Atabrine
indiscipline became a particularly potent manifestation of the poor morale
common in troops en route to the theater and within units experiencing their
first weeks of training in India. Unfortunately, command interest in reinforcing
individual Atabrine discipline was also lacking, often neglected until malaria
brought training to a standstill. Disease made morale even harder to restore.
The Marauders entered Burma in February 1944 with inadequate collective
anti-mosquito protection. As with the Chindit Special Force, little was done to
control malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Means by which individuals could limit
mosquito exposure—repellants and “mosquito bars” (protected sleeping enclo-
sures)—were unpopular and used by only a handful. Predictably, malarial infec-
tion and reinfection were rife during operations in the theater. The theater
commander, General Joseph Stilwell, exacerbated morale problems by pressing
his men to extend offensive operations and placing restrictions on medical evac-
uation. Gradually, fatigued and disease-ridden men began to repudiate Ata-
brine. It was a vicious cycle. The sicker the troops became, the lower the morale.
The lower their morale, the less hope there was of restoring Atabrine discipline
and curbing malaria.
As reported by a malaria expert on the staff of General Stilwell, the failure to
control malaria destroyed combat effectiveness. “It was incumbent upon any
medical officer surveying a unit with a current malaria rate of 4,080 attacks/
1,000 men per annum; with 7.4% of the men noneffective each week because of
Malaria; and 57.3% of the remainder infected during the past year, to consider
the unit as unfit for operations before adequate rest period and replacement is
provided.”7 The loss rate was unsustainable.
Few of the original 2,750 combatants endured the entire campaign. At one
point, the Marauders were losing seventy to a hundred men daily to malaria,
dysentery, and scrub typhus. By August 1944 only two hundred of the original
Galahad force remained, and these were utterly worn out.
Thus were the Marauders destroyed, not by mis-leadership, although it played a part
in the closing phase of the disaster, nor by the enemy. . . . Their destruction occurred
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on the ridges and jungle trails. . . . Of the three causes of the Regiment’s collapse, the
environment was the underlying cause. The tactical engagement was the precipitating
cause; and the invasion of the troops by disease was the final and decisive cause. To
an unknown extent the Marauders helped their enemies by their loose sanitary prac-
tices, by command ineptness in supporting the medical establishment, and by defi-
ance of Atabrine suppressive discipline. In the end, disease producing parasites
Amoebae (Dysentery) and Plasmodia (Malaria), as well as bacteria and Rickettsia
(Typhus) organisms, rather than Japanese soldiers, vanquished Merrill’s Marauders.8
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMAND
In general, mere mention of hygiene and sanitation elicits tolerant but bored
amusement from specialists in the combat arms. To this day, many senior offi-
cers are unwilling to accept the fact that hygiene is not only a function of disci-
pline but one of the basic factors upon which discipline is built. Personal
discipline aggregates to collective discipline; its absence in the individual pro-
duces the same absence in the operational unit.
The recent embarrassing experience with malaria during Liberian operations
once again demonstrated the historically validated and fundamental axiom that
training in the prevention of disease must be given top priority and be treated
like any other battle exercise aimed at attainment of an objective with the least
casualties. Training must be sufficiently intensive to ensure that all personnel
can be relied upon to maintain personal hygiene, unsupervised, during any pe-
riod of active operations. Without this, morale and fighting effectiveness will
crumble.
Malaria is a particular challenge; aside from the intake of suppressive medica-
tions, strict anti-malaria discipline must be enforced during training periods,
and any breach sanctioned. If compliance with expected anti-malarial measures
proves unwieldy or unrealistic, a unit commander is obliged to facilitate the de-
velopment of an engineering or medical solution. In operational theaters where
malaria is endemic, administration of anti-malarial medication and compliance
with personal and collective force protective measures can be ensured by eve-
ning inspections at the first indication of sundown, when mosquitoes are most
active. Such measures of personnel protection from mosquito-borne illnesses
must be practiced repeatedly until their observance becomes a conditioned
reflex.
The importance of effective command discipline was validated by yet another
historical example from the jungles of Burma during World War II. Like
Wingate’s Special Force and others, the British South East Asia Command’s
Fourteenth Army, in general, faced significant losses to malaria. A new com-
mander, then Lieutenant General Sir William Slim, took over determined to
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enforce vigorously a malaria-control program in the Fourteenth Army. As he
later recalled in his memoirs, “In 1943 for every man evacuated with wounds, we
had 120 evacuated sick. The annual malaria rate alone was 84 percent per an-
num of the total strength of the Army, and was still higher among the forward
troops. A similar calculation showed me that in a matter of months, at this rate,
my army would have melted away.”9
Lieutenant General Slim saw correctly that more than half the battle against
disease is fought not by doctors but by regimental officers. Those in direct, regu-
lar contact with the troops are best placed to ensure that personal anti-mosquito
measures are observed and that daily doses of anti-malarial drug are taken. Gen-
eral Slim initiated surprise checks in which every man in the unit was examined.
If men had not taken the drug, and if the overall results of blood tests for the
medication within the unit were less than 95 percent positive, Slim “sacked the
commander. I only had to sack three; by then the rest had got my meaning.” Be-
cause of this emphasis from the top,
slowly, but with increasing rapidity, “as all of us, commanders, doctors, regimental
officers, staff officers and [noncommissioned officers] united in the drive against
sickness, results began to appear. On the chart that hung on my wall, the curves of
admissions to hospitals and Malaria in forward treatment units sank lower and
lower until in 1945 the sickness rate for the whole 14th Army was one per thousand
per day.”10
As the recent incident in Liberia demonstrates, the global war on terrorism may
become completely paralyzed without a wholesale commitment of leadership,
“from the top,” to the environmental protection of the troops. Flesh and blood
remain the central element of all weapons systems. The will and physical capa-
bility to fight remain the crucial factors in any equation for victory. If command-
ers are unable to recall the hard medical lessons learned in previous conflicts,
and fail to ensure the health of their soldiers, how can America expect to con-
front bioweaponry or other, more dangerous infectious threats?
Standards of hygiene and sanitation are not only indicative of discipline
within a unit but are direct personal reflections upon the leadership capabilities
of commanding officers and their staffs. Regular care and maintenance of vehi-
cles are essential to trouble-free operation; so it is with human resources during
combat deployments. Unless the war fighter’s welfare receives constant atten-
tion, sickness and ill health are bound to ensue. In units where hygiene and sani-
tation are poor or lacking, commanding officers have neglected the interest and
welfare of their soldiers, and their fitness for command is to be questioned.
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HOSPITAL SHIPS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Sanctuaries or Targets?
Richard J. Grunawalt
Employment of military hospital ships in support of the war on terror is mili-tarily, politically, and morally appropriate. White ships adorned with the red
cross or red crescent are internationally recognized as protected platforms en-
gaged exclusively in the care and treatment of the casualties of war or the victims
of disaster, whether natural or man-made. Despite the humanity of their mis-
sion, outdated rules of conventional and customary international law, designed
for a bygone era, hamper their effectiveness and imperil their safety. This en-
quiry examines these problems in the context of the war on terror and an adver-
sary intent on destroying such “soft” targets as hospital ships in order to create the
maximum in shock and horror. A brief overview of the development of the law
pertaining to hospital ships is provided as well, with emphasis on rules governing
methods of identification, modes of communication, and means of defense.
EVOLUTION OF LAW AND PRACTICE PERTAINING TO
HOSPITAL SHIPS
The special protected status accorded to hospital ships during international
armed conflict has a long and storied past. The utility of vessels especially de-
signed or equipped to care for and transport wounded and sick soldiers and sail-
ors has an even more extensive history. Indeed, there is some evidence that both
the Athenian and Roman fleets employed vessels as hospital ships.1
Early Development (1868–1949)
By the seventeenth century, vessels especially configured to care for the wounded
following engagements at sea routinely accompanied naval squadrons.2 Pictet
noted that by the time of the Crimean War (1853–56) “more than 100,000 sick
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and wounded were repatriated to England on board hospital transports. There-
after, no military expedition was ever undertaken without the necessary ships
being assigned to evacuate soldiers from the combat area and give them the
medical treatment they might require.”3
It was not until 1868, however, that the international community sought to
cloak ships engaged exclusively in the care and treatment of the wounded, sick,
and shipwrecked with formal immunity from capture and destruction. Follow-
ing adoption of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded in the Armies in the Field of 1864, a diplomatic conference was
convened in Geneva for the purpose, among others, of extending to naval forces
at sea the protections accorded in that treaty to wounded combatants on land.4
That effort produced a convention entitled Additional Articles Relating to the
Condition of the Wounded in War of 1868, which was never ratified but set forth
basic precepts that continue to inform the law of armed conflict relative to hos-
pital ships.5 Principal among them is that “vessels not equipped for fighting
which, during peace the government shall have officially declared to be intended
to serve as floating hospital ships, shall . . . enjoy during the war complete neu-
trality, both as regards stores, and also as regards their staff, provided that their
equipment is exclusively appropriate to the special service on which they are em-
ployed.”6 Although it was not in legal force, belligerents in both the Franco-German
War of 1870–71 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 agreed to accept and abide
by the 1868 accord.
By 1898, there was growing recognition of the need to revise and expand the
1864 Convention, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
began the task of drafting an expanded version. This effort was overtaken, how-
ever, by the czar of Russia’s initiative to convene the First Hague Peace Confer-
ence, which drafted and adopted, among other instruments, the 1899 Hague (II)
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Reg-
ulations Annexed Thereto7 as well as the 1899 Hague (III) Convention for the
Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of
22 August 1864.8 Given the failure of the 1868 Additional Articles to gain ratifi-
cation, the Hague (III) Convention was the first successful attempt to extend to
the maritime environment the formal protections applicable to medical facili-
ties and the wounded and sick in the field on land.9 Article 1 of the latter accord
provides that vessels constructed or assigned solely for use as military hospital
ships, and properly announced as such, “shall be respected and cannot be cap-
tured while hostilities last.” Article 4, in turn, stipulates that hospital ships must
accord relief and assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked without dis-
crimination as to nationality, must not be used for “any military purpose,” and
must not “hamper the movements of the combatants.” Article 4 also provides
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that hospital ships are subject to visits, inspections, and some measures of con-
trol by the opposing belligerent. Article 5 states that military hospital ships are to
be painted white (with a horizontal green stripe) and fly “the white flag with a
red cross” to identify them as protected vessels.
The 1899 Hague (III) Convention was ratified by the United States in Sep-
tember 1900 and was incorporated into the U.S. Naval War Code of 1900.10 Arti-
cles 21 through 28 of the latter correspond, more or less verbatim, with Articles 1
through 10 of the former.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 provided the first real test of the 1899
Hague (III) Convention. Both Russia and Japan were parties to the treaty, and
both accepted and (for the most part) abided by its terms. There were, however,
allegations of intentional violation. Of particular note was a Russian claim that
the Japanese deliberately fired at Russian hospital ships during the siege of Port
Arthur in May 1904, an assertion that the Japanese denied.11 The following year
the Russian hospital ship Orel was captured and subsequently condemned by a
Japanese prize court for “signaling” and providing other nonmedical services to
the Russian fleet in ways that amounted to use for military purposes.12
The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 produced twelve separate con-
ventions, including the 1907 Hague (X) Convention for the Adaptation to Mari-
time Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention.13 This treaty is
essentially a reiteration of the 1899 Hague (III) Convention with several new ar-
ticles added for clarity. Most important, for the purposes of this enquiry, is Arti-
cle 8, which provides:
Hospital ships and sick wards of vessels are no longer entitled to protection if they
are employed for the purpose of injuring the enemy.
The fact of the staff of the said ships and sick wards being armed for maintaining or-
der and for defending the sick and wounded, and the presence of wireless telegraphy
apparatus on board, is not a sufficient reason for withdrawing protection.14
The 1907 Hague (X) Convention continues the 1899 Hague (III) Convention re-
gime with respect to mandatory steps to enhance the identification of hospital
ships—for example, external surfaces painted white with a green stripe, and a
white flag with a red cross.15
At the outbreak of World War I, the 1899 Hague (III) Convention and the
1907 Hague (X) Convention were recognized by the belligerents of both sides as
governing the use and protection of hospital ships during international armed
conflict. Indeed, these same rules applied during World War II. Although the
Diplomatic Conference of 1929 produced the 1929 Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the
Field,16 which revised and updated the 1906 Convention of the same name, and
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the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,17 ef-
forts to revise the 1906 Hague (X) Convention did not proceed beyond the draft
stage before the onset of World War II.18 Consequently, rules fashioned to ac-
commodate warfare at sea in the nineteenth century were still in place as late as
1949. Indeed, this body of law was arguably obsolete even before the onset of
hostilities in 1914. One observer, writing shortly after the end of World War II,
noted that
the framers of Hague Convention No. X had two main contingencies in mind: the
first was the old-fashioned fleet action fought at short range with bloody carnage and
consequently need for speedy succour of the wounded. Hospital ships were expected
to accompany the fleet to sea and wait on the outskirts of the engagement with a view
to picking up the wounded and drowning, and accordingly required protection while
engaged on their task; thus, too, the obsolete provisions for respecting sick bays look
back to the days when they might have been the scene of hand-to-hand fighting. Sec-
ondly, the Convention had to provide for the protection of sick and wounded com-
batant personnel such as might have been found on board troopers [sic] or merchant
ships intercepted by the enemy. Having safeguarded them, its framers had completed
their task of giving the sailor the protection to which the soldier was already entitled:
they made no provision for the civilian, because none was needed.19
By the advent of World War I, the role of the hospital ship had evolved signifi-
cantly. No longer hovering at the fringe of battle to attend to stricken seamen af-
ter engagements, the hospital ships of that conflict were principally engaged in
the transport of wounded and sick combatants from theaters of operations
ashore to hospital facilities at home—a role not envisioned by the framers of
early conventions. The only specific admonition against using hospital ships for
military purposes set forth in Article 4 of the 1907 Hague (X) Convention is that
against hampering “the movements of the combatants,” clearly a vestige of
close-aboard fleet action of a bygone era. Nonetheless, the belligerents of both
world wars accepted the applicability of Hague (X) to those conflicts, while dif-
fering, often markedly, as to its interpretation.20
Practice during World Wars I and II
Many of the problems encountered during both conflicts revolved around the
difficulty of identification. White hulls, green stripes, and the distinctive flag
may have served well in daylight encounters with surface vessels relatively
nearby, but they proved largely ineffective in warfare at sea marked by
long-range surface bombardment and air and subsurface engagements, often
during darkness or in adverse weather conditions. Not surprisingly, damage to
and destruction of hospital ships in both world wars was generally the result of
misidentification, although deliberate attacks certainly did occur. In January
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1917, alleging that British and French hospital ships were being used to trans-
port troops and munitions, Germany announced that it would sink on sight en-
emy hospital ships found in certain designated waters.21 Both Great Britain and
France denied those allegations, but a number of British and French hospital
ships were in fact sunk by German U-boats. Perhaps most grievous was the sink-
ing of Llandovery Castle on 27 June 1918 by U-86. The British hospital ship
Llandovery Castle was en route to England after delivering wounded and sick Ca-
nadian soldiers to Halifax, Nova Scotia, when it was torpedoed and sunk some
116 nautical miles southwest of Ireland. Two hundred thirty-four of its 258 crew
and medical staff perished (there were no patients on board at the time). The
German Supreme Court, in the war crimes trial of two of the U-boat’s officers in
1921, found that
up to the year 1916 the steamer Llandovery Castle had . . . been used for the transport
of troops. In that year she was commissioned by the British Government to carry
wounded and sick Canadian soldiers home to Canada from the European theatre of
war. The vessel was suitably fitted out for the purpose and was provided with the dis-
tinguishing marks, which the Tenth Hague Convention . . . requires in the case of na-
val hospital ships. The name of the vessel was communicated to the enemy Powers.
From that time onward she was exclusively employed in the transport of sick and
wounded. She never again carried troops, and never had taken munitions on board.22
The Court further found that notwithstanding directives from the German
high command that hospital ships (other than those encountered in designated
barred areas) were exempt from capture or destruction,
[the U-boat commander] was of the opinion . . . that on the enemy side, hospital
ships were being used for transporting troops and combatants, as well as munitions.
He, therefore, presumed that, contrary to International Law, a similar use was being
made of the Llandovery Castle. In particular, he seems to have expected she had
American airmen on board. Acting on this suspicion, he decided to torpedo the
ship.23
The first controversy over the protected status of hospital ships in World War
I, however, involved the capture and condemnation as prize of the German aux-
iliary hospital ship Ophelia in October 1914 by Great Britain. The prize court
found that Ophelia was “adapted and used as a signaling ship for military pur-
poses.”24 This instance of a hospital ship being used to obtain or transmit infor-
mation of a military character—reminiscent of the Orel case previously
mentioned—was, at least in part, responsible for the inclusion in Article 34 of
the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention of a specific prohibition of the possession or
use by hospital ships of a “secret code” for communications, a matter more fully
addressed below.25
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Hospital ships fared significantly better in World War II than in World War I.
The scholar J. C. Mossop has noted:
It is, perhaps, fair to say that during the 1939 war the British Admiralty, the United
States Navy Department, and the German Naval Command respected the Principles
of the [1907] Convention; such abuses as occurred were authorized at a low level and
were corrected when discovered. Despite government statements on both sides there
is little evidence to show that attacks on hospital ships were authorized by the respec-
tive commands and much to prove that the majority were accidental and due in the
main to faulty recognition.26
Although Mossop’s observations were addressed principally to the European
theater of operations and war in the Atlantic, the conduct of the belligerents in
the war in the Pacific followed a similar pattern. Violations were reported, both
regarding the misuse of hospital ships to transport combatant personnel and
munitions, and with respect to the intentional targeting of such vessels ostensi-
bly operating in full compliance with the 1907 Hague (X) rules.27 However, as
was the case in the Atlantic, both sides recognized the practical value of hospital
ships and sought to honor their protected status. In this respect the belligerents
were “principled” adversaries, adhering to basic humanitarian values perceived
to be in their respective interests. This general compliance with the law of naval
warfare was not, then, entirely altruistic. Indeed, the importance of reciprocity
in this calculus is reflected in an exchange of message traffic between Admiral
H. P. Smith, USN, Senior Officer Present of U.S. Naval Forces in the Marianas,
then providing blockade forces in the Bonin Islands, and the Commander in
Chief Pacific. Admiral Smith had expressed his intention to
exercise the privilege accorded in Article 4 of the Hague Convention to divert the
[Japanese] hospital ship, on her departure from Chichi Jima, to Iwo Jima, where I
would conduct an examination.
I was immediately directed by the Commander-in-Chief not to undertake the action
in view of the fact that every effort was being made to avoid any incident regarding
hospital vessels, which might lead to a reprisal against our own.28
The practical difficulties associated with identifying hospital ships were, as
noted above, amply and tragically exemplified in the two world wars. As the role
of long-range artillery, submarines, and attack aircraft expanded exponentially
in war at sea, so too did the likelihood of faulty identification. In recognition of
this reality and the experience of World War I, a committee of experts that con-
vened in Geneva in 1937 to draft revisions to the 1907 Hague (X) Convention
reported:
The development of means of modern warfare (aviation and long-range artillery) has
rendered insufficient the means of identification heretofore provided in the Hague
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Convention. That is why the Commission has believed that it should stipulate the
obligation for hospital ships, in addition to the red band on a white background, to
be furnished on the bridge and the elevated parts with red crosses on a white back-
ground clearly visible from any direction whatsoever.29
Due to the onset of World War II, that effort did not come to formal fruition.
However, the need to improve the identification regime for hospital ships was
such that the belligerents adopted the markings proposed in the committee’s re-
port. William Bishop, in a U.S. State Department internal memorandum of 7
May 1943, noted,
It would . . . appear that the provisions of Article 5 of Hague Convention X are being
complied with in the present war, but that there is developing a practice by
belligerents, approved by the International Committee of the Red Cross, of placing
additional markings of red crosses on white backgrounds on their hospital ships. . . .
[Such] additional markings are being used currently on Japanese hospital ships, as
well as on those of the United States, Great Britain, Germany and Italy.30
These initiatives, and others during the course of the conflict, proved to be
very beneficial. Mossop notes that
during the 1939 war additional markings on the sides, stern, and deck of hospital
ships to aid identification by day, and illumination at night with a band of green
lights on the sides and red crosses on the sides and deck picked out with red lamps,
were adopted by common consent and provided a high degree of protection against
underwater attack—although errors are not unknown in practice.31
However, as Mossop also observes,
the advent of the high-level bomber has provided a problem of an entirely different
kind. Existing methods of marking and illumination have proved unsatisfactory even
at close range, and objections raised by local military authorities to the presence in-
side their ports of illuminated ships have added a complication to an already difficult
problem. At sea and in port accidental attacks on hospital ships have been all too fre-
quent and the casualty lists heavy.32
The issue of effective identification of hospital ships was to remain a matter
of importance in the drafting of postwar rules.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The experience of the two world wars, coupled with the revolution of that era in
naval warfare technology and practice, mandated a thorough overhaul of the
rules pertaining to the protections and obligations of military hospital ships. Ac-
cordingly, a diplomatic conference convened in Geneva in early 1949 to revise
and expand the regime for international protection of war victims set about to
include a comprehensive treaty with respect to the maritime environment. It
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C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:39 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
99
War College: Winter 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
produced the Geneva (II) Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.33 The 1949
Geneva (II) Convention consists of sixty-three articles, whereas the 1907 Hague
(X) Convention had but twenty-eight: “This extension is mainly due to the fact
that the present Convention [the 1949 Geneva Convention(II)] is conceived as a
complete and independent Convention whereas the 1907 Convention restricted
itself to adapting to maritime warfare the principles of the [1906 Geneva] Con-
vention on the wounded and sick in land warfare.”34
Chapter III (Articles 22 through 35) of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention sets
forth the basic obligations and protections of hospital ships. They are to be pro-
tected at all times “and may in no circumstances be attacked or captured.”35 This
language makes clear that hospital ships retain their protected status whether or
not they are, at a given moment, engaged in the treatment or transport of casual-
ties. It also clarifies the somewhat archaic wording that hospital ships “shall be
respected,” with the admonition that they may not be “attacked.” Article 22 re-
flects the actual practice of the world wars in making clear that the permissible
employment of hospital ships includes the transportation as well as the treat-
ment of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, including military members ren-
dered hors de combat in land warfare. Among the clarifications necessitated by
disparate interpretations that surfaced during World War I, and again in World
War II, is the assertion in Article 26 that the protections of the convention ex-
tend to hospital ships of any tonnage, as well as to their lifeboats.
Of particular relevance to this enquiry are those provisions of the convention
that address the circumstances or actions that may lead to loss of protection. Ar-
ticle 30 sets forth the basic premise that hospital ships are not to be used for any
military purpose other than, of course, the care and transport of casualties.
Moreover, they “shall in no wise hamper the movement of the combatants.” Ar-
ticle 30 also postulates, however, that “during and after an engagement” hospital
ships “act at their own risk.” Pictet, in his analysis of this latter provision, noted
that
in 1937, the question was raised as to whether a hospital ship should not waive the
protection of the Convention when being escorted by warships since it would then
no longer be possible to stop and search it. In fact that was the position taken by cer-
tain countries during the Second World War. A hospital ship is obviously bound to
lose its immunity under the Convention if it is being escorted by warships.36
However, in a footnote accompanying that assertion, Pictet added: “Which does
not mean that the humanitarian principles would not be applied in such a case,
or that one would be justified in deliberately firing on the hospital ship.”37
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This rather confusing commentary is clarified in the ensuing paragraph, in
which Pictet postulated that “if hospital ships draw near to warships, they do not
lose their protection of the Convention but they may in fact expose themselves
to danger.” Clearly, warships in proximity to hospital ships do not thereby some-
how assume immunity from attack; conversely, hospital ships do not lose their
immunity when in the presence of warships. The language of Article 30 should
be read in that sense, whether or not the hospital ship is under warship convoy.
The likelihood that a hospital ship may be engaged in some nefarious purpose
while under escort is so remote that any doctrine justifying its attack solely on
the ground that the intercepting force is denied the opportunity to stop and
search it becomes, in my view, indefensible.
Article 34 of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention provides, in pertinent part,
The protection to which hospital ships and sick-bays are entitled shall not cease un-
less they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the
enemy.
. . . In particular, hospital ships may not possess or use a secret code for their wireless
or other means of communication.
Pictet, in his commentary on Article 34, stated that the term “acts harmful to the
enemy” is “self evident and must remain quite general,” noting that such acts in-
clude “carrying combatants or arms, transmitting military information by ra-
dio, or deliberately providing cover for a warship.” He added,
The fact that the use of any secret code is prohibited affords a guarantee to the
belligerents that hospital ships will not make improper use of their transmitting ap-
paratus or any other means of communication. Hospital ships may only communi-
cate in clear, or at least in a code that is universally known, and rightly so, for the
spirit of the Geneva Conventions requires that there should be nothing secret in their
behaviour viz-à-viz the enemy.38
Unfortunately, this desire to avoid any possibility of using a hospital ship’s
communications suite in a manner harmful to the enemy, as was the case with
the Orel in 1904, created a major problem for contemporary naval practice.39 In
order to carry out fully their humanitarian functions, hospital ships must be
able to proceed to designated pickup points to evacuate wounded and sick per-
sonnel from facilities ashore and to rendezvous with combatant units at sea
when and where necessary to embark casualties. To do so without providing
critical military information to the enemy obviously requires the use of en-
crypted communications. The experience of the Royal Navy in the Falklands/
Malvinas conflict of 1982 illustrates the point. The legal expert Philippe Eberlin
has described the practical difficulties encountered:
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All communications were made in clear. As the use of secret codes is banned by Arti-
cle 34 of the Second Convention, the radio communications exchanged by the hospi-
tal ships with their land bases were also in clear. It was not possible for them to
communicate directly with the warships, since any communication in clear could re-
veal the warship’s position to the adversary. Consequently the hospital ships were not
informed about the movements of the fleet or about the development of military op-
erations on land, and thus had to wait in readiness in a zone known as the “Red
Cross Box,” which could be equated with a neutralized zone. . . .
To maintain long distance contact with their bases, the . . . hospital ships used radio
telex via the Inmarsat satellite system. Telex messages were likewise exchanged in the
clear, which meant that the hospital ships could not be informed in detail about the
medical evacuations in which they were required to participate. . . . The Naval Com-
mand, from which the hospital ship received its orders, could not use coded radio
communications to inform it directly, and thus rapidly, about the military situation
and dangers in the area where it was operating, nor about the numbers of casualties
to be evacuated, the wounds sustained, emergency cases, etc.40
It should be noted that the drafters of Article 34 were aware of at least some of
the difficulties that were to be encountered in its application. Resolution 6 of the
diplomatic conference that produced the 1949 Geneva Conventions states:
Whereas the present Conference has not been able to raise the question of the techni-
cal study of means of communication between hospital ships, on the one hand, and
warships and military aircraft, on the other, since that study went beyond its terms of
reference;
Whereas this question is of the greatest importance for the safety and efficient opera-
tion of hospital ships, the Conference recommends that the High Contracting Parties
will, in the near future, instruct a Committee of Experts to examine technical im-
provements of modern means of communication between hospital ships, on the one
hand, and warships and military aircraft, on the other, and also to study the possibil-
ity of drawing up an International Code laying down precise regulations for the use
of those means, in order that hospital ships may be assured of the maximum protec-
tion and be enabled to operate with the maximum efficiency.41
This recommendation proved to be easier said than done. Unfortunately, the
prohibition on the use of “secret codes” remains a serious problem for contem-
porary practice; it will be addressed further below.
Specific conditions set forth in Article 35 that do not deprive hospital ships of
their protections include:
• Arming of crew members for the purpose of maintaining order, for their
own defense or for the defense of the wounded and sick 42
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• The presence on board of apparatus exclusively intended to facilitate
navigation or communication43
• Portable arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and sick
• Care of wounded, sick and shipwrecked civilians
• Transport of equipment and personnel intended exclusively for medical
duties.44
The first condition cited, arming crew members, is essentially the same as that
set forth in Article 8 of the 1907 Hague (X) Convention. While it is premised on
an outdated view of the employment of hospital ships in naval warfare, it retains
some contemporary utility with respect to the possible boarding of such vessels
by terrorists, pirates, or other unauthorized forces.
Article 43 of the 1949 Geneva II Convention addresses the distinctive mark-
ings to be used to identify hospital ships. Pictet commented, “It is clear from the
records that the lack of an up-to-date system of marking, visible at a great dis-
tance, was the cause of most of the attacks made on hospital ships during the Sec-
ond World War. [T]he Diplomatic Conference therefore adopted far-reaching
amendments to the 1907 text.”
However, the improvements that were attained remained in the realm of what
was to be painted how large and in what color—not solutions of problems asso-
ciated with high-altitude bombers, let alone beyond-visual-range projectiles
and missiles—considerations that even then were beginning to dominate war at
sea. Article 43 provides, in pertinent part, that
the [hospital] ships . . . shall be distinctively marked as follows:
(a) All exterior surfaces shall be white.
(b) One or more dark red crosses, as large as possible, shall be painted and displayed
on each side of the hull and on the horizontal surfaces, so placed as to afford the
greatest possible visibility from the sea and from the air.
All hospital ships shall make themselves known by hoisting their national flag. . . . A
white flag with a red cross shall be flown at the mainmast as high as possible.45
Comprehensive improvements in the regime for identification of hospital
ships were not formally achieved until the coming into force of Additional Pro-
tocol I and its annexes.
Additional Protocol I of 1977
The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(known simply as “Additional Protocol I”), has its origins in conferences of gov-
ernment experts under the auspices of the ICRC between 1974 and 1977. That
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effort produced a draft treaty that was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference at
Geneva on 8 June 1977 and opened for signature on 12 December of that year.46
Additional Protocol I does not address the rules of international law applicable
in war at sea, except as the conflict affects the civilian population on land (naval
and air bombardment from sea to shore, etc.);47 however, it does pertain to the
protection of the victims of international armed conflict, including wounded,
sick, and shipwrecked personnel—and, therefore, hospital ships.
The provisions of Additional Protocol I bearing on this enquiry include Arti-
cle 22 (1), which stipulates that hospital ships may care for and transport civilian
sick, wounded, and shipwrecked persons; and Annex I, which provides technical
regulations for the marking and identification of hospital ships, among other
things. The inclusion of civilian casualties reflected the practice of both world
wars and was not controversial. Annex I, while adopted by consensus by the Dip-
lomatic Conference, nonetheless poses some problems in its implementation.
Chapter III of Annex I, “Distinctive Signals,” begins by asserting that use of
the signals “is optional” (Article 5). Article 6 addresses a signal specifically for
medical aircraft (a flashing blue light) but states that it may also be employed on
other medical transports, including hospital ships. Article 7 prescribes an iden-
tifying radio message, preceded by a distinctive priority signal, for use exclu-
sively by medical transports: call sign, position, and type; intended route, times
of departure and arrival; and other relevant information, such as flight altitude,
radio frequencies being guarded, and “secondary surveillance radar” (below)
modes and codes. These messages are to be transmitted in English at appropriate
intervals on an agreed frequency.48 Article 8, in turn, establishes the secondary
surveillance radar (SSR) system for identifying medical aircraft;49 the parties to a
conflict may agree to use the SSR system on hospital ships as well. Finally, Article
9 (as amended on 30 November 1993) provides in part that:
3. It should be possible for medical transports to be identified by submarines by the
appropriate underwater acoustic signals transmitted by the medical transports.
The underwater acoustic signal shall consist of the call sign . . . of the ship preceded
by the single group YYY transmitted in Morse on an appropriate acoustic frequency,
e.g. 5 kHz.
Parties to a conflict wishing to use the underwater acoustic signal . . . shall inform the
Parties concerned of the signal as soon as possible, and shall . . . confirm the fre-
quency to be employed.50
The effectiveness and efficiency of the distinctive signals regime of Annex I
have, of course, yet to be tested in the crucible of combat at sea. Given that adop-
tion by the parties to Additional Protocol I of the various signals in Chapter III
of Annex I is optional, and that hospital ships are today few in number, these
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technical means of identification will likely remain untested under wartime
conditions for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, in an effort to optimize these
provisions, the ICRC published in 1990 its Manual for the Use of Technical Means
of Identification. W. E. M. Heintschel von Heinegg (the Naval War College’s
Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law for 2003–2004) has ob-
served that “in modern warfare, which is characterized by the use of electronic
means of warfare, these additional technical means of identification are essen-
tial for minimizing the danger of mistaken attacks. . . . In view of modern weap-
ons technology the methods recommended [in the 1990 manual] are, however,
only a first step in the right direction.”51
Assuming that these distinctive signals do prove effective in combat, there re-
mains the potential for abuse, particularly with respect to the underwater acous-
tic signal concept set forth in Article 9 (as amended). However, attempts by
vessels to pose as hospital ships are not likely in the war on terror and so will not
be further pursued here.
The San Remo Manual of 1994
The purpose of the manual is to provide a contemporary restatement of interna-
tional law applicable to armed conflicts at sea.
A contemporary manual was considered necessary because of developments in the
law since 1913 that for the most part have not been incorporated into recent treaty
law, the Second Geneva Convention of 1949 being essentially limited to the protec-
tion of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea. In particular, there has not been a
development for the law of armed conflict at sea similar to that for the law of armed
conflict on land with the conclusion of Protocol I of 1977 additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.52
The international-law specialists and naval experts from twenty-two differ-
ent nations who produced the San Remo Manual did so in their individual,
rather than official, capacities. Nonetheless, the manual is widely regarded as au-
thoritative in its articulation of both the customary and conventional law of na-
val warfare. Accordingly, its rendering of the rules pertaining to cryptographic
communications, defensive armament, and means of identification for hospital
ships—the three principal areas of this enquiry into the employment of hospital
ships in the war on terror—are particularly germane.
Article 171 of the San Remo Manual represents a fairly sharp departure from
existing conventional law with respect to cryptographic equipment on hospital
ships. Article 34 of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention not only specifically pro-
hibits the possession by hospital ships of “a secret code for their wireless or other
means of communication” but does so in the context of “acts harmful to the en-
emy” that trigger loss of immunity from attack, albeit only after due warning
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and failure to take remedial action.53 The practical difficulties with adherence to
this prohibition in the modern age have been addressed above in connection
with the Falklands/Malvinas War; it comes as no surprise that the drafters of the
new manual concluded that Article 34 is no longer workable:
Technology has changed since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions. All messages
to and from warships, including unclassified messages are nowadays automatically
encrypted when sent and decrypted when received by communication equipment
that organically includes the crypto function. Hospital ships, therefore, should have
the same type of communication equipment to avoid delays in receiving vital infor-
mation caused by having separate and outdated radio equipment that does not have
the integral crypto function.54
Accordingly, Article 171 of the manual provides that “in order to fulfill most ef-
fectively their humanitarian mission, hospital ships should be permitted to use
cryptographic equipment. The equipment shall not be used in any circum-
stances to transmit intelligence data nor in any way to acquire any military
advantage” [emphasis added]. This formulation is an expression of what the
drafters considered the law ought to be, not what it is. Nonetheless, it is certainly
welcome as a step in the right direction.
The manual also takes a more realistic approach to the need for hospital ships
to possess at least some means of self-defense. Long-standing conventional law
prohibits “acts harmful to the enemy” by hospital ships.55 While those proscrip-
tions are silent as to the means that may be employed to defend the ship itself (as
opposed to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked being cared for on board), it is
clear that offensive capability is impermissible. Indeed, interpretation of con-
ventional law in this respect has historically been very restrictive, not even al-
lowing a modicum of self-defense capability, beyond small arms to protect
casualties and medical staff. This hesitation stems from the obligation of hospi-
tal ships to submit to boarding and inspection by warships of the opposing
party; weapons sufficient to thwart such boardings would pose potential for
abuse.56 This restrictive interpretation is reflected in the military manuals cur-
rently in use by most navies.57 Again, this is very understandable. In the abstract,
there is a reluctance to take any initiative that could possibly lead to loss of
immunity.
Article 170 of the San Remo Manual provides that “hospital ships may be
equipped with purely deflective means of defence, such as chaff and flares. The
presence of such equipment should be notified.” The explanation accompanying
this provision states:
As there is no prohibition on hospital ships defending themselves, it would be unrea-
sonable not to allow them to do so as long as it is in a way that cannot be interpreted
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as being potentially aggressive. In particular, with modern means of warfare, it is
quite likely that a missile could be deflected from a military target using its deflective
means of defence, and that the missile would then find a ship without such means,
namely, hospital ships. As hospital ships are likely to be in the vicinity of warships,
the chances of their being hit in this way are quite high and not allowing them this
means of defence would mean that they are more likely to be hit than warships,
which would be an absurd result. . . .
This paragraph is formulated in a way as to leave no doubt that hospital ships can
only use deflective means of defence, and not means that could be used in an offen-
sive fashion, such as antiaircraft guns.58
This provision is also a welcome contribution. However, as will be discussed
below in the context of the war on terror, much remains to be done if hospital
ships are to be given a realistic chance to survive an attack, whether intentional
or inadvertent.
With respect to identification, the manual provides in Article 172 that “hos-
pital ships . . . are encouraged to implement the means of identification set out
in Annex I of Additional Protocol I of 1977.” Article 173, in turn, states, “These
means of identification are intended only to facilitate identification and do not,
of themselves, confer immunity.” It is important here to bear in mind that the
distinctive signals set out in Annex I are optional. Not using them does not de-
prive an otherwise protected platform of immunity from attack.
U.S. NAVY HOSPITAL SHIPS: CONTEMPORARY CAPABILITY,
DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE
The concept of employment of U.S. Navy hospital ships is officially character-
ized as follows:
Hospital ships are flexible, capable and unique Navy HSS [health service support] as-
sets that can be used in joint operations or combined/coalition wartime operations
and peacetime operations. They are well suited for joint operations with a naval com-
ponent because of their self-sustainability. They can be employed in war operations
and in certain military peacetime operations, such as humanitarian assistance and di-
saster relief. In peacetime operations, the hospital ship may operate independently or
as part of a joint or coalition force. Hospital ships are designed for operations of a
long-term nature (i.e., 60 days or longer, 30 days without major resupply).59
U.S. Navy Hospital Ship Capability
The primary mission of a U.S. Navy hospital ship is to:
Provide rapid, flexible, and mobile acute medical care to support a Marine air/
ground task force (MAGTF) deployed ashore, Army and Air Force units deployed
ashore, and naval amphibious task forces and battle forces afloat. Operations are
governed by the principles of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
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Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea of
12 August 1949.
As a secondary mission, the ships (with appropriate tailoring of manning,
medical material/equipment, and provisions) are capable of providing mobile
surgical hospital service for use by U.S. government agencies involved in disaster
or humanitarian relief, or of limited humanitarian care incident to these mis-
sions or to peacetime military operations.60
The U.S. Navy currently has two hospital ships in active status, USNS Mercy
(T-AH 19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20).61 They joined the fleet in 1986 and
1987, respectively. Both are converted San Clemente–class commercial
supertankers with a full-load displacement of 69,360 tons and an overall length
of 894 feet. They have a range of thirteen thousand nautical miles at 17.5 knots.
Each is manned (when activated) with a civilian master and sixty-three civilian
mariners, as well as fifty-eight Navy communications and support personnel.
Upon full mobilization, each ship would be staffed by an additional 1,100 medical/
dental personnel. However, that number can be significantly lower, depending
on the mission. As an example, Mercy operated in the Philippines as a hospital
facility in 1987 with a medical/dental complement of just 375 personnel, treat-
ing over sixty-three thousand patients during a three-month deployment. Both
Mercy and Comfort boast twelve operating theaters, four X-ray rooms, a phar-
macy, and a blood bank. They each have an eighty-bed intensive care unit and
920 other patient beds to accommodate intermediate and minimal-care casual-
ties. Mercy and Comfort are maintained in a “reduced operational status,” Mercy
in San Diego and Comfort in Baltimore. They can be fully activated and crewed
within five days.62
Without question, the Mercy-class hospital ship represents a formidable ca-
pability in the treatment and care of casualties in the numbers that may be en-
countered in the course of the war on terror, whether or not weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) fall into the hands of, or are employed by, al-Qa‘ida or
other terrorist entities. Obviously, mass casualties can result from conventional
weapons and devices—witness the destruction of the Marine barracks in Beirut
in 1983; the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995; the Khobar Towers in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996; Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in
1988; the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the World Trade Center
in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, in 2001; the nightclub
in Kuda, Bali, in 2002; and the train in Madrid, Spain, in 2004, to cite but a few
such attacks. Nonetheless, the potential carnage from a nuclear, chemical, or bi-
ological attack makes WMD a terrorist threat of another order of magnitude.
Nonetheless, whether attacks are conventional or unconventional, the
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importance of the humanitarian contribution that platforms such as Mercy and
Comfort can make in the war on terror is apparent.
Recent Practice and Current Doctrine
Both Comfort and Mercy were activated in August 1990 and deployed to the Per-
sian Gulf in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Comfort
was also activated in 1994 during the Haitian crisis to process refugees in Opera-
tion UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and again in 1998 to participate in BALTIC CHAL-
LENGE 98, a NATO Partnership for Peace exercise in the Baltic Sea.63 More
recently, Comfort was deployed to New York Harbor in the aftermath of the de-
struction of the World Trade Center in September 2001 and, in January 2003, to
the Persian Gulf in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Comfort’s deployment following 9/11 illustrates the versatility of this class of
ship. On departure from Baltimore on 12 September, Comfort was assigned to
provide emergency medical assistance to victims of the terrorist attack. However,
by the time the ship arrived on station, its mission had been changed to providing
logistical and hotel services support to firefighters and emergency personnel.64 In
January 2003, Comfort returned to its primary mission while deployed in support
of IRAQI FREEDOM, treating more than 650 battle-related casualties, including
about two hundred Iraqi prisoners of war and Iraqi civilians.65
Current doctrine regarding identification of U.S. Navy hospital ships is pre-
mised on applicable provisions of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention, in accor-
dance with which such vessels (hospital ships and lifeboats) are “conspicuously
marked. They are painted white with dark red crosses painted on their bow, side,
stern, and horizontal surfaces for recognition from the air and sea. The red
crosses should be illuminated at night. A hospital ship must fly its national flag
and a white flag with a red cross at the main mast.”66
To my knowledge, Navy doctrinal publications make no mention of the dis-
tinctive electronic identification signals outlined in Annex I to Additional Pro-
tocol I—flashing blue lights, priority radio signals, SSR modes and codes, or
underwater acoustic signals.67 However, flashing blue lights and the SSR system
are in fact installed in Comfort, although the underwater acoustic signal system
is not.68 This is not surprising, in that the United States is not a party to Addi-
tional Protocol I, the distinctive signals regime of Annex I being optional in any
event. Moreover, in the war on terror it is not at all clear that such signals would
serve any useful purpose.
As regards the employment of cryptographic communications equipment in
U.S. hospital ships, U.S. Navy doctrine continues to recite the 1949 Geneva II
Convention prohibitions on the use of “secret codes”:
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The second paragraph of Article 34 of GWS-Sea [i.e., the 1949 Geneva II Conven-
tion] provides that hospital ships may not possess or use a secret code for their wire-
less or other means of communication. This proscription may include many types of
encryption devices that are common to many means of modern communication.
United States policy is to follow all provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including
the prohibition on use of secure and encrypted communications aboard hospital
ships.
The technological requirements of modern communications have clearly rendered
this provision of GWS-Sea outdated. . . . [M]ost modern communications and navi-
gation systems, including satellite systems, use some form of encryption even at the
most basic level. While avoiding all use of encrypted equipment may be problematic,
the prohibition contained in the Geneva Convention requires extreme vigilance in
ensuring that hospital ships do not lose their protected status.69
This formulation is reflective of existing conventional law. However, as dis-
cussed above, compliance with these dictates poses severe practical problems for
hospital ships in the modern era. Actual U.S. Navy practice reflects a more flexi-
ble approach. Michael Sirak, writing for Jane’s Defence Weekly, has reported that
encrypted communications devices were installed in Comfort before deploy-
ment to the Middle East in January 2003:
USN officials argue that the rules preventing hospital ships from using encrypted
communications devices—contained principally in the Second Geneva Convention
of 1949—do not adequately account for technological advancements, such as satellite
communications, which are today regarded as vital for these vessels to function effec-
tively. “The way most naval warships communicate now is done on a level that even
the most simple communications have some level of encryption,” said one Navy offi-
cial. “Even the actual navigation of the ship can sometimes be in jeopardy if you can-
not use these encrypted forms of communication.”70
Assuming this report is accurate, and I have no doubt that it is, the U.S. Navy has
exercised very good sense in equipping Comfort with encrypted communica-
tions prior to deployment for IRAQI FREEDOM.
Current U.S. Navy doctrine respecting the placement of weapons in hospital
ships notes that such ships lose their protection if they engage in hostile acts but
that arming crews for the maintenance of order, for their own defense or that of
the sick and wounded, does not deprive hospital ships of the protection other-
wise due them.71 As noted above, this formulation, taken from the 1949 Geneva
(II) Convention, has historically been interpreted to mean that only light indi-
vidual weapons may be employed.
Contemporary U.S. Navy practice is more realistic. Jane’s Defence Weekly re-
ports that .50-caliber machine guns were installed on Comfort prior to its de-
ployment in support of IRAQI FREEDOM:
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USN officials say the small arms currently allowed on hospital ships, such as side
arms and rifles, are not enough to thwart an attack by a non-state actor like a terror-
ist group. They say the limited protection afforded to these vessels under interna-
tional law would be unlikely to deter terrorists and, unlike lawful belligerents,
terrorists would consider them an attractive “soft” target. Therefore, they argue that
it is necessary to place “crew-served” weapons like .30-cal. and .50-cal. machine guns
on them, exclusively for defence, to fend off attacks by swarming, heavily armed
speed boats or suicide craft.72
Again, I have no doubt that this report is correct. Indeed, it would have been
inexcusable if Comfort had been dispatched to the Arabian Gulf, and thereby
placed in harm’s way, without at least this modicum of self-protection.
ASSESSMENT, RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSALS, AND OPTIONS
Both the conventional and customary law of international armed conflict cloaks
hospital ships with immunity from capture or attack. This humanitarian dictate
is premised on the principle that unnecessary suffering and destruction in
armed conflict serves no valid military purpose and, accordingly, is to be mini-
mized as much as possible.
Identification of Hospital Ships in the War on Terror
Wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military members, and the medical personnel
who care for them, are considered noncombatants and therefore not subject to
direct attack. Hospital ships caring for and transporting casualties of war enjoy
immunity from deliberate attack, provided they are identifiable as such—hence
the rules regarding distinctive markings, emblems, and signals. As this article
has noted, most of the damage and destruction inflicted on hospital ships in past
conflicts was the result of misidentification, a problem that has intensified in
this era of beyond-visual-range targeting.
However, the notion that hospital ships will not be intentionally attacked if
they can be properly identified is premised on the assumption that the adversary
is principled. Members of the armed forces of sovereign states engaged in armed
conflict are presumably fully conversant with the law of armed conflict and ded-
icated to compliance with it. Indeed, notwithstanding the carnage of the wars of
the twentieth century, there was a decided effort by most, if not all, participating
states to respect the law of armed conflict. The war on terror presents a far differ-
ent paradigm. A terrorist organization, whether composed of nonstate actors or
clandestine operatives of sovereign entities, is by definition an unprincipled ad-
versary, with the will to target intentionally noncombatant personnel, facilities,
and activities, both civilian and military. They consider protected places and
platforms targets of choice, both for their vulnerability and the shock value
of their destruction. In this context, effective identification of hospital ships
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becomes academic—in the war on terror, hospital ships may be targeted because
they are hospital ships. It is perhaps not unreasonable, then, to question the wis-
dom of painting them white, adorning them with red crosses or crescents, and il-
luminating them at night.
At this juncture it would be well to remember that the essence of the law is
protection of the humanitarian function performed by the platform, not its
coating of paint or the symbols it displays. A vessel devoted exclusively to the
care and transport of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked personnel, and under-
stood by an adversary to be so employed, is protected under the law whether it is
painted white, green, or haze gray.73 If identification worsens the vulnerability of
a hospital ship to attack, a fresh coat of paint offers little comfort.
That said, however, I am not a proponent of removing protective markings
from U.S. Navy hospital ships in the war on terror, provided they are defended by
accompanying combatants or are equipped to protect themselves from attack,
deliberate or inadvertent. In my view, the distinctive painting and the promi-
nent display of the protective symbol serve a purpose beyond that of reducing
the likelihood of inadvertent attack by a principled adversary. Hospital ships are
symbolic of our humanity, in many ways. They provide hope and comfort sim-
ply by their visible presence. This is particularly so in an era of mass casualties
inflicted by terrorists on innocent men, women, and children. In a world beset
by savagery, hospital ships are internationally recognized as a potent moral
force. We ought not to give that up lightly.
Encrypted Communications in Hospital Ships in the Twenty-first Century
As noted above, current U.S. Navy doctrine prohibits the possession or use by
hospital ships of any cryptographic means of communications during armed
conflict. While recent practice has somewhat eased that total proscription, the
problem remains. The genesis of these constraints involves a few isolated inci-
dents many years ago when hospital ships were alleged to have used coded wire-
less communications capability to transmit operational intelligence, a “military
purpose” use inconsistent with their protected status and in violation of the
1899 Hague (III) Convention and the 1907 Hague (X) Convention. In an effort
to prohibit such acts more clearly, the drafters of the 1949 Geneva (II) Conven-
tion created the “secret codes” prohibition of Article 34, discussed above, which
now frustrates the effective and efficient operation of hospital ships. Moreover,
combatant and logistic-support ships and aircraft transporting casualties to a
hospital ship remain targetable. If such platforms communicate in the clear, they
may reveal information that would help the enemy target not only themselves
but the rendezvous location, thereby endangering the hospital ship as well.
Domestic law considerations also are at issue in that Federal medical privacy
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standards mandate the protection of health information of individuals, necessi-
tating employment of secure means for the transmission of medical data. In
short, compliance with the “secret codes” prohibition of Article 34 of the 1949
Geneva (II) Convention seriously degrades the ability of modern hospital ships
to carry out their humanitarian mission, not only during the war on terror, but
generally.
The time has now come to abandon formally U.S. Navy adherence to the pro-
hibition of the possession and use by hospital ships of encrypted communica-
tions, whether for reception or transmission. Obviously, the conventional and
customary rules mandating that hospital ships not be used for any military pur-
pose other than the care and transport of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked
must remain inviolable. However, the likelihood that a hospital ship would be
employed to collect and promulgate military intelligence in this age of satellite
sensors, over-the-horizon radar, and fixed and mobile long-range hydrophones
is extremely remote; it strains the imagination to conjure up a scenario where it
would have any utility whatsoever. In my view, this is yet another instance of a
convention provision that no longer serves the purpose for which it was in-
tended and that adherence to which works at cross purposes with the greater
good envisioned by the treaty as a whole. I applaud the U.S. Navy’s reported de-
cision to equip Comfort with cryptographic communications in January 2003;
additionally, however, naval doctrinal publications should be modified accord-
ingly and the international community informed. Lest anyone doubt the legiti-
macy of its purpose, the U.S. Navy should publicly reaffirm its adherence to the
mandate that hospital ships not be utilized for military purposes in any way
harmful to a potential adversary. To this end, the right of a principled adversary
to board and inspect, and the presence on board of a neutral observer, should, in
my view, both be specifically endorsed.
Defensive Arming of Hospital Ships in the War on Terror
Given that existing conventional law is silent with respect to the means that hos-
pital ships may lawfully employ in their own defense, it is somewhat anomalous
that the U.S. Navy, and modern navies in general, find the issue so difficult to ad-
dress. I believe that there are two principal reasons for this hesitance. The first is
that protected places, persons, and things historically have been by their very na-
ture vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability, in turn, has been viewed as an as-
surance of their benign status; consequently, there can be no legitimate reason
for a principled adversary to attack them. The personnel, assets, and activities of
the ICRC are not intentionally targeted by principled combatants for precisely
this reason. Universally respected for the humanity they bring to the face of war,
they represent no threat to the belligerents; their ability to function effectively in
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harm’s way is dependent on this vulnerability. So too, with hospital ships. Inten-
tional attacks on hospital ships in the course of the two world wars were pre-
mised on the conviction, mistaken or otherwise, that despite their distinctive
markings and protected symbols, they were being employed in a manner harm-
ful to the attacking side—for instance, carrying arms and ammunition, trans-
porting combatant personnel, or transmitting intelligence. Defensive arming of
such platforms could contribute to the suspicion that some such nefarious pur-
pose was afoot.
That leads to the second reason for reluctance to give hospital ships defensive
armament—that, as suggested earlier, it could be wrongfully employed to thwart
legitimate boarding and inspection by the opposing party. Although I am un-
aware of any such misuse in actual practice, the potential for abuse remains.
Clearly, the concept of reciprocity is also at play here. Were the United States to
provide its hospital ships with a defensive capability, other states could do so as
well, and perhaps with a view to misuse.
Although conventional law provides little guidance on the issue, customary
practice has made clear that any arming of hospital ships beyond side arms and
the like will be viewed with suspicion at best. The San Remo Manual’s sanction-
ing of “deflective means of defense” in hospital ships, such as chaff and flares, is
most welcome. However, this timid formulation remains rooted in the concept
of vulnerability. This is made clear by its accompanying explanation: “This para-
graph is formulated in a way as to leave no doubt that hospital ships can only use
deflective means of defence, and not means that could be used in an offensive
fashion, such as antiaircraft guns. This is necessary to preserve the obviously in-
nocent nature of the vessel.”74 While the notion that antiaircraft guns installed in
hospital ships can plausibly be described as “offensive” gives pause, the manual’s
point is that vulnerability remains the sine qua non of protection.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is merit in restricting the
defensive capability of hospital ships to “deflective means” during conventional
warfare with a principled adversary, such niceties have no place in the war on
terror. As noted above, hospital ships are an attractively “soft” target for terror-
ists.75 Moreover, contemporary terrorist entities may have access to a variety of
weapons and weapons systems, ranging from state-of-the-art surface-to-surface
and air-to-surface missiles to unsophisticated but nonetheless deadly explosive
devices. With regard to the former, chaff and flares do provide some measure of
protection, but it would be irresponsible in the extreme to suggest that they can
be relied upon to thwart a missile attack. As to the latter, the effectiveness of un-
sophisticated weaponry must not be underestimated; witness the destruction of
the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.
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In this instance, the delivery means was an apparently innocent Mercedes
Benz stake-bed truck.76 The explosive mechanism was a gas-enhanced device,
probably consisting of bottled propane, butane, or acetylene, placed in proxim-
ity to a conventional explosive such as primacord, all of which are readily avail-
able on the retail market.77 Despite the lack of sophistication and ubiquity of its
component parts, a gas-enhanced device can be a very lethal weapon. Following
the Beirut barracks tragedy, the realization that terrorist organizations have
weapons of potentially enormous yield (the Beirut device is estimated to have
had the power of over twelve thousand pounds of TNT), deliverable by an ordi-
nary truck or van, led to the emplacement of protective barriers around critical
government facilities throughout the United States. The appreciation that such a
formidable weapon could also be delivered by a seemingly innocent small boat
or aircraft against a target at sea led in early 1984 to specially tailored naval rules
of engagement for U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.
The attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000 is yet another
case in point. In that incident a smaller device, apparently consisting of four to
seven hundred pounds of C-4 military plastic explosive, detonated in a small
boat that had come alongside Cole. The blast ripped a forty-by-forty-foot hole in
Cole’s port side, killing seventeen members of the crew and injuring forty others.
Had that attack occurred at sea, Cole might have been lost. The small boat that
delivered the bomb was similar to the many boats providing various services in
the harbor. The attacks both in Beirut and on Cole were suicide missions.
The point is that the risk of terrorist attack by a small boat or aircraft against a
U.S. Navy hospital ship operating in such waters is very real. Consequently, the
decision to place .50-caliber machine guns on Comfort prior to her deployment
to the Arabian Gulf last year was sound.
That having been said, I believe it would be prudent to install more effective
defensive means on U.S. Navy hospital ships. Specifically, and unless operational
or manning considerations dictate otherwise, I propose that the Phalanx
Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) be placed in Comfort or Mercy should either
be again deployed in support of the war on terror.78 Despite the curious com-
ment in the explanation accompanying the San Remo Manual that antiaircraft
weapons are offensive in nature, it is in my view ludicrous to suggest that Pha-
lanx is anything other than defensive.79
Phalanx provides ships of the U.S. Navy with a “last-chance” defense against
anti-ship missiles and littoral warfare threats that have penetrated other fleet de-
fenses. Phalanx automatically detects, tracks and engages anti-air warfare threats
such as anti-ship missiles and aircraft, while the Block 1B’s man-in-the-loop-system
counters the emerging littoral warfare threat. This new threat includes small, high-
speed surface craft, small terrorist aircraft, helicopters and surface mines.80
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The Phalanx weapons system is essentially a Gatling gun capable of firing 20 mm
rounds at a rate of 4,500 per minute. While its effective range is classified, its
purpose, as noted, is to stop close-in, penetrating threats.
The placement of .50-caliber machine guns and the Phalanx CIWS in U.S.
Navy hospital ships obviously would constitute a departure from the “safety in
vulnerability” mind-set that heretofore has characterized our approach to the
problem. I believe that these self-defense systems will not only enhance the capa-
bility of the platform to defeat a terrorist attack but provide a deterrent effect by
announcing to terrorist entities that a U.S. Navy hospital ship may not be as
“soft” a target as generally supposed. I therefore also propose that the United
States then notify the international community that necessary and appropriate
defensive means, namely Phalanx and .50-caliber machine guns, have been in-
stalled in both Comfort and Mercy. I further suggest that the United States again
confirm its intentions to abide fully with the right of a principled adversary to
board and inspect U.S. Navy hospital ships during international armed conflict.
Moreover, doctrinal publications should be revised to reflect the view that the
defensive arming of hospital ships is fully consistent with both the letter and the
spirit of the law of armed conflict.
When one considers the impressive humanitarian capability of the Mercy-
class hospital ship and the enormous psychological damage, let alone the cost in
human lives, that would be incurred if one should be lost to terrorist attack, the
case for state-of-the-art defensive capability seems apparent. The case against
rests not on any specific proscription of conventional law but upon adherence to
a vulnerability philosophy wholly unsuited to the realities of modern warfare at
sea generally or of the war on terror in particular. Heintschel von Heinegg makes
the very salient point that:
the law of naval warfare contains no rule or other provision that would justify the
conclusion that a belligerent is obliged to suffer an illegal attack or other illegal act
and to remain passive. In other words: the inherent right of self-defence that is not
abolished by any known legal order is implicitly recognized also by the law of naval
warfare. Accordingly, if there exist reasonable grounds for suspicion that hospital
ships will be the target of an illegal attack, a belligerent is entitled to take all necessary
measures to effectively prevent or counter that attack. If the only means available to
achieve that aim is the—defensive—arming of a hospital ship then this would not
constitute a violation of the law of naval warfare.81
The “Opt-Out” Option
Should the foregoing proposals prove politically unrealizable in the face of criti-
cism by traditionalists unwilling to depart from practices and policies fashioned
for a bygone era, serious consideration should be given to “opting out.” By this I
mean abandonment of the protections accorded to hospital ships by the 1949
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Geneva (II) Convention. Much as the Royal Navy has done with RFA (Royal
Fleet Auxiliary) Argus, Comfort and Mercy could be painted haze gray and desig-
nated as primary casualty receiving and treatment platforms rather than as hos-
pital ships.82 The Royal Navy, apparently concluding that the emplacement of
cryptographic communications equipment and defensive armament in Argus
would be inconsistent with conventional or customary law, elected not to rate
Argus as a hospital ship within the meaning of the 1949 Convention. Instead, the
ship is configured as a “highly versatile, self-defending and helicopter-capable
PCRS [Primary Casualty Recovery Ship] rather than a dedicated HAS [Hospital
Ambulance Ship] . . . [that] must be declared under the Geneva Convention,
must be open to regular inspection, and cannot embark any military capability
(even self-defense weapons) of any kind.”83
As noted above, a vessel devoted exclusively to the care and transport of the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, and recognized by a principled adversary as
such, is not subject to intentional attack no matter what its color scheme.84 It
therefore would still be prudent to notify the international community of the
vessel’s name and characteristics and to make it available for boarding and in-
spection by a principled adversary.
I do not advocate “opting out” as the preferred solution, whether during the
war on terror or in conventional conflict with a principled adversary. However,
should it be determined that effective defensive capability cannot, for whatever
reason, be emplaced in hospital ships, it would be prudent to give that option
very serious consideration. Hospital ships adorned with white paint and dis-
playing the protective symbol of the red cross or red crescent have a moral maj-
esty about them that evokes the best of our humanity, even in the depths of
destruction and despair that so often accompany armed conflict. That is most
certainly worth hanging on to—but one must ask, “At what cost?”
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49. The SSR system is briefly described in ibid.,
p. 1249. Basically, the SSR utilizes the military
IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system,
which consists of a primary radar, a second-
ary interrogator surveillance radar, and a
transponder. The primary radar, installed on
the seeking ship or aircraft, sweeps the horizon
with electromagnetic pulses. When a pulse
encounters an object an echo is bounced
back, allowing the object to be detected. If the
object is a ship or aircraft equipped with a
transponder, the primary radar pulse will
trigger an automatic transmission of the de-
tected ship or aircraft’s identification code. A
full description of the IFF technology may be
found in Trevor Dupuy, ed. in chief, Interna-
tional Military and Defense Encyclopedia
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993), vol. 3,
pp. 1239–41.
50. The text of Annex I, as amended, may be
found at the ICRC homepage, www.icrc.org.
For a further discussion of the provisions of
chapter 3 of Annex I, see Louise Doswald-
Beck, ed., San Remo Manual on International
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, Pre-
pared by International Lawyers and Naval Ex-
perts Convened by the International Institute of
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 237–41.
51. Heintschel von Heinegg, “The Law of Armed
Conflict at Sea,” p. 478.
52. Introductory Note, San Remo Manual, p. 5.
53. See note 38 above and accompanying text.
54. San Remo Manual, p. 236.
55. 1907 Hague (X) Convention, Article 8; 1949
Geneva (II) Convention, Article 34.
56. To my knowledge, there is no historical rec-
ord of an actual employment by a hospital
ship of weapons or weapons systems to pre-
vent lawful boarding and inspection by an
opposing force. Nonetheless, the possibility
of such abuse seems to foster concern in
some quarters.
57. See, for example, U.S. Navy Dept., The Com-
mander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Op-
erations, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP)
1-14M (Washington, D.C.: 1995). Paragraph
8.2.3 provides that “hospital ships may not be
armed although crew members may carry
light individual weapons for the maintenance
of order, for their own defense and that of the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked.”
58. San Remo Manual, p. 235.
59. U.S. Navy Dept., Hospital Ships, Navy Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures Publication
(NTTP) 4-02.6 (Washington, D.C.: February
2004), para. 2.1.1.
60. Ibid., para. 2.2.
61. Hospital ships are vessels of the Military
Sealift Command and carry the designation
“USNS” (U.S. Naval Ship). When in the ac-
tive inventory they are “in active service,” vice
“in commission” (see 32 CFR 700.406[c]).
U.S. Navy hospital ships are assigned “benev-
olent” names in keeping with their purely hu-
manitarian function. The U.S. Navy has, of
course, other afloat medical facilities. As an
example, the Wasp-class amphibious assault
ships (LHDs), of which seven are currently in
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commission with an eighth under construc-
tion, boasts a formidable medical capability:
“The ships have six fully equipped operating
rooms and a 600-bed hospital, by far the larg-
est at sea with the exception of hospital ships.
The LHD 1 has medical and dental facilities
capable of providing intensive medical assis-
tance to 600 casualties, whether combat in-
curred or brought aboard ship during
humanitarian missions. The corpsmen also
provide routine medical/dental care to the
crew and embarked personnel. Major medical
facilities include four main and two emer-
gency operating rooms, four dental operating
rooms, x-ray rooms, a blood bank, laborato-
ries, and patient wards. In addition, three
battle dressing stations are located through-
out the ship, as well as a casualty collecting
area at the flight deck level. Medical elevators
rapidly transfer casualties from the flight deck
and hangar bay to the medical facilities”
(LHD-1 Wasp Class, www.globalsecurity.org/
military/systems/ships/lhd-1.htm).
62. See Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting
Ships, 2003–2004 (Coulsdon, Surrey, U.K.:
Jane’s Information Group, 2003), p. 857;
Norman Polmar, ed., The Naval Institute
Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S.
Fleet, 17th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2001), pp. 257–58.
63. See “Hospital Ships: T-AH,” 15 September
2003, United States Navy Fact File, www.chinfo
.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile.
64. See “Bringing Comfort to New York in Time
of Need,” 19 September 2001, Navy & Marine
Corps Medical News, www.chinfo.navy.mil/
navpalib/news.
65. See U.S. Navy Press Release: Navy Hospital
Ship USNS Comfort to return from Operation
Iraqi Freedom, 10 June 2003, available at
www.msc.navy.mil/NOOp/pressrel.
66. NTTP 4-02.6, para. 4.2.1.
67. See notes 48 and 49 above and accompanying
text.
68. Author’s conversation with master of USNS
Comfort, April 2004.
69. NTTP 4-02.6, para. 4.4.2. This prohibition on
cryptographic communications, as it pertains
to the transmission of encrypted messages
during armed conflict, is also set forth in
NWP 1-14M, para. 8.2.3, which provides, in
pertinent part, that “use or possession of
cryptographic means of transmitting message
traffic by hospital ships is prohibited under
current law.” The Annotated Supplement to
the handbook includes the following com-
ment on this provision: “GWS-Sea [1949
Geneva (II) Convention], art. 35(2), autho-
rizes hospital ships to carry and employ com-
munications equipment necessary for their
movement and navigation. GWS-Sea, art. 34,
however, restricts the use of cryptographic
means of communication. The English lan-
guage version of art. 34 implies that the pos-
session or use of such means for both sending
and receiving encrypted communications is
prohibited. The equally authentic Spanish
and French texts of art. 34(2), however, pro-
hibits only the sending (‘pour leurs emissions’)
of encrypted traffic. . . . The requirement that
hospital ships must transmit in the clear is
undergoing critical review in various interna-
tional fora and it is anticipated that this pre-
scription will eventually be either relaxed or
abandoned” (Annotated Supplement to the
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations [Newport, R.I.: Naval War Col-
lege, 1997], p. 8-15, available at www.nwc.navy
.mil/ILD/Annotated%20Supplement%20to
%20the%20Commander’s%20Handbook.htm).
70. Michael Sirak, “U.S. Navy Seeks to Revise
Laws of War on Hospital Ships,” Jane’s De-
fence Weekly, 19 August 2003.
71. NTTP 4-02.6, para. 4.5. See also NWP 1-14M,
para. 8.2.3.
72. Sirak, “U.S. Navy Seeks to Revise Laws of War
on Hospital Ships.”
73. See NWP 1-14M, para. 11.9.7, which states,
“When objects or persons are readily recog-
nized as being entitled to protected status, the
lack of protective signs and symbols does not
render an otherwise protected object or person
a legitimate target. Failure to utilize interna-
tionally agreed protective signs and symbols
may, however, subject protected persons and
objects to the risk of not being recognized by
the enemy as having protected status.” See
also Sandoz et al., eds., Commentary on the
Additional Protocols: “These provisions [of
Article 23 of Protocol I pertaining to coastal
rescue craft] on marking are laid down only
in the form of recommendations. . . . [T]hus
ships and craft covered by Article 23 are pro-
tected even when they are not marked, though
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in this case they obviously run the risk of sus-
taining damage due to mistaken identity” (p.
266).
74. San Remo Manual, p. 235.
75. In a recent example of the tragic results that
can ensue from failure to appreciate the will-
ingness of terrorists to hit “soft” targets that
pose no threat to them, the United Nations
headquarters in Baghdad was destroyed on 19
August 2003 by a car packed with explosives,
killing twenty-two people and wounding
more than 150 others. Following an exhaus-
tive investigation into that attack, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan fired his chief of global
security, who was found to have been “blinded
by the conviction that U.N. personnel and in-
stallations would not become a target of at-
tack, despite clear warnings to the contrary.”
See “Five Penalized by U.N. Chief in Iraq
Bombing,” New York Times, 30 March 2004,
p. A11.
76. Use of a seemingly benign vehicle to deliver a
terrorist explosive device is also seen in the
destruction of the Khobar Towers residential
complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 25
June 1996, which claimed the lives of nine-
teen Americans and wounded 372 others. In
that instance, a tanker truck was loaded with
an estimated five thousand pounds of plastic
explosives, parked adjacent to the facility, and
detonated. See U.S. Department of Justice Press
Release of 21 June 2001, available at www.fbi
.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/khobar.htm.
77. See Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23,
1983 (also known as the Long Commission
Report), 20 December 1983, part 6, sec. 1,
available at www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/
XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD
-Report/.
78. I assume, and certainly recommend, that
should Phalanx be installed in Comfort or
Mercy, a military detachment would be em-
barked for that purpose. For a comprehensive
discussion of the placement of defensive
armament on USNS vessels and the embark-
ing of military personnel to serve them, see
MSC [Military Sealift Command] Attorney’s
Deskbook: Topic—The Law of Armed Conflict
as It Applies to MSC, MSC internal publica-
tion, revised 6 July 2003.
79. San Remo Manual, p. 235.
80. See “Phalanx Close-In Weapons System,” De-
fense Daily Program Profiles, www.defensedaily
.com/progprof/navy/wep-phal.html.
81. W. E. M. Heintschel von Heinegg, “Current
Legal Issues in Maritime Operations: Mari-
time Interception Operations in the Global
War on Terrorism, Exclusion Zones, Hospital
Ships and Maritime Neutrality,” in Israeli
Yearbook of Human Rights [forthcoming].
82. See David Foxwell and Rick Jolly, “The RFA
Argus: A Gas-Tight, Floating Field Hospital,”
International Defense Review 24, no. 2 (1992),
pp. 116–17.
83. Ibid.
84. See note 73 above. See also San Remo Man-
ual, p. 241, para. 173: “These means of identi-
fication [distinctive signals] are intended only
to facilitate identification and do not of
themselves confer protected status.” The ex-
planation accompanying this paragraph adds:
“The exemption from attack or capture of
medical vessels is based on their function,
namely, that their purpose is to rescue the
shipwrecked and to give medical care to the
sick and wounded. It is in order to give pro-
tection to these categories of persons that
protection from attack and capture is given to
the vessel, subject to certain procedures and
regulations that have been instituted in order
to assure the bona fide use of these vessels.”
Of course, U.S. Navy ships that are not de-
voted exclusively to humanitarian pursuits
are not immune from attack no matter how
formidable the medical-care capability—the
Wasp-class LHDs being a case in point (see
note 61 above).
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MIDWAY
Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?
Thomas Wildenberg
Six decades after the spectacular American victory over the Imperial JapaneseNavy’s First Air Fleet, the reasons behind the U.S. Navy’s success at the battle of
Midway are still not fully understood. Though the details of this famous battle
continue to be argued in the pages of scholarly jour-
nals, the critical role of doctrine has not been properly
analyzed.1 Yet it was better doctrine that ultimately led
to the American victory once the forces were engaged,
a victory that changed the course of war in the Pacific.
Doctrine, as defined by the U.S. Department of De-
fense, comprises the fundamental principles by which
military forces guide their actions.2 For the Navy it is
the foundation upon which tactics, techniques, and
procedures are built—a shared way of thinking that
must be uniformly known and understood to be use-
ful and effective.3 Because doctrine articulates the op-
erational concepts that govern the employment of
armed forces, it is critical for the success of any mili-
tary operation—thus its importance in evaluating the
actions of the forces engaged at the battle of Midway.
An analysis of the doctrinal thinking of the two pro-
tagonists reveals significant differences in their ap-
proaches to carrier warfare, differences that were
fundamental to the victor’s success.
Thomas Wildenberg is an independent historian/
scholar specializing in the development of naval avia-
tion and logistics at sea. He has written extensively
about the U.S. Navy during the interwar period. Mr.
Wildenberg’s work has appeared in a variety of schol-
arly journals, including the Journal of Military His-
tory, American Neptune, U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, and this journal. He is also the author of
three books on U.S. naval history, of which Gray Steel
and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea
in the U.S. Navy, 1912–1992 (1996) is on the Chief of
Naval Operations reading list. His most recent work,
All the Factors of Victory (2003), is a biography of Ad-
miral Joseph Mason Reeves, “the father of carrier war-
fare” in the U.S. Navy.
Mr. Wildenberg is a former Smithsonian Fellow, having
served successive terms as a Ramsey Fellow at the Na-
tional Air and Space Museum in 1998 and 1999. He re-
ceived the John Laymen Award for best biography from
the North American Society for Oceanic History in
2003, was awarded the Edward S. Miller Naval War
College Research Fellowship in 1998, and received an
honorable mention in the Ernest J. Eller Prize in Naval
History in 1994.
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The battle of Midway also marked the final phase in a revolution in military
affairs (RMA) in which the aircraft carrier supplanted the battleship as the abso-
lute determinant of naval supremacy. It was the culmination of a technical revo-
lution in which carrier airpower displaced gunnery as the primary means of
delivering naval ordnance. Moreover, it is one of the few instances in the history
of RMAs in which the dominant player (in this case the U.S. Navy) was success-
ful in implementing a revolutionary change in the basic character of warfare.4
Technology-driven RMAs, such as the paradigm shift to carrier warfare, are
characterized by the introduction of a number of technological innovations in a
series of stages over time. Richard Hundley terms this process the “Multiple In-
novation Model” of an RMA.5 Evaluating the development of carrier warfare on
the basis of this model (table 1) is useful for analyzing how the doctrine of carrier
warfare evolved along parallel, though slightly different, lines in the Japanese and
American navies. This article will explore how these differences affected the out-
come at Midway and their ramifications vis-à-vis the theory of RMAs.
The quintessential element in the development of carrier warfare took place
in stage three of the model, as shown in table 1, when the aircraft carrier came
into being as a totally new system for taking land-based aircraft to sea. The air-
craft carrier, which was introduced by the Royal Navy in World War I, did not
become an important capital ship until the Washington Treaty on Naval Arms
Limitations was enacted in 1922. The treaty, which severely limited the size and
total tonnage of battleships in service among the major navies of the world,
placed limitations on the total carrier tonnage allowed each navy and restricted
any new carrier (i.e., built from the keel up) to twenty-seven thousand tons stan-
dard displacement. A special provision of the treaty permitted the Japanese and
American navies to exceed this limitation, however, by allowing each to convert
two incomplete battle cruisers that would otherwise have been scrapped under
the treaty. As a result of this provision the Japanese and American navies began
plans to construct two thirty-three-thousand-ton aircraft carriers apiece.6 Once
completed, the ships would dwarf any aircraft carrier then in existence. Each
1 2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Stage* Basic Model Carrier Warfare Model
1 New technology Science of Aeronautics
2 New device Airplane
3 New system Carrier and Its Aircraft
4 New operational concept Carrier Air Strike
5 New force structure & doctrine
USN = Task Force
IJN = Air Fleet
* The innovations associated with the stages in the basic model do not always occur in order.
TABLE 1
MULTIPLE INNOVATION MODEL OF THE RMA IN CARRIER WARFARE
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would be capable of operating far more aircraft than had ever been put in the air
by a single ship. How to conduct flight operations in the most efficient manner
with such a large air group had yet to be determined by either navy.
Neither the Japanese nor American navy had any operational experience with
carriers at the time of the treaty’s signing in February 1922. Though both were
commissioning their first experimental carriers, the first flights (from the Japa-
nese Hosho and the American Langley) would not take place for the better part
of a year. In the interim, both navies had to rely for the most part on whatever
knowledge could be gleaned from the British, who had been conducting flight
operations from the full-deck carriers HMS Argus and HMS Eagle. Argus, which
entered service in 1918, was the first aircraft carrier to have a single flight deck
extending the entire ship’s length. Although Eagle was not placed in commission
until 2 February 1924, an extensive series of flight tests was conducted from its
deck in 1920.
The Americans were fortunate in having acquired a great deal of information
on flight operations and carrier design from their British allies during World
War I and the period shortly thereafter.7 The data provided a firm foundation for
the carrier design studies conducted by the U.S. Navy in the early 1920s. These
studies led to the continuous single-flight-deck arrangement on the Saratoga
and Lexington, converted from the two battle cruisers allocated to the U.S. Navy
by the Washington Treaty. The two navies had ceased to share information by the
time of the treaty. The lack of direct contact may have been a godsend to the U.S.
Navy, for it probably prevented a grievous error in carrier design—the twin-
hangar dual flight deck.
This failed innovation appeared on the next generation of British carriers—
Furious, Glorious, and Courageous—the basic design characteristics of which
were established in 1920.8 Unlike the Japanese and American conversions, the
new British carriers were produced from fast but poorly armed and under-
protected cruisers built late in the war. To accommodate the maximum number
of aircraft in the smaller space available, with constraints regarding the arrange-
ment of boiler uptakes, their designers added a second hangar. Adding a small
second flight deck as well, forward of the upper hangar, would (the designers be-
lieved) permit dual-flight-deck operations. In theory this would increase the
speed of launching, so more aircraft could be placed in the air in the least time—
a necessary improvement, as demonstrated by the poor trial performance of the
single-deck Eagle. Because of the time required to spot aircraft between launch-
ings, Eagle could keep only six aircraft in the air at one time.9
The Japanese too benefited from their wartime relationship with the Royal
Navy. Their first aircraft carrier, Hosho, had been designed largely with British
help, and in 1920 a Japanese representative observed air operations on board
W I L D E N B E R G 1 2 3
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Furious.10 In the absence of documentary evidence, one can only make an edu-
cated guess as to the design process for the Akagi and Kaga.11 It seems likely,
based on the timing and similarities in design to Furious, Glorious, and Coura-
geous, that the multiple-flight-deck arrangement of the Japanese vessels was in-
fluenced by information obtained from the Semple Naval Air Mission, which
arrived in Japan in 1921.12 This unofficial delegation of British aviation experts
was invited to provide technical assistance and training to the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN) in all aspects of aviation. Although its members were mostly pilots
and aircraft designers, it is logical to assume that at least one or two were familiar
with the twin-deck carrier then under development in Great Britain.
The “smoking gun” for this assumption can be seen in features of the first
large Japanese carriers, Akagi and Kaga, commissioned in 1927 and 1928 respec-
tively. Like their British contemporaries, both Japanese carriers sported multiple
flight decks when completed.13 This arrangement proved so unsatisfactory, how-
ever, that both had to be redesigned and rebuilt in the mid-1930s with single
flight decks.14 This unfortunate detour cost the Japanese dearly in lost time—
time that might have been used to explore better methods of conducting flight
operations with the single-deck design that emerged as the standard for the fleet
carriers operated by the IJN in World War II.
This is precisely what transpired on the American side. Like the Japanese fly-
ers on board the Hosho, naval airmen on board Langley initially copied British
operating procedures. Those procedures required a clear deck for landing; as
soon as an aircraft landed it was struck below.15 Although this practice gave flexi-
bility in takeoffs and landings, the time it took to stop an airplane, move it onto
the elevator, and bring it below lengthened the landing cycle. This in turn lim-
ited the number of aircraft that could be operated to the capacity of the ship’s
hangar; the number was also determined to some extent by the time it took a
group of returning aircraft to form up overhead and land.16
The clear-deck landing procedure was used until Captain Joseph M. Reeves
took command of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet in mid-October 1925. Reeves,
then the U.S. Navy’s foremost authority on battleship gunnery, had just come
from the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he had served two
tours of duty—first as a student, then as head of the Tactics Department. It was
there that Reeves learned the importance of aircraft and the critical need to se-
cure command of the air in any future engagement of the Battle Fleet.17
When Reeves took over the Aircraft Squadrons he was surprised to discover
that Langley had put no more than six planes in the air at one time.18 This
seemed an absurdly small figure to Reeves; he would dramatically change it. The
years spent in the fleet perfecting gunnery had taught Reeves the critical impor-
tance of meticulous practice and thorough training. He had also learned the
1 2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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value of faultless procedures for ensuring speed and safety during any poten-
tially dangerous shipboard activity.19 These same principles he used to cajole
Langley’s air wing to find ways to speed up takeoffs and landings—the recovery
cycle, in modern jargon—so that as many aircraft as possible could be put into
the air and recovered, in the least time. Under Reeves’s tutelage, Langley’s crew
invented the deck park, the crash barrier, specialized teams of flight-deck per-
sonnel identified by jerseys of various colors, and a host of other innovations that
radically changed the way operations were conducted on cramped flight decks.
At first the object was to get as many planes in the air as possible in order to
defend the fleet against attacking bombers. Slowly but surely, the number of
planes operating from Langley expanded, and the time required to launch and
recover aircraft decreased. By February 1926 sixteen planes could be kept in the
air at one time. One year later the number had increased to twenty-two. This was
a big improvement, but Reeves, who had been promoted to flag rank in 1927,
now wanted Langley to operate
even more planes. When the
ship returned from its yearly
overhaul in early 1928, he or-
dered thirty-six aircraft placed
on its flight deck.20 Six more
planes were stowed below, so that when Langley departed from San Diego on 9
April 1928 to join the fleet headed on a transit to Hawaii, it had forty-two aircraft
on board.21
By then Saratoga and Lexington had arrived on the West Coast. The progress
made on Langley’s flight deck paved the way for a spectacular eighty-three-
plane raid launched in an exercise from Saratoga’s flight deck against the locks
and facilities of the Panama Canal on 26 January 1929. The success of this record-
breaking operation—more planes put in the air at one time by one carrier than
ever before—laid the groundwork for the developments that took place in
stage four of the Carrier Warfare Model, establishing the operational concepts
that would determine the carrier’s role in the fleet’s battle plan. During the
next few years the Lexington and Saratoga faced off in a series of simulated en-
gagements conducted during yearly exercises known as “Fleet Problems.” The
carrier-versus-carrier duels that frequently occurred during these exercises
brought to light the importance of quickly locating the opposing carrier so
that air strikes could be launched against the enemy’s flight deck as soon as pos-
sible to forestall a counterstrike. Time after time, the carrier that struck first
emerged victorious. Thus, by the mid-1930s it was understood that the job of
the American carriers was to seek out and destroy the enemy’s flight decks.
This unwritten doctrine—it was not codified until 1941—was responsible for
W I L D E N B E R G 1 2 5
The carriers’ position within the force structure
was not fully resolved until Pearl Harbor, when
carriers became the U.S. Navy’s preeminent
striking force by default.
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the development of a new aircraft type unique to the U.S. Navy, the scout
bomber.22 It was also instrumental in determining the makeup of air groups
aboard American carriers.
While the U.S. Navy was busy experimenting with the carrier-versus-carrier
duels that would so heavily influence its future battle doctrine, the Japanese were
still struggling to perfect their carrier doctrine. Sidetracked by the war in China,
Japanese naval aviators made little progress in working out an effective strategy
for dealing with enemy flight decks.23 Like their American counterparts, the Jap-
anese expected aerial operations to precede the “decisive” clash of battleships
that both sides predicted would determine the outcome of the next war.24 Unlike
the Americans, however, they failed to anticipate the importance of carrier-
based scouting, concentrating entirely on the attack mission.25 No scouting units
were assigned to the Japanese carriers, and little emphasis was placed on this im-
portant aspect of carrier warfare. Reconnaissance was relegated to a few
floatplanes, which would be catapulted from accompanying cruisers. The Japa-
nese also overlooked or failed to develop the deck park, relying instead on the
hangar deck to store and prepare aircraft for flight. On the Japanese carriers, air-
craft capacity was determined by the size of the hangar, not of the flight deck, as
was the case for the Americans.26 The disparity in aircraft-handling procedures
and search strategies resulted in substantial differences in the makeup of the
typical air group deployed by the two sides.
As can be seen from table 2, the U.S. Navy, because of its innovative use of the
deck park, was able to deploy more planes per carrier. Each carrier operated with
seventy-two aircraft, on average, organized into four squadrons: one fighter
(VF), one scout (VS), one bombing (VB), and one torpedo (VT). The Japanese,
on average, operated with just sixty-three aircraft, organized into three
twenty-one-plane squadrons: one fighter, one carrier attack, and one bombing.
The VS squadron on American carriers and the preponderance of scout
bombers in air groups attest to the significance the Americans placed on
1 2 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
IJN USN
Type* Mfg/Model Number % Mfg/Model Number %
VF Mitsubishi A6M 21 33 Grumman F4F 18 25
VB Aichi D3A 21 33 Douglas SBD 18 25
VS — — Douglas SBD 18 25
VT Nakajima B2N 21 33 Douglas TBD 18 25
Total Aircraft 63 72
* VF = fighter, VB = dive-bomber, VS = scouting, VT = torpedo bomber
TABLE 2
STANDARD CARRIER AIR GROUP COMPLEMENTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
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scouting. The exercises of the early 1930s had pointed to the need for a fast, well
armed scout plane that could not only find the enemy carrier but attack its flight
deck. Heeding the advice of the aviators, the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics
began to develop a series of scout bombers that evolved into the SBD, a plane
that proved to be a superb dive-bomber as well as an effective scout.
The contrasting lack of reconnaissance planes and the preponderance of tor-
pedo and dive-bombing aircraft on board Japanese carriers were in keeping with
the IJN’s emphasis on attack. The IJN’s preference for the torpedo plane (the
“carrier attack plane,” in Japanese naval parlance) was in keeping with the IJN’s
faith in the torpedo as a weapon that could inflict severe underwater damage on
almost any warship. This was contrary to the view of U.S. naval aviators, who be-
lieved that the torpedo was an inefficient weapon of aerial warfare, based on the
small size of its warhead in relation to the total weight. To the Americans, hitting
under the waterline did not appear to be a unique advantage; tests conducted in
1924 on the incomplete battleship Washington had shown that a heavy bomb
falling close alongside would produce the same damage.27 American pilots were
also skeptical of the torpedo plane’s ability to survive at the slow speeds and low
altitudes required for a successful attack. It was only because the torpedo (in the
absence of an effective armor-piercing bomb capable of penetrating four inches
of hardened steel) was the only aerial weapon that could significantly damage a
heavily armored battleship that a VT squadron was retained in limited numbers
on American carriers.28
While the airmen on both sides were perfecting the tactical procedures and
aircraft that would ultimately define their respective air groups, their flag offi-
cers were wrestling with the force-structure and doctrinal issues (the last stage in
Hundley’s model) raised by the increasing combat effectiveness of air warfare
and the growing number of carriers within their fleets. The conundrum facing
all these leaders was how to protect the inherently vulnerable carrier and yet
maximize its tactical effectiveness.
In the U.S. Navy, the main question was the positioning of carriers with re-
spect to the main body of the fleet. Although the carrier task force had become a
regular feature of exercises, the Navy’s battleship admirals continued to insist
that carriers remain with the battleships for mutual support.29 At issue was the
survival of the carriers, which were now considered essential for fleet air defense.
Tying the carriers to the slow battleships was the kiss of death, according to the
Navy’s airmen, who argued “that evasive movements at high speed were a car-
rier’s best protection against attack.”30 The Americans continued to experiment
until the fleet moved to Hawaii in 1940; by then, carriers had become the center
of the cruising formation when operating with the fleet. The question of the car-
riers’ position within the fleet’s force structure—both its physical location and
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tactical function—was not fully resolved in the U.S. Navy until after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, when carriers became its preeminent striking force by
default. When hostilities commenced, however, all the pieces were in place for
the deployment of a number of carrier task forces, complete with heavy escorts
of cruisers and destroyers, and accompanied in every instance by an oiler for lo-
gistic support.31
In the meantime, the Japanese navy had embarked on a much different path.
As Mark Peattie and the late Dave Evans explain in their groundbreaking history,
the lessons learned during warfare with China inevitably led Japan’s naval lead-
ers to conclude that carriers had to be concentrated to provide the large num-
bers of aircraft that seemed needed to achieve air superiority.32 However, like
their American counterparts, they understood the vulnerability of aircraft
carriers and that grouping
them together would be
extremely dangerous, not
only tactically but opera-
tionally—all the force’s
carriers would be exposed
to attack if any one of them
was detected. A solution to this dilemma, one that Peattie and Evans describe as
one of “tactical effectiveness versus strategic risk,” emerged at the end of 1940,
when the “box” carrier formation was first introduced in the IJN.33 The arrange-
ment enabled the rapid massing of air groups for offensive operations but also
an augmented protective combat air patrol.
Operational experiments with this new formation were conducted in early
1941. By then Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Com-
bined Fleet, had submitted a paper to the navy minister, Koshiro Oikawa, insist-
ing that the IJN “deliver a fierce attack on the American fleet at the outset of
hostilities to demoralize the U.S. Navy.”34 The instrument that would be chosen
for Yamamoto’s surprise attack was the First Air Fleet, a unit of the Japanese
navy that came into being in April 1941, when all three carrier divisions were
combined with two seaplane divisions and ten destroyers into what was then
“the most powerful agglomeration of naval air power in the world.”35 Although
the First Air Fleet represented a radical innovation in terms of naval organiza-
tion, it was not a tactical formation that could undertake a naval operation on its
own, for it would need escorts and logistical support.
Though the multicarrier attack was a brilliant tactical innovation, it did not
challenge the concepts underlying the IJN’s overall strategy of overpowering the
U.S. Navy by destroying its battle line at sea.36 When the Combined Fleet sailed
for Midway at the end of May 1942, the battleship remained the centerpiece of
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barrier, flight-deck teams in jerseys of various colors,
and a host of other innovations that radically
changed the way operations were conducted.
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Yamamoto’s strategy for dominating the Pacific. “For all his lip service to the
principle of the offensive and to naval air power,” he “still . . . visualized the
battleship as the queen of the fleet.”37 As part of the operation, Yamamoto
hoped to draw out remnants of the U.S. Pacific Fleet so that it could be engaged
in the “decisive battle” that still remained the focus of Japanese naval strategy.38
Instead of using his battleships in direct support of his carriers (as suggested by
Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi), Yamamoto stationed the three powerful
dreadnoughts of the Combined Fleet far to the rear, to surprise and destroy any
American surface force bold enough to attempt to interfere with the invasion of
Midway.39
While the First Air Fleet (designated the “Mobile Force” in this operation)
was steaming in what would prove to be its highly vulnerable box formation to-
ward Midway, the three carriers (Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet) available to
the commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area at the end of May 1942, Admi-
ral Chester W. Nimitz, sortied from Pearl Harbor. They steamed in two task
forces, the tactical units that had come to dominate U.S. naval operations since 7
December 1941. Unlike its adversary across the Pacific, the U.S. Navy’s love affair
with the battleship now rested in the mud of Pearl Harbor, where a number of its
cherished “battlewagons” were being laboriously salvaged. Though Nimitz still
had a strong force of battleships (Task Force 1 comprised Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Colorado, Idaho, Tennessee, New Mexico, and Mississippi), he chose not to deploy
them; they would only slow the carriers down and would require screening ships
that were needed more elsewhere.40 Nimitz also deployed a number of submarines
for the defense of Midway; however, they too would not be a factor in the battle,
the outcome of which would be determined by airpower alone.
The outcome of the battle of Midway was decided, and the fate of the IJN was
sealed, at precisely 10:22 AM on 4 June 1942, when the first of three squadrons of
American dive-bombers from Yorktown and Enterprise attacked the First Air
Fleet as it was preparing to launch its own planes against the U.S. carriers.41 The
American planes struck the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu in quick succession, setting
all three ablaze within three minutes. The surviving Japanese carrier, Hiryu,
quickly retaliated. After an exchange of air strikes that afternoon, Hiryu was
burning from stem to stern, while its opponent, Yorktown, was dead in the water,
without power. Hiryu sank the next day. Yorktown survived long enough to be
taken under tow but then was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine.
The different paths of carrier development taken by the Japanese and American
navies led to differences in carrier doctrine—differences that had a tremendous
impact once the two forces were engaged. First and foremost of these was the
American airmen’s obsession with locating the enemy’s carriers first so they
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could be struck first. This principle became sacrosanct in U.S. carrier doctrine as
soon as commanders realized that the best way to achieve air supremacy was to
attack the opposing carrier before it had a chance to get its own planes in the air.
Once launched, such a strike would be almost impossible to fend off, since (prior
to the introduction of radar) there was virtually no way to detect approaching
enemy planes or direct fighters to intercept them.42 Although the Japanese un-
derstood this principle, they made no attempt to find an adequate means of lo-
cating the enemy’s carriers.43 As Mark Peattie aptly points out, success
“depended not only upon the time required for carriers to launch their attack
squadrons but, even before that, upon finding the enemy first.”44
That the lack of a carrier-borne capability for scouting (reconnaissance, in
Japanese naval parlance) contributed greatly to the demise of the Japanese carri-
ers was affirmed by Akagi’s former air officer, Mitsuo Fuchida. As Fuchida ex-
plained, writing in 1955, Japanese carrier forces were devoted entirely to the
attack mission.45 There were no organic scouting units of any appreciable size in
the Japanese navy, and very little emphasis was placed on this important aspect
of carrier warfare: “In both training and organization our naval aviators [de-
voted] too much importance and effort . . . to attack.”46 Reluctance to weaken the
carriers’ striking power led to a single-phase search plan that was insufficient—
in Fuchida’s opinion—to ensure the carriers’ security. “Had Admiral [Chuichi]
Nagumo [the commander of the Mobile Force] carried out an earlier and more
carefully planned two-phase search . . . the disaster that followed might have
been avoided.”47
The second doctrine-based difference was the predominance of the scout/
dive-bomber on the American side. This type was unique to the U.S. Navy and
could both locate and attack an enemy carrier. The effectiveness of the scout/dive-
bomber (particularly the superb SBD, which outflew, outdove, and outbombed
the Japanese Val) was proved beyond the shadow of a doubt at Midway.48
Last, but certainly not least, was the adoption of the deck park and the associ-
ated handling procedures devised by American airmen to maximize the number
of aircraft that could be operated at one time from an aircraft carrier. This sys-
tem enabled the U.S. Navy to operate more aircraft per carrier than its Japanese
counterparts and thus to fly almost as many aircraft as the Japanese at Midway,
with one less carrier. The deck park allowed a second dive-bombing squadron
(though bearing the VS designation) to be added to each carrier’s air group. It
was one of these squadrons, VS-6 from the Enterprise, that made up for the lost
planes from the Hornet, which failed to locate the enemy carriers. The extra
squadron allowed the United States to strike three carriers at once, leaving just
one. The outcome at Midway would have been very different had VS-6 not been
present.
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On the downside, the U.S. Navy’s reliance on the deck park meant that the en-
tire air strike group had to be launched at one time. This worked well during the
short-range simulated engagements conducted during the thirties, when the
various squadron types could circle the carrier while the air group formed up. At
Midway differences in aircraft range, cruising speed, and the takeoff run for each
type (VF, VB, VTB),
combined with the ex-
treme range to target,
played havoc with the
air group’s ability to
conduct any kind of a
coordinated attack.
The piecemeal commitment of forces that resulted from this approach and the
lack of satisfactory air cover had disastrous consequences for the torpedo squad-
rons, which were all but annihilated.
In terms of launching aircraft, the Japanese had devised a workable doctrine
that was in some ways superior to the U.S. technique. By contrast they developed
the concept of the “deckload spot,” wherein each carrier contributed one of its
attack units (VB or VTB) and then some number of escort fighters.49 Not only
was this technique better suited to the smaller flight decks of the Hiryu and the
Soryu, but it was highly advantageous when it came to coordinating air strikes
from multiple carriers. The latter enabled the Japanese to conduct the massive
air strikes that were the hallmark of the First Air Fleet.
The lack of coordination among the American carriers was a major defi-
ciency that could have cost them the battle. Instead of assembling for a coordi-
nated strike, individual flights from different carriers—both torpedo and
dive-bombing—arrived over the target independently of each other and at-
tacked separately. This resulted in the ineffective torpedo plane attacks that pre-
ceded the arrival of the two flights of dive-bombers, whose simultaneous
appearance at this critical juncture of the battle was extremely fortuitous (many
would say “sheer luck”). A third flight of dive-bombers from the Hornet never
found the Japanese carriers.
The American victory at the battle of Midway was abetted by major weak-
nesses in Japanese carrier doctrine. The most significant of these was the IJN’s
inability to ensure (its leadership having previously failed to allocate sufficient
assets for searching) that no enemy carriers were in striking range of its own.
This fatal flaw in doctrine caused the Japanese to be caught while their hangar
decks were packed with aircraft being fueled and armed. The outcome of an at-
tack in such circumstances had been first predicted in 1933 by Commander
Hugh Douglas, U.S. Navy, before an audience at the Naval War College: “In case an
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RMAs in which the dominant player was successful in
implementing a revolutionary change in the basic
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enemy carrier is encountered with planes on deck, a successful dive bombing attack
by even a small number of planes may greatly influence future operations.”50 The
deadliness of such a contingency was well understood by American carrier avia-
tors, who continually worried about being caught in that perilous situation.51
The Japanese determination to deliver a massed air attack on Midway meant
that all four Japanese carriers were committed to preparations for a follow-up
strike just as the U.S. carriers were discovered. This deprived the Mobile Force of
the flexibility it needed to preempt the threat. Further, the box formation, which
was established to facilitate the massive aerial attacks invented by the IJN, also
contributed to the demise of the First Air Fleet. It would have been much more
difficult to locate and hit three Japanese carriers at once had the elements of the
Mobile Force been separated. Various arguments have been put forward in de-
fense of the box formation—indeed, the four-carrier task force was adopted by
the U.S. Navy later in the war; nevertheless, the fact remains that all three carri-
ers were caught together.
The doctrinal differences concerning the deployment of the naval forces avail-
able to each side indicate just how far each navy had come in adjusting to the
concepts later embodied in the Carrier Warfare Model of seapower. The dispar-
ity has important ramifications for the theory of revolutions in military affairs,
for it supports Hundley’s contention that it is not enough to be aware of an
emerging RMA. To avert the kind of disaster visited upon the Japanese at Mid-
way, a military must also be responsive to the implications of that RMA.52 The
Imperial Japanese Navy failed at Midway to take account of the consequences of
the fundamental changes in naval warfare that they themselves had helped to
initiate at Pearl Harbor.53
Several conclusions can be drawn. First, force structure and doctrine play
critical roles; both are crucial to successful transformation in an armed service’s
ability to wage war. Second—and this, to some bureaucrats at least, is a painful
revelation—technological prowess alone is insufficient to achieve a revolution
in military affairs. Lastly, but most unsettling to military leaders, different paths
lead to different technical solutions. The examples analyzed here show that
chance and circumstances often play major roles in the evolutionary path taken
by a military establishment as it attempts to adapt to new technologies and the
changes they bring to the character of warfare.
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RACE FOR THE DECISIVE WEAPON
British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942–1943
James P. Levy
It is popularly understood that after the spectacular American victory at the bat-tle of Midway the aircraft carrier reigned supreme; that war at sea was changed
completely; and that the presence of America’s two surviving carriers after the
sinking of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s four flattops forced the cancellation of
the Midway invasion and the retreat of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s eleven bat-
tleships, sixteen cruisers, and fifty-three destroyers from the Central Pacific.1
The reality was more complex. Midway was, in fact, followed by nearly two years
of war in which carriers notably failed to deliver knockout blows of the kind
most proponents of new technology promise for their innovations. Even at the
battle of the Philippine Sea, despite the lopsided carrier-air duel, more damage
was inflicted on the Imperial Japanese Navy’s ships by U.S. submarines than by
carrier aircraft.2 This is not to say that carriers were unimportant, just that they
spent more of their time in Corbettian activities like providing cover for am-
phibious landings than in Mahanite fleet-to-fleet combat. Most naval battles in
1942–43 involved cruisers and destroyers rather than carriers. Of the seventeen
engagements fought between the U.S. and Imperial Japanese navies in the
Solomons, fifteen were fought by surface ships, two by carriers.3
We think of the Pacific war as the “war of the carriers” and the “beginning of the car-
rier age.” Well, that’s technically true. But keep in mind that only five carrier-to-carrier
battles were fought during the entire war. . . . The “carrier-versus-carrier era” lasted
only twenty-five months . . . [a]nd actually, the last carrier-to-carrier combat that
was anything like an even fight was in October 1942. . . . In effect, the “Golden Age
of Carrier Battles” lasted from May to October 1942.4
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In Europe, the major naval battles in Europe during 1942–43—the Barents
Sea and the North Cape—were gunnery actions. Yet by 1944, everyone agrees,
carriers ruled the waves. Why was it that the primacy of the aircraft carrier her-
alded at Taranto and Pearl Harbor, and confirmed at Midway, did not immedi-
ately come to pass? Why did not carrier forces from that day forward completely
dominate naval combat? This seeming discrepancy between the emergence of
the carrier as the dominant capital ship in 1942 and its full manifestation as the
decisive weapon in naval warfare in 1944 was caused by a chronic shortfall in
carriers and operational aircraft. This was true of all three “carrier powers”: Brit-
ain, the United States, and Japan. They all knew what was needed, but previous
losses, ongoing attrition, and regular maintenance made the massing of an over-
whelming carrier fleet impossible. Only with the introduction of numerous
Essex-class ships, along with a mass of trained pilots and excellent carrier planes,
was the promise of Midway turned into reality.
This article will compare and contrast the carrier fleets of Great Britain, the
United States, and Japan. In addition, it will examine their activities in the
post-Midway strategic environment and see how each carrier power responded
to the perceived need for additional carrier airpower. We will see how and why
the United States won the race for the decisive weapon of modern naval warfare.
A note on the carriers available to the Americans, Japanese, and British in 1942–
43 is in order. Carriers came in three main types: fleet, light fleet, and escort. We
will limit our discussion here to fleet and light fleet carriers.
As we can see in table 1, the U.S. Navy’s largest operational carrier in 1942 was
its oldest—Saratoga. However, it was torpedoed on two separate occasions early
in the war and was out of service for months.5 Also operational during this pe-
riod were the Enterprise
and Hornet, but Hornet
was sunk by the Japanese
on 24 October 1942. The
Wasp served in the Pacific
briefly but was sunk by a
submarine on 15 Septem-
ber 1942. The Ranger was
classified as a fleet carrier,
but because it had trouble
reaching its des igned
speed and was very lightly
protected, it was deemed unsuitable for Pacific Fleet operations. (It did serve in
the Operation TORCH landings in Morocco and again with the Royal Navy’s
1 3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Name
Full-Load
Displacement
Speed
(knots)
Aircraft
Complement*
Saratoga 43,000 33 63
Ranger 17,500 29 72
Enterprise, Hornet 25,400 32.5 84
Wasp 18,450 29.5 76
Essex Class 34,800 32.5 90
Independence Class 14,700 31 30
TABLE 1
U.S. NAVY CARRIERS 1942–1943
* Theoretical total aircraft complement: 379
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Home Fleet in the summer of 1943.) The U.S. Navy did not operate light fleet
carriers until the summer of 1943, when the first of nine Independence-class
ships, built from converted light cruiser hulls, made their appearance. All nine
were completed in 1943, but only the first four were in action by the end of that
year. More critical for U.S. Navy operations were the big Essex carriers on the way
in 1942; four joined the Pacific Fleet by November 1943, with ten more building.
It was these carriers that would sweep the Pacific.
The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) operated a substantial carrier fleet in
1942–43, as we can see in table 2. Despite the losses at Midway, Japanese carriers
proved themselves a match for American ones in the battles around the
Solomons. The center-
pieces of their carrier
force were the sisters
Shokaku and Zuikaku—
well armored and fast,
and with large air groups.
They were probably the
best carriers afloat until
the Essex class commis-
sioned. The converted lin-
ers Junyo and Hiyo were
much less impressive,
with little armor, inade-
quate speed, and suspect engines. The light carrier Zuiho was a fine ship and
served its country well. Confusingly, Japan successively commissioned two light
carriers named Ryuho. U.S. carrier planes sank the first on 24 August 1942; it was
replaced by a converted submarine depot ship that proved a disappointment in
service. No new fleet carriers joined the IJN in 1943, but the armored fleet car-
rier Taiho and the light fleet carriers Chitose and Chiyoda were due to enter ser-
vice in early 1944.
Table 3 gives us the details of Royal Navy carriers. The hard-to-categorize car-
rier Eagle served with the fleet briefly during the period under discussion.6 It was
a converted First World War–era battleship, and this author tends to categorize
it as a light fleet carrier. Eagle spent its distinguished wartime career in the Medi-
terranean, where it was sunk by U-boat torpedoes during Operation PEDESTAL
in August 1942. The British had five fleet carriers in commission during 1942–
43: Furious, Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious, and Indomitable. Furious was a
converted light battle cruiser, and despite age and dodgy engines that often
sent it back to port for repairs, it performed yeoman service. Illustrious, Formi-
dable, and Victorious were sturdy, well-armored carriers that sacrificed air
L E V Y 1 3 9
Name Full-Load
Displacement
Speed
(knots)
Aircraft
Complement*
Shokaku, Zuikaku 32,105 34 72
Junyo, Hiyo 28,300 25 53
Zuiho 14,200 28 30
Ryuho1 8,000 29 37
Ryuho2 13,366 26 31
Taiho 37,000 33 72
Chitose, Chiyoda 15,300 29 30
TABLE 2
IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY CARRIERS 1942–1943
*Theoretical total aircraft complement: 317
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complement (normally
thirty-three to thirty-six
aircraft) for deck and side
protection.7 They could
carry additional aircraft
by parking planes on the
flight deck (which was
standard American prac-
tice but contrary to Royal
Navy policy). Their half-
sister Indomitable had
been redesigned during
construction with somewhat less armor but additional hangar space. Two fleet
carriers (Implacable, Indefatigable) that would join the fleet in 1944 struck a
good balance of armament, speed, and air complement. The unique Unicorn
had been designed before the war as a maintenance carrier to support overseas
deployments. It was pressed into service as a light fleet carrier in 1943.
As can be seen from table 4, carrier strength fluctuated widely throughout the
period in question. The table clearly reveals how well major naval operations
dovetail with carrier availability. One sees this with Operation WATCHTOWER
(the Tulagi/Guadalcanal landings) in August 1942, Operation PEDESTAL the
same month, TORCH in November 1942, and Operation HUSKY (the Sicily inva-
sion) in July 1943. Operation GALVANIC, the Tarawa/Makin amphibious as-
saults, took place as soon as enough Essex and Independence-class carriers were
ready for action, in November 1943. The exception to this pattern is the Japanese
carrier force’s inaction during 1943, for reasons discussed below. The IJN’s car-
riers withdrew from combat after their costly victory at the battle of Santa Cruz
in October 1942 and did not sortie again until June 1944. However, Japanese car-
rier planes, sans carriers, operated repeatedly from land bases throughout 1943.
Carriers are useless as combatants without proper aircraft. After the availabil-
ity of hulls, the factors that determine the power and effectiveness of carrier
forces are the number and quality of planes embarked and the training of their
aircrews. In this respect the United States held a distinct edge over Britain and
Japan. (The characteristics of the various aircraft types in use during the period
under discussion are summarized in table 5.) The British were dependent on
short-range fighters converted from land use and a slow biplane torpedo
bomber for most of 1942–43. This is not to say that the Sea Hurricane, Seafire,
and Albacore were objectively bad aircraft. What hurt them was how they fit into
midwar carrier operations. The Seafire was basically an interceptor, with a weak
undercarriage prone to damage and landing accidents. The British had a true
1 4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Name Full-Load
Displacement
Speed
(knots)
Aircraft
Complement*
Eagle 22,600 24 21
Furious 22,450 30 36
Illustrious, Formida-
ble, Victorious
28,620 30.5 33
Indomitable 29,730 30.5 45
Unicorn 20,300 24 35
Implacable Class 32,110 32 60
TABLE 3
ROYAL NAVY CARRIERS 1942–1943
*Theoretical total aircraft complement: 236
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carrier fighter that could escort strike formations, the Fulmar, but it was too
slow to deal with modern opposition. The Albacore was optimized as a torpedo
bomber, and most Albacore crews were trained for night antishipping strikes
with torpedoes. Many Albacores had surface search radar attached to their
underbellies.
Unfortunately, the Royal Navy in 1942–43 needed an aircraft for bombing
and close air support much more than an obsolescent torpedo plane best suited
to antishipping strikes. The Barracuda, though not the failure it is sometimes
portrayed as having been, was not the major improvement the Fleet Air Arm
(FAA) needed. Its deficiencies forced the British to procure U.S. planes under
Lend-Lease. British pilots were good, but relatively small carrier air groups and
less than stellar aircraft limited FAA effectiveness. A comparison of air groups in
the summer of 1943 is illuminating. When the name-ship of the Essex class be-
came operational, it carried an air group of thirty-six Hellcats, thirty-six
L E V Y 1 4 1
Imperial Japanese Navy Royal Navy U.S. Navy
Fleet Lt. Fleet Fleet Lt. Fleet Fleet Lt. Fleet
July ’42 S VIFIL E ESWR
August SZ R VIFILFu E ESWR
September SZ Zu ILFu ESRH
October SZJH Zu ILFu ERH
November ZJ VFILFu ER
December ZJ VFILFu ES
January ’43 ZJ Zu FILFu ES
February ZJ Zu VFILFu ESR
March ZJH ZuR2 VFFu ESR
April ZJH ZuR2 VIFFu ESR
May SZJH ZuR2 VIF SR
June SJ R2 VIF U SR
July SZ ZuR2 VIFILFu SR
August SZJ Zu VFIL U EsYSR In
September SZJ Zu VFIL U LSR InPBw
October SZJH ZuR2 VFILFu EsYSRL InPBwC
November* SZH ZuR2 VFu EsYRLBhE InPBwC
TABLE 4
OPERATIONAL CARRIER STRENGTH JULY 1942–NOVEMBER 1943
KEY
Japan: S = Shokaku, Z = Zuikaku, J = Junyo, H = Hiyo, R = Ryuho, Zu = Zuiho, R2 = 2nd Ryuho
Royal Navy: V = Victorious, I = Indomitable, IL = Illustrious, F = Formidable, Fu = Furious, E = Eagle, U = Unicorn
U.S. Navy: E = Enterprise, S = Saratoga, W = Wasp, R = Ranger, H = Hornet, Es = Essex, Y = Yorktown, L = Lexington, Bh = Bunker Hill, In = Independence,
P = Princeton, Bw = Belleau Wood, C = Cowpens
Sources: A. J. Watts and B. G. Gordon, The Imperial Japanese Navy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971); E. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
2000); N. Friedman, British Carrier Aviation (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988); H. A. Gailey, The War in the Pacific (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995); H.
Jentschura, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977); Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, ed. J. L. Mooney
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959–67); grateful acknowledgment is extended to D. Ashby of the Naval Historical Branch London and C.
Rounsfell of the Fleet Air Arm Museum Yeovil for help in compiling this table.
*Saratoga left service for major refit after the first week of November 1943.
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Dauntlesses, and eighteen Avengers—a staggering ninety aircraft.8 That July In-
domitable embarked thirty Seafires and twenty-one Albacores, while Formidable
had six Seafires, twenty Martlets (the British name for Wildcats), and eighteen
Albacores aboard—in all, ninety-five planes. Thus these two British carriers to-
gether only roughly equaled the combat power of Essex alone. Their only advan-
tage over a single Essex-class ship would have been that two hulls are harder to
disable than one, and RN carriers had a slight edge in armor and survivability.
By way of comparison, in October 1942 Zuikaku operated its designed maxi-
mum of seventy-two aircraft: twenty-seven Zeroes, twenty-seven Vals, and eigh-
teen Kates.9 In terms of planes, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during 1942
averaged 3,191 combat aircraft in their collective inventory; the Fleet Air Arm
fielded 461 combat aircraft in frontline service (carrier and land-based) in Sep-
tember of that year.10
Also problematic for the British was carrier doctrine. Rear Admiral Reginald
Henderson had experimented with multicarrier operations in the early 1930s.
The 1939 Fighting Instruction specified that the role of the carriers was to “deny
the use of aircraft to the enemy” by finding and sinking his carriers.11 When war
came, the Home Fleet had a flag officer, “Vice Admiral Aircraft Carriers,” tasked
1 4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
User Max. Speed
(knots)
Combat Radius
(nm)
Armament
FIGHTERS
Zero IJN 267 335 2 x 20 mm, 2 x 7.7 mm
Fulmar RN 211 275 8 x .303-in.
Sea Hurricane RN 252 200 4 x 20 mm
Seafire RN 289 237 2 x 20 mm, 4 x .303-in.
Wildcat USN/RN 274 265 4 x .50-in.
Hellcat USN/RN 280 324 6 x .50-in.
TORPEDO BOMBERS
Kate IJN 178 209 1 x 21-in. torpedo
Jill IJN 225 355 1 x 21-in. torpedo
Albacore RN 122 348 1 x 18-in. torpedo
Barracuda RN 198 196 1 x 21-in. torpedo or 1 x 1,600-lb. bomb
Avenger USN/RN 209 348 1 x 24-in. torpedo or bombs (2,000 lbs.)
DIVE-BOMBERS
Val IJN 201 332 816 lbs.
Judy IJN 272 450 1,300 lbs.
Dauntless USN 192 382 1,000 lbs.
Helldiver USN 222 652 1,000 lbs.
TABLE 5
CARRIER AIRCRAFT
Sources: Owen Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 6th rev. ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991); and James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi,
Victory at Sea (New York: William Morrow, 1995).
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with overall control of carrier operations. He had up to three carriers under his
direct command (Ark Royal, Furious, and Glorious) during the Norwegian cam-
paign in May and June 1940—although they tended to work in pairs, two on op-
erations and one back at Scapa Flow (in the Orkneys) refueling.12 Even the strike
on Taranto, Italy, in November 1940 was to have been a multicarrier operation,
but damage to Eagle precluded its participation.13 However, in 1943 opinion was
still divided within the RN on how many carriers could work together effec-
tively, whether each carrier should have its own screen or all should share a col-
lective one, and whether one carrier should maintain the defensive combat air
patrol overhead or each should contribute a small number of fighters to a com-
bined CAP.14 Although the RN was prepared to use up to three carriers together
defensively (as in Operation PEDESTAL, the crucial relief convoy for Malta in Au-
gust 1942), it lacked experience and training in multicarrier offensive opera-
tions. Because carriers were so widely needed, and because of losses, battle
damage, overhauls, and transit times to the many theaters of operation, the Brit-
ish rarely got the chance to mass their carriers. So even if the Royal Navy had had
a coherent carrier doctrine based on massive strikes delivered by massed carri-
ers, as the United States and Japan did, real-world demands would have mili-
tated (as in fact they did) against its implementation.
British operational procedure was also different, partly for philosophical reasons,
partly for practical ones. To avoid corrosion from constant exposure to sea spray
and reduce the risk of multiple losses in landing accidents, British practice was to
strike aircraft immediately below into the hangar upon landing, not park them on
the flight deck forward. This made sense, given the paucity of British planes and
typical Atlantic sea conditions. However, combined with the slow speed of British
aircraft, it meant that RN air groups took more time launching, forming up, and
landing than did their U.S. and Japanese counterparts. This consumed fuel, reduced
combat radius significantly, and slowed the tempo of operations.15
By contrast, Japanese carrier planes were very good. Two outstanding aircraft,
the Judy dive-bomber and the Jill torpedo plane, entered service in large num-
bers by the end of 1943. However, the Zero remained in the order of battle long
after the American Hellcat made it obsolete. Losses were hard to make up, and
replacement-pilot quality was low. The IJN devoted great effort after Midway to
revamping its naval air force, but the process took two years. By then, the United
States, with twice Japan’s population and ten times its gross national product,
had far outstripped anything Japan could hope to match in terms of ships,
planes, or trained personnel.
The U.S. Navy, after the replacement of the Devastator with the Avenger, had
no real weakness in its air arsenal, and its training program and rotation policy
could produce high-quality pilots with ease. Crucial in the period under
L E V Y 1 4 3
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discussion was the replacement of the very good Wildcat with the excellent Hell-
cat; the capture of a crashed, yet largely intact, Zero fighter in the Aleutians in
June 1942 helped American designers produce in the Hellcat a superb
Zero-killer. Late in 1943 the Dauntless dive-bomber was replaced by the margin-
ally better Helldiver. Overall, by November 1943 the U.S. Navy enjoyed a spec-
tacular advantage over the RN and the IJN in the sheer bulk of high-quality
ships, planes, and aircrews it could throw into action. Even in the interwar years
planes and pilots had not been in as short supply in the U.S. Navy as they had
been in the Royal Air Force–dominated Fleet Air Arm or the quality-obsessed
IJN, wedded to the “invincibility of refined technique.”16
American carrier doctrine flowed out of the big air wings of Lexington and
Saratoga. It has been argued that tests using these large air groups prior to World
War II made the U.S. Navy uniquely conscious of the emerging primacy of the
aircraft carrier. This assertion has been partially undermined by two pieces of
evidence: first, the U.S. Navy’s building program up through the Vinson Act in
1940 devoted more money to battleship procurement than to building aircraft
carriers; second, American fleet tactics as developed in the 1930s were battleship-
centric.17 Yet it is true that the atmosphere of relative scarcity in which the Brit-
ish and Japanese carrier air forces developed were in marked contrast with the
situation in the United States. British and Japanese admirals were obliged to
ponder anxiously the likelihood of having to fight a “come as you are” war, with-
out the massive infusion of new ships, planes, and pilots that American admirals
could largely take for granted. What one historian of D-Day has written in re-
sponse to critics of the U.S. Army is just as true for the Navy: “To accuse Ameri-
cans of mass-production thinking is only to accuse them of having a
mass-production economy and of recognizing the military advantages of such
an economy. The Americans were power-minded.”18 This cornucopia of power
would underwrite the swift disintegration of Japan’s military position after No-
vember 1943.
For the U.S. Navy, the period from Midway to the carrier raids on Rabaul
(June 1942–November 1943) embodied two themes: wearing down the Japanese
and building up overwhelming strength for the decisive drive across the Central
Pacific. This is why operations during that period were largely confined to the
Solomons and the southwest Pacific. Before the war, the “Rainbow Five” plan en-
visioned a drive across the Central Pacific at the earliest possible opportunity.
But the need to protect Australia and keep the restless and influential General
Douglas MacArthur occupied intervened; Pearl Harbor and carrier losses in
1942 delayed the effort also. But in the southwest Pacific land-based airpower
could augment carrier forces until the Essex and Independence–class ships be-
came fully operational. Between December 1942 and June 1943 Essex, Lexington,
1 4 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Yorktown, Bunker Hill, Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, and
Monterey all commissioned.19 The Americans, however, refused to rush them
into service, preferring to work them and their air groups up to great efficiency
before committing them to battle. This decision left a serious gap in available
carrier strength throughout the winter and spring of 1943. Enterprise being not
at 100 percent efficiency due to damage inflicted in autumn 1942, the Pacific
Fleet was down to Saratoga in May, June, and July 1943. (It was backstopped by
the Royal Navy’s Victorious, which was deployed to the Pacific Fleet from March
through July.)20 Whenever a large carrier force was available (August 1942, No-
vember 1943) the U.S. Navy could independently take the offensive, otherwise
not. Despite this, MacArthur and Admiral William F. Halsey (then commanding
the South Pacific Force) could keep up the pressure on the Japanese, because
they had substantial U.S. Army Air Forces and Marine Corps air assets in New
Guinea and the Solomons. But by November 1943, when five fleet and four light
fleet carriers were ready for action in the Pacific, Admiral Chester Nimitz (com-
manding the Pacific Ocean Area) could begin his island-hopping campaign at
Tarawa with little fear of successful Japanese intervention. In December 1943
Nimitz’s Task Force 50, comprising four fleet and two light fleet carriers, could
operate independently against Japanese air bases at Kwajelein Atoll with 386
combat aircraft embarked.21 Carrier aircraft could now cover any attack the
Americans chose to make.
The Japanese, by contrast, faced in the period from Midway to the battle of the
Philippine Sea a bewildering series of strategic dilemmas that proved well nigh
insurmountable. The physical and psychological damage inflicted at Midway
haunted the Imperial Japanese Navy and sapped its will; the battles of attrition
in the Solomons and New Guinea sapped its strength. No fleet carriers joined the
Combined Fleet in 1943, and the two converted liners that were pressed into ser-
vice in 1942 (Junyo, Hiyo) were both inferior to any of the four ships lost at Mid-
way. Although the number of Japanese carriers available often exceeded those of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Japanese admirals were unwilling to risk them, as more
would not be immediately forthcoming; American land-based airpower acted as
a further deterrent to offensive action. In addition, the quality of Japanese pilots
was in near free fall during 1943, and things would get worse, not better. Lack of
fuel curtailed training, a desperate need for new pilots led to a shortened curric-
ulum, and the Combined Fleet refused to release combat-experienced men to
become instructors; all three factors took their toll.22 By the winter of 1943–44
Japanese pilots were lucky to get 275 hours of flight training, while American pi-
lots were not released to squadrons until they had 525 hours in the air.23 Added
to this, the effective assassination of Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943 further
L E V Y 1 4 5
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increased the gloom within the IJN. Wherever his successor, Admiral Mineichi
Koga, turned, he could perceive only Allied strength and Japanese weakness. The
fact that Koga’s intelligence picture was at best rudimentary while American in-
telligence efforts were huge and largely successful did not help matters.24 Should
Koga defend Truk? Bougainville? Rabaul? New Guinea? Should he husband his
resources or make a stand somewhere in 1943?25 The grimness of the situation
seems to have paralyzed the upper echelons of the Japanese navy until early in
1944, when the threat of a landing in the Marianas galvanized its planners.
Japanese carrier planes after the Pyrrhic victory at Santa Cruz in October
1942 fought exclusively from land bases until the Combined Fleet’s last realistic
throw of the dice at the Philippine Sea in June 1944. Zuikaku, Junyo, and Zuiho
had been poised to cover the evacuation of Guadalcanal in January 1943, but the
Americans failed to intervene.26 In April, after a general lull as both sides licked
their wounds from Guadalcanal, Yamamoto ordered ninety-six Zeros and
sixty-five Vals from his carrier air groups to Rabaul in support of Operation
I-GO. The plan was to launch four big air raids on bases in the Solomons and
western New Guinea to disrupt Allied operations in the area. Because the de-
fenders were alerted by decrypts of Japanese signals, the raids netted a disap-
pointing twenty-five enemy planes knocked out and a U.S. destroyer, a New
Zealand corvette, a tanker, and two transports sunk, at the cost of forty Japanese
carrier aircraft. The planes were ordered back to Truk on 17 April.27 In July
ninety-two planes were dispatched from Junyo, Hiyo, and Ryuho to Rabaul,
where all were lost. In November, 150 more aircraft from Shokaku, Zuikaku, and
Zuiho were thrown into the maelstrom after Allied air raids by as many as 213
heavy and medium bombers and 138 P-38 Lightning fighters threatened to neu-
tralize Rabaul, thus uncovering both Bougainville and the northern coast of
New Guinea. Half the planes were lost, and the rest were withdrawn after two
weeks.28 The resulting absence of fighters away at Rabaul rendered infeasible any
attempt by the Combined Fleet to intervene when the U.S. struck at Makin and
Tarawa later in November.
The strategy of diverting carrier planes to Rabaul has often been criticized,
but one is left with the impression that Admirals Yamamoto and Koga had little
choice. If planes were hard to replace, ships were irreplaceable entirely, and
land-based operations did not risk them. If we can see now that pilots were the
true key asset and that Japanese pilots by the time of the “Marianas Turkey
Shoot” were hopelessly outclassed by more experienced and better trained
American ones, all that was probably not so clear in April 1943. Given the power
of American land-based air forces in the southwest Pacific, it is difficult to imag-
ine that planes would have fared better operating from carriers than they did de-
ployed to land bases. Furthermore, the Judys and the Jills reaching squadron
1 4 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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service in 1943 were excellent attack planes, and Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa went
into battle in June 1944 with more carriers and operational planes—approxi-
mately 460 to 420—than Nagumo had at Pearl Harbor.29 Using carrier planes to
protect Rabaul, the key to Japan’s entire position in the South Pacific, and to buy
time for new ships and planes to come on line must have seemed a good bet. In
any case, given the immense American strength then on the way, two hundred
pilots saved in 1943 could in no way have turned the tide for Japan in 1944.
Therefore, although in theory and hindsight we may find fault with the Japanese
decision to use carrier planes to prop up Rabaul, it was probably no worse than
doing nothing—an inevitable consequence of Japanese material inferiority
vis-à-vis the United States.
For its part, the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm was obliged throughout 1942 and
1943 to tailor its force to the defense of convoys and amphibious operations. The
FAA’s major combat area from Operation PEDESTAL in August 1942 to the
Salerno landing in September 1943 was the Mediterranean. With no enemy car-
rier fleet to contend with, the British needed fighters, fighters, and more fighters
to deal with German and Italian aircraft. This led to a skewing of carrier air
groups. Whereas Victorious was operating a standard mix of twenty-one Alba-
core torpedo bombers and twelve Fulmar fighters in July 1941, in August 1942 it
carried only six Albacores but eighteen Fulmars and six Sea Hurricane fighters.
By the summer of 1943 it had embarked thirty-six Martlets (Wildcats) but only
twelve Avengers. In May 1942 Formidable operated twenty-one Albacores and
twelve Martlets; in November 1942 it carried six Albacores, six Seafires, and
twenty-four Martlets for Operation TORCH.30 Thus the 1941 ratio of attack
planes to fighters had been reversed. With few if any targets for its Albacores’ tor-
pedoes, the FAA failed to garner the wider experience the U.S. Navy and IJN
found in the Pacific. When the FAA went back onto the offensive in 1944 it had
to readapt to strike missions that were very different than Taranto, Matapan, or
the Bismarck chase. Although the Royal Navy on average operated as many fleet
carriers in the period under discussion as the U.S. Navy or the IJN, smaller air
groups and less combat experience left the British carrier fleet behind those of
the other two carrier powers in flexibility and striking power. Also, whereas the
U.S. Navy could field over nine hundred carrier planes in June 1944 and the Jap-
anese about half that number, in the summer of 1944 squadrons on the Royal
Navy’s six operational fleet carriers totaled about 288 planes.31 Thus it was that
by the summer of 1944 American carriers were first to reach the critical mass
necessary to smash any surface fleet within reach. Ozawa’s ships survived the
battle of the Philippine Sea because they fled and Admiral Raymond Spruance
did not pursue. Potential had been transformed into reality.
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All three carrier powers understood the value of carriers, but due to losses, dam-
age, and the relentless need for maintenance there were never enough of them
operational to suit any navy in 1942–43. Without carriers, it proved impossible
to sustain continuous operations. The timing and pace of campaigns, especially
for the Americans and British, were largely determined by the availability of car-
riers. Although land-based airpower substantially substituted for carrier forces
in the southwest Pacific and in Italy (after the Anglo-Americans were firmly en-
sconced in Sicily and southern Italy), operations like HUSKY, GALVANIC, and later
FLINTLOCK (Guam) and ICEBERG (Okinawa) were unthinkable without carriers.
Only they could neutralize enemy airfields and counterattacks. Further, the car-
riers of the United States and Britain became indispensable for the defense of
amphibious operations and convoys. Only carriers—fleet, light, and escort—
could respond in a quick and timely manner to events in and around distant
beachheads. Carrier airpower had become the decisive weapon in naval warfare.
The U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, and the Imperial Japanese Navy all raced to
achieve a critical mass of carriers, pilots, and planes in 1942–43. Ironically, the
Japanese and the British, often portrayed as too wedded to the battleship, had
become at least as “carrier conscious” in their construction priorities as the
Americans. Although the idea that the U.S. Navy had a unique interest in carrier
airpower going back to the early 1930s is widespread, it is illuminating to con-
sider that whereas the Royal Navy’s 1937 “wish list” of capital-ship strength as of
late 1942 was twenty battleships and fifteen carriers, in July 1940 the U.S. Navy’s
General Board envisioned a future fleet of thirty-two battleships and fifteen car-
riers.32 Obviously, the U.S. Navy was as enamored of the big gun as anyone. More
concretely, after the British completed the battleships Anson and Howe in June
and August 1942, respectively, and the Japanese commissioned the Musashi in
August, that was it. Dock space, steel, and labor were shunted thereafter by both
Britain and Japan into carrier and antisubmarine escort construction. The Brit-
ish battleship Vanguard, under construction in 1942, was given such low priority
that it did not commission until 1946, and the Japanese completed Musashi’s sis-
ter ship Shinano as a carrier.33 The British completed two fleet and five light fleet
carriers between Midway and the end of the war, with two more fleet and eleven
light fleet carriers still building at the termination of hostilities. Japan com-
pleted six fleet and three light fleet carriers between Midway and final defeat.34
Yet the United States won the race hands down. Once the primacy of the car-
rier was established, the Americans applied their vast economic strength and en-
gineering know-how to the problem and so decided the issue.35 It took time, but
economic strength was converted into military power quickly and effectively.
Archetypal carrier-versus-carrier battles ceased because in the two years 1942–
44 the Americans completely outstripped the competition. They commissioned
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sixteen fleet and nine light fleet carriers prior to VJ Day. They also managed to
finish five battleships and two battle cruisers of the Alaska class between the time
of Midway and Nagasaki (although the four Iowas and the Alaskas were rather
gilded lilies).36 The Americans also built their ships faster than the other carrier
powers. The British fleet carriers Implacable and Indefatigable took over four
years from keel-laying to commissioning. The Japanese fleet carrier Taiho took
thirty-two months to complete. By comparison, the USS Intrepid took twenty
months from laying down to completion, Franklin twenty-five months.37 It was
thanks to the prodigious output of U.S. shipyards, aircraft factories, and flight
training schools that the promise of Midway was fulfilled in the great Central
Pacific offensive of late 1943 through 1945.
All weapons systems require time to develop both the numbers and the doc-
trine necessary for optimal effect in combat conditions. Like the tank before it,
carrier airpower needed time to reach a critical mass of units and experienced
operators before its full potential could be realized. In the race for the decisive
weapon of naval warfare, the navies of Britain, Japan, and the United States all
quickly identified the primacy of the aircraft carrier once they were seriously en-
gaged in the war at sea. The United States alone was able to mobilize the finan-
cial, technological, and industrial resources needed to procure a force of ships
and planes that could humble enemy battle fleets and seize local command of
the sea. In this unique ability to manifest huge material and intellectual assets in
the form of carrier airpower lie the roots and reality of American naval suprem-
acy from June 1944 until today.
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REVIEW ESSAY
A NEW STANDARD FOR THE USE OF FORCE?
Lawrence J. Korb
Barnett, Thomas P. M. The Pentagon’s New Map: War and
Peace in the Twenty-first Century. New York: Putnam, 2004.
320pp. $26.95
From the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the collapse of the twin towers in 2001
to the present, after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the United States has
not had a consistent national security policy that enjoyed the support of the
American people and its allies. This situation is markedly different from the
Cold War era, when our nation had a clear, coherent, widely supported strategy
that focused on containing and deterring Soviet Communist expansion.
The tragic events of 9/11, the increase in terrorist attacks, and possible threats
from such countries as North Korea and Iran that are capable of developing
weapons of mass destruction make it imperative to develop a new national secu-
rity strategy to safeguard the United States. In The Pentagon’s New Map: War and
Peace in the Twenty-first Century, Thomas Barnett, a senior strategic researcher
and professor at the U.S. Naval War College, attempts to provide one.
Unfortunately, he does not succeed. The failure of Barnett’s strategy is most
vividly demonstrated by the strategic rationale he offers for the Bush adminis-
tration’s poorly planned invasion and occupation of Iraq.
According to Barnett, the world is divided into two parts, the Functioning
Core and the Non-Integrating Gap. The Functioning Core consists of those sta-
ble countries in North America, much of South Amer-
ica, the European Union, Russia, Japan, China, India,
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. There is
little threat of war or widespread violence in the
Core, because its members enjoy the benefits of
Lawrence J. Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for
American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center
for Defense Information, was an assistant secretary of
defense in the Reagan administration.
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globalization, specifically rising standards of living. The Gap, on the other hand,
consists of areas such as the Caribbean Rim, most of Africa, the Balkans, the
Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast
Asia. In those areas there is a great deal of violence and turmoil, because they are
not connected to the Core. This lack of connectivity results from the rejection of
modernity by the elites in the Gap. Therefore, the members of the Gap do not
enjoy the benefits of globalization, and hence these areas become incubators for
terrorists.
If the United States wants to win the war against terrorism, Barnett argues, it
must take the lead in shrinking the Gap. To do this, it must export security to the
Gap until it is ready to integrate into the Core, or else the Gap will continue to
export terrorism to the Core. Barnett calls this a “global transaction strategy.”
His global transaction strategy makes the war against Iraq a war of necessity,
not one of choice. According to Barnett, the invasion of Iraq was justified be-
cause “Saddam Hussein’s outlaw regime was dangerously disconnected from the
globalizing world—from our rule sets, our norms, and all the ties that bind the
Core together in mutually assured dependence. He was the Demon of
Disconnectedness and he deserves death for all his sins against humanity over
the years.” Wow!
These words are eerily reminiscent of what President George W. Bush said on
board the USS Abraham Lincoln in May 2003, in his infamous “mission accom-
plished” speech. In remarks onboard the carrier the president claimed that “the
battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September 11th,
2001” and that the defeat of Saddam Hussein was “a crucial advance in the cam-
paign against terror.”
It does not seem to matter to Barnett or his strategic view that the reasons the
president gave for invading Iraq were spurious or that the war in Iraq repre-
sented a substantial setback in the struggle against al-Qa’ida. The unnecessary
invasion of Iraq not only diverted attention away from Afghanistan, thus dam-
aging the prospects for crippling al-Qa’ida, but created a new justification
among the radical jihadists for attacking Westerners, drained the reservoir of
goodwill that the United States enjoyed in the global community, and in the eyes
of many Muslims transformed the war against terrorism into a war against Islam.
Instead Barnett characterizes the Bush administration’s decision as “amaz-
ingly courageous,” because “it has committed our nation to shrinking a major
portion of the Gap in one fell swoop.” This decision makes the author love and
admire the U.S. government and, by extension, the Bush approach to the global
war on terror.
As a consequence of the framework he has developed, Barnett is also an un-
abashed supporter of Bush’s preemption doctrine when it comes to dealing with
1 5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:54 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
156
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/25
actors and regimes in the Gap. There are two problems with his approach. First,
it confuses preemption with preventive war. It is not only legal under interna-
tional law but moral for a nation to take preemptive military action when it has
what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld calls “elegant intelligence” about an immi-
nent threat. But this is not what the United States did in Iraq. President Bush has
stated repeatedly that Iraq was not an imminent threat, yet he waged a preven-
tive war against what he claimed was “a grave and gathering danger.” If this is the
new standard for the use of force against members of the Gap, what is to prevent
India from waging a preventive war against Pakistan? Or Russia against Georgia?
Second, while Barnett concedes that the traditional strategies of containment
and deterrence will work against other Core states, he argues that it will not work
against members of the Gap. Yet Barnett fails to recognize that while nonstate
actors like al-Qa’ida cannot be deterred, even the most evil regimes in the Gap
can be deterred, because their rulers wish to remain in power. The recent report
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence demonstrates that Iraq was con-
tained and that the sanctions and American and British military pressure helped
to destroy Saddam’s military machine and his capacity to produce conventional
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz testified, the cost of containing Saddam amounted to $2.5 billion a
year. At the time of this writing the Bush administration has spent $144 billion
in Iraq, without making us safer.
Unlike the Bush administration, Barnett does not appear to have learned that
the doctrine of launching preemptive strikes against established states in the
Gap died in Iraq. Barnett wants to launch a preventive war against North Korea.
According to his analysis, Kim Jong Il has become “globalization’s enemy num-
ber one following Saddam Hussein’s demise and must be removed from power.”
He believes that Bush’s reelection means that such action is inevitable.
Finally, Barnett’s analysis falls into the trap of thinking that terrorists in the
Gap attack the West for what it is and what it thinks. However, as demonstrated
in the book Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror by Anony-
mous (a twenty-three-year CIA veteran), America is hated and attacked for what
it does—that is, the policies it pursues that impact the Islamic world, such as its
support for apostate, corrupt, and tyrannical Muslim governments. He notes
that “the Islamic World is not so offended by our democratic system of politics,
guaranties of personal rights and civil liberties, and separation of church and
state that it is willing to wage war against overwhelming odds to stop America
from voting, speaking freely, and praying or not, as they wish.”
Because of these failings, Barnett’s global transaction strategy will not gain
the support of the American people or its allies that containment did. Rather,
the global transaction strategy is in reality an updated version of the domino
R E V I E W E S S A Y 1 5 3
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:54 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
157
War College: Winter 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
theory, which led the United States to believe that if it did not intervene to pre-
vent South Vietnam from becoming communist, all of Southeast Asia would be-
come part of the Soviet empire. Just as the domino theory led successive
American presidents to commit national blood and treasure to a peripheral
cause that was not essential to the goal of containing Soviet communist expan-
sionism, the invasion of Iraq, even though it is a member of the Gap, was not es-
sential to winning the struggle against radical jihadists like al-Qa’ida.
Unfortunately, these conceptual weaknesses undermine some of the sensible
recommendations that Barnett makes, particularly about U.S. force structure.
Yet even the best organized and equipped military will be of little use if it is em-
ployed incorrectly.
For those looking for a twenty-first-century version of containment, I recom-
mend Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leader-
ship. The “Global Balkans,” which he identifies as a source of political instability,
is similar to Barnett’s Gap. However, Brzezinski shows how the self-defeating ar-
rogance of the Bush administration has undermined what must be the Ameri-
can goal of creating a new global system based on shared interests.
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BOOK REVIEWS
THE EXPANSION OF NATO
Simon, Jeffrey. Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2003. 131pp. $26.95
Simon, Jeffrey. Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2004. 195pp. $28.95
Simon, Jeffrey. NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 307pp. $34.95
The enlargement of the European Union
and the consummation of the second
wave of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s expansion in the spring
of 2004 would tempt one to believe that
the postcommunist transition is com-
ing to a close as a kind of normalcy set-
tles over the region. Jeffrey Simon’s
careful and informative series of books
concerning civil-military relations in
four Central and Eastern European
countries reminds us that in important
respects, transition is still under way. Or
rather, given the state of civil-military
relations across the region, we should
hope that it is, for the difficulties that
postcommunist states face in democra-
tizing, rationalizing, and strengthening
their military-security apparatuses are
still manifold. Placing Simon’s insights
against the backdrop of NATO’s own
strategic transition—the outcome of
which is very unclear—one has contin-
uing reason to worry about the stability
of postcommunism. By extension, Eu-
ropean security is at stake insofar as
stability and security stem from con-
structive military-societal relations, so-
phisticated defense expertise, and well
institutionalized democratic
accountability.
In each of the three volumes, which
cover Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslo-
vakia (now the Czech and Slovak re-
publics) respectively, Simon provides a
detailed chronology of defense reforms
since communism’s collapse. In all
cases, Simon’s narrative is set against
four consistent criteria to which he
continually refers as he assesses the
merits and shortcomings of reform.
The four criteria revolve around:
the division of civilian authority in
democratic societies; parliamentary
oversight, especially in matters of bud-
geting; subordination of general staffs
to civilian institutions; and military
prestige, trustworthiness, and account-
ability. According to Simon’s analysis,
Poland has clearly been the best at
transforming its military-security appa-
ratus, despite some fairly serious
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setbacks in the early 1990s. Measured in
terms of the four criteria, the Czech Re-
public has fared somewhat better than
its Slovak counterpart, which, after the
“velvet divorce” of 1993, found itself
building a range of military and secu-
rity institutions from scratch. The big-
gest surprise in the series for students of
the postcommunist transition will be
how poorly Hungarian civil-military re-
lations have developed—especially
given Hungarian politicians’ strenuous
efforts to enter the alliance.
These books are essential reading for
anyone writing on NATO, because, con-
cerning as they do half of NATO’s new-
est members, the problems within these
states will no doubt have some bearing
not only on the functioning of the alli-
ance but also on its political orienta-
tion. Certainly, there are few people
better placed to report on events and
persons crucial to the military-security
reform process than Jeffrey Simon,
given his long-standing role as a leading
American adviser to postcommunist
governments on how to advance
institutional change in this area. More
generally, those interested in the post-
communist transition and cross-national
variation would do well to spend time
trying to understand this somewhat
arcane sector’s evolution, not least be-
cause military-society relations carry
with them implications for democratic
consolidation. Admittedly, Simon does
not make this an easy or inviting task.
He has evidently been so close to the in-
tricacies of reform that one unfamiliar
with the issues or the personnel could
conceivably drown in the detail.
Despite the particular challenges that
Simon’s intimate portrayal poses, I
would nevertheless suggest that his find-
ings provide some puzzling questions
for the literature on postcommunist
transition. For example, Poland and
Hungary are very often grouped to-
gether as states whose strong opposi-
tion to state socialism made them
especially susceptible to Westernizing
reform. The more repressive nature of
the Czechoslovak regime contributed to
relatively less political competition after
the transition, allowing policy errors to
endure. Although Poland’s ability to ex-
ploit NATO’s criteria for membership
in order to achieve reform confirms the
democratic opposition hypothesis,
Hungary’s relatively poor performance
in restructuring the military and ac-
companying political oversight raises
new questions about what provides the
impetus for reform. The military could
require explanations distinct from those
that cause variation in other kinds of
political and economic reform. On the
other hand, the logic underpinning the
democratic opposition hypothesis is
sufficiently broad that national defense
establishments should be susceptible to
Westernizing influences.
With specific respect to military-security
reforms, Simon points repeatedly in all
three volumes to problems that can
plague civil-military relations generally,
as well as to those issues that may be
peculiar to the region. The lack of civil-
ian expertise in former Warsaw Pact
countries figures prominently in the
initial failure to formulate effective re-
structuring such that new lines of au-
thority allow ministries of defense to
take on the bulk of planning and man-
agement. From lack of civilian expertise
flow other problems, including the fail-
ure to provide transparency, discipline
military malfeasance, or dedicate ade-
quate funding to militaries in decline.
Other perennial issues have included
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the lack of acceptance of civilian con-
trol as NATO defines it—among both
military personnel and civilians, ten-
sion between general staffs and minis-
tries of defense, and a behavioral gap
between formal institutions and lived
experience.
The news from Central Europe is, of
course, not all bad. Probably owing to
the legacy of some form of political
control dating back to the Warsaw Pact,
in combination with public enthusiasm
for communism’s collapse, none of the
militaries in question has in any serious
way attempted to interfere in the demo-
cratic transition. More often than not,
politicization of the armed forces has
been the will of errant politicians rather
than ambitious generals. On the whole,
attempts at reform have been consistent
with NATO’s objectives of improving
transparency and accountability. Parlia-
mentary committees have gradually
gained competence over a decade and a
half and are increasingly comfortable
exercising their authority over defense
budgets. Nevertheless, in spite of the
generally positive trajectory, Central
and Eastern European states continue
to have real trouble committing the
necessary resources to reorient their ca-
pabilities toward NATO’s evolving stra-
tegic challenges, democratic political
control has not been fully established in
some instances, and, in the Czech Re-
public and Hungary in particular, back-
sliding away from initial goals has been
evident since their accession in 1999.
The massive variation over time and
across the issues under consideration
leaves one wishing that Simon had used
his vast knowledge to impose some or-
der on the data. This is especially the
case with respect to the following two
questions: What accounts for such
variation across countries, and what
difference has NATO made to the do-
mestic politics and foreign policies of
Central and Eastern European coun-
tries? Although standard explanations
of postcommunist performance by
themselves generally do not explain this
variation very well, Simon’s analysis
does provide some starting points. The
combination in Poland of having had a
strong democratic opposition commit-
ted ultimately to Westernization and a
relatively high level of public respect for
the armed forces as an institution, de-
spite the military’s past participation
in domestic repression, proved to be a
big advantage relative to the Czech Re-
public or Hungary. In the latter two
instances, while the existence of demo-
cratic oppositions under communism
(albeit in different forms) certainly in-
formed transition in positive ways, the
very low standing of the armed forces
in these societies inhibited complete
reform. Slovakia is the reverse of both
variables—it has a relatively high level
of respect for the military coupled
with a political ambivalence toward
Westernization, as opposition move-
ments in the other three countries con-
ceived of it under state socialism.
On the second question, concerning the
extent to which NATO enlargement has
shaped domestic political reform and,
equally important for regional stability,
informed foreign policies, Simon has
remarkably little to say. This is a shame,
because someone of Simon’s stature
could be a powerful advocate for
NATO’s engagement in domestic policy
reform on the basis that the consolida-
tion of democratic oversight, defense
budget transparency, and humane
treatment of conscripts improves the
quality of governance in postcommunist
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states. We might infer from Simon’s
books that he is skeptical of NATO’s
transformative capacity and truly does
view the evolution of civil-military rela-
tions as primarily a domestically gener-
ated phenomenon. This would be a
difficult conclusion to defend, however,
given that Simon himself points out
that NATO made the Czech-Slovak re-
lationship much easier to manage after
the split than it otherwise would have
been. Beyond that single, very impor-
tant insight, the reader is left wondering
whether the logic of NATO’s stabilizing
capacity could be extended elsewhere.
In all likelihood, NATO’s inclusiveness
has not only stabilized relations be-
tween states in Central Europe and
between Russia and former Soviet
satellites, but it also improved the qual-
ity of a range of domestic institutions
throughout the region. Speculating
about postcommunist Europe without
NATO’s engagement, one imagines a
historically vulnerable set of states with
all the domestic dysfunctions that ac-
company acute military insecurity. All
of the democratic adaptations that
NATO requires to improve the inter-
face with its members and consolidate a
particular set of values would have been
the subject of protracted debate. More-
over, without NATO’s support, those
values, even in the most Western-
oriented societies, might never have
prevailed. There is indeed evidence of
the contingent nature of democratic
civil-military relations in the Polish
case, where a series of crises and dissent
over the value of democratic control
delayed the subordination of the gen-
eral staff to the Ministry of Defense. Al-
though Hungary, Slovakia, and, to a
lesser extent, the Czech Republic con-
tinue to have problems in consolidating
democratic civil-military relations, it
is worth asking where these countries
would be if NATO had never intro-
duced the norm as a desirable and
functional feature of democratic
governance.
For those concerned with NATO’s im-
pact on the region, Simon’s series is, of
course, an invaluable resource in un-
derstanding exactly what happened. Yet
one has to look further than Simon to
see the subtle, as well as the not-so-
subtle, ways in which NATO has trans-
formed the politics of postcommunist
Europe. Now would be a particularly
apt time for Simon to contribute to the
debate about whether NATO has salu-
tary political effects, because as the stra-
tegic environment has worsened, the
United States in particular is manifest-
ing less interest in the quality of demo-
cratic institutions in new member states
than in foreign policy support for wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although cul-
tivating policy loyalty might be politi-
cally expedient, NATO could be
missing an opportunity afforded by
the transition’s political and institu-
tional fluidity to facilitate reforms that
would not only improve the quality of
domestic governance but also help con-
solidate a widening democratic
community.
RACHEL EPSTEIN
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver
Kaufman, Joyce P. NATO and the Former Yugo-
slavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic Alliance.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
231pp. $74
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As the world steps farther away from
the Cold War, the evolving structure of
the international system continues to
fascinate informed citizens as well as
professional scholars. In this work,
Joyce Kaufman, professor of political
science at Whittier College, contributes
to the debate on the evolution and fu-
ture of the Atlantic Alliance, particu-
larly as the situation in the Balkans
confronted a post–Cold War (and ex-
panding) NATO. In detailing the events
between the collapse of Soviet commu-
nism (1990) and the attack on the twin
towers (2001), the author makes a
forceful case for the need for a unified
NATO alliance that is willing to use
force if necessary to quell international
instabilities.
Kaufman’s effort is particularly helpful
in plotting the movement of theory into
practice in international relations.
While no one at NATO headquarters in
1990 suggested that the world had not
materially changed with the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the alliance’s premier strat-
egists could only make reasonable
guesses about this “new world,” as they
drew up the alliance’s Strategic Concept
of 1991. It took the decade-long disso-
lution of the former Yugoslavia to force
alliance planners to appreciate the de-
tailed complexities of this world.
In one sense, this book is merely a con-
firmation of much of the conventional
wisdom on diplomatic theory and the
operations of alliances. On numerous
occasions the author explicitly makes
the point that diplomatic threats with-
out military power are in vain; collec-
tive decision making is tortured,
difficult, and slow; domestic politics in-
trude on the capacity to be statesman-
like; and the absence of a clear enemy
provides an inducement for an alliance
to lose focus. However, as Kaufman
develops the story with names, person-
alities, and events, the reader can watch
these theories come to life.
No one expects that alliance strategy
would be made in a vacuum, and this
work clearly and persuasively shows
how constraints of domestic politics
must be factored into NATO politics.
Of particular interest to makers of
American foreign policy is Kaufman’s
documentation of how the United
States evolved from an attitude that the
Balkans was a “European problem” to
being the alliance’s most forceful advo-
cate for military intervention.
This work’s principal flaw is that its
sources are almost exclusively official
NATO documents and interviews with
the people directly associated with
those documents. The story is told
from NATO’s viewpoint by someone
who spoke to insiders but was not her-
self a member. Unfortunately, this
provides the reader with a conven-
tional, albeit well supported, interpreta-
tion of events.
However, this work’s positive attributes
overwhelm this shortcoming. This easy-
to-read historical account provides
significant value for the student of in-
ternational affairs, because it docu-
ments a perfect contemporary test case
of how alliances evolve in the face of a
changing security environment. While
most pundits saw the Balkans as the
most likely spot for crisis and conflict
in Europe a decade ago, few would have
guessed that the NATO alliance would
have ultimately achieved such a preemi-
nent role in its resolution. Indeed, just
prior to the signing of the London Dec-
laration in 1990, numerous editorials
were suggesting that while NATO had
done an admirable job during the Cold
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War, we should make preparations to
“turn out the lights” in Brussels. Today,
as we find ourselves involved in a global
war on terrorism, the United States is
faced with a similar quandary. Does
NATO have the capacity, flexibility, and
will to engage the international terrorist
movement? Do our European allies
view the threat of terrorism as we do,
allowing for unity of action and willing-
ness to use force? Do adversaries such
as al-Qa’ida allow the alliance to con-
sider the entire globe its ultimate area
of responsibility? Can NATO, as
Madeleine Albright asked, move to a
more expansive concept of collective se-
curity? These questions may also re-
quire a decade to resolve, but Kaufman
previews the kind of difficulties the alli-
ance is likely to encounter en route and
sheds some light on the ultimate
answers.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Purdum, Todd S. A Time of Our Choosing: Amer-
ica’s War in Iraq. New York: Times Books, 2003.
319pp. $25
The late Washington Post publisher
Philip Graham once said that journal-
ism is the first draft of history. Todd S.
Purdum’s A Time of Our Choosing:
America’s War in Iraq, is the first draft
of the history of the U.S. occupation of
Iraq. Months before the Department
of Defense made the controversial deci-
sion to embed reporters within U.S.
units, Purdum was in Iraq reporting
the war.
The military’s major criticism of the
practice is that those assigned to the
same unit throughout the campaign
would only have a “soda straw” view of
the war and would thus miss the big
picture. Others (primarily the media)
were concerned that reporters would
lose their objectivity once the shooting
started. However, Purdum’s profes-
sional work puts that argument to bed.
Early on, Purdum states that his task
was to “draw the work of my colleagues
into a single narrative.” In other words
his job was to bring those “soda straws”
together into a comprehensive and con-
cise chronicle of the war. He certainly
has the necessary credentials for the
task—he has worked for the New York
Times for over twenty-five years and is a
former White House and diplomatic
correspondent.
Although Purdum’s narrative style is ap-
pealing, it is his ability to bring together
all the different material that makes this
book hard to put down. One reads of the
Bush administration’s intensive efforts
to convince a skeptical world of its case
for invasion and of the debate over UN
Security Council Resolution 1441. Divi-
sions deepened as Secretary of State
Colin Powell and France’s charismatic
foreign minister Dominque de Villepin
both courted the United Nations and
public opinion. Meanwhile, military
planning proceeded at the Pentagon and
U.S. Central Command. Defense Secre-
tary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Sec-
retary Paul Wolfowitz, expecting the
Iraq army to implode, deployed a force
much smaller than that of the nearly
550,000 troops in Operation DESERT
STORM. Their plan was a test of a new
American style of warfare that engaged
large numbers of special operations
forces and used highly accurate preci-
sion weapons and new technology in
the form of unmanned aerial vehicles.
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The book’s primary focus is the relent-
less twenty-one-day fight to Baghdad by
the Marines on the right flank and the
Army on the left flank. Purdum excels
in tying together all the resulting re-
porting. What emerges is a factual and
very human account of the intense
ground campaign. Included are events
of 23 March, which saw the ambush of
the 507th Maintenance Company and
the devastating losses suffered by the
11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. The
brief campaign also saw some excellent
soldiering, such as the feint and race for
the Karbala Gap and the “Thunder
Run” armored thrusts into central
Baghdad. Ever the concise chronicler,
Purdum also discusses the northern
front that was opened by the airdrop of
a thousand paratroopers, and the oper-
ations conducted by the British in and
around Basra. Purdum weaves all this
together in such a way as to make this
work an excellent read for military pro-
fessionals and armchair strategists alike.
It is a bit thin on the air and naval as-
pects of the war, due to the lack of threat
posed by the Iraqi air force and navy and
because the bulk of the embedded re-
porters accompanied ground units.
One of the successes of the program,
however, was how the reporting
brought out the human side of the war.
Purdum discusses numerous examples
of how the war directly affected such
individuals as the U.S. Army officer
who, after witnessing the results of an
air strike, commented, “It’s a helluva
thing watching people die,” or how an
Iraqi man, his hands swollen from re-
cent beatings by Iraqi security forces,
emotionally thanked the Americans for
saving him.
The book’s main strength—its immedi-
acy in telling the whole story of the
conflict—is also a major drawback. To-
ward his conclusion, Purdum recounts
the events of July 2003 surrounding the
deaths of Saddam Hussein’s infamous
sons, Uday and Qusay. One of the vex-
ing questions remaining was the where-
abouts of Saddam Hussein. The
coalition would wonder about the fate
of the former Iraqi leader for another
five months. The book concludes before
Saddam’s capture in December.
Future historians and scholars will no
doubt revisit this war and debate end-
lessly on the merits of preemptive
self-defense, the effectiveness of the
coalition of the willing, and whether the
outcome achieved was the one desired.
For now, however, Todd Purdum’s A
Time of Our Choosing will more than
suffice as the first draft of history.
D. L. TESKA
U. S. Transportation Command
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
Bush, Richard C. At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan
Relations since 1942. Armonk, New York: M. E.
Sharpe, 2004. 320pp. $27.95
For years, “one China” has meant two
completely different Chinas masquer-
ading as one country—the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC) and Taiwan
(a.k.a. the Republic of China [ROC]).
The PRC is huge, with a population of
1.3 billion, while Taiwan has only
twenty-two million people in compari-
son. There are other differences as well:
Taiwan is rich, with a per capita income
in 2003 of over $23,000, versus the
PRC’s per capita $5,000; Taiwan’s 5
percent unemployment rate is half, its 1
percent poverty rate is a tenth, and its
seventy-seven-year life expectancy is
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five years more than those of the PRC.
More importantly, during the past de-
cade Taiwan adopted a multiparty
democracy, while the PRC has only
one legal political party that is holding
tightly onto its autocratic powers—the
Chinese Communist Party.
How can two such divergent Chinas
possibly reunite? What role has the
United States played in their sixty-year
standoff? These are the questions that
Richard C. Bush, former chairman and
managing director (September 1997 to
June 2002) of the American Institute in
Taiwan (AIT—the pseudo–American
embassy in Taipei), asks in At Cross
Purposes.
Bush starts with an extremely useful
historical summary of the origins of the
PRC-Taiwan problem. He asks, for ex-
ample, what would have happened if
Chiang Kai-shek had not requested in
1942–43 that Japan cede Taiwan to
China. Would there even be a PRC-
Taiwan problem today? After all, China
at one point considered, then rejected,
demanding Okinawa as well. If circum-
stances had been different, could Tai-
wan have remained a part of Japan or a
UN protectorate, or even been given its
independence?
Bush argues that the great powers’ (the
United States, the United Kingdom,
and China) decision at Cairo to return
Taiwan to China was the real origin of
the “one China” problem, even though
cross-strait tensions did not erupt until
after the Nationalist retreat from the
mainland in 1949. To this day, the PRC
takes this World War II decision very
seriously. For example, from 21 to 26
July 1995, the PRC marked the fiftieth
anniversary of the July 1945 Potsdam
Declaration, which confirmed the Cairo
Decision, by lobbing “test” missiles off
Taiwan’s shores.
After World War II, the U.S. govern-
ment quickly found itself in a dilemma,
since it appeared obliged to support the
repressive Kuomintang. February 28,
1947, was the beginning of the massacre
by the Nationalists, who arrested and
killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
Taiwanese; it was followed by an era
known as the “White Terror.” Nation-
alist repression on Taiwan continued
for more than three decades, until 10
December 1979 and the Kaohsiung In-
cident, which was the turning point in
Taiwan’s transition to democracy.
Following Washington’s decision to
recognize the People’s Republic of
China in 1978 (part of America’s Cold
War strategy aimed at the Soviet
Union), Taipei’s increasing dependence
on Washington for security actually
gave the United States greater leverage
to sponsor democratic reforms. Thus,
quixotically, democratic reforms in Tai-
wan appear to have been spurred rather
than halted by U.S. recognition of the
PRC.
It is understandable that Bush, as for-
mer head of the American Institute of
Taiwan, would want to credit U.S. dip-
lomats and government officials with
sponsoring Taiwan’s democratic devel-
opment (one chapter even investigates
the impact of the U.S. Congress and
Taiwanese-Americans on this process).
Granted, this is a subject he knows well;
however, lest Taiwanese democracy be
mistaken as simply an American knock-
off, even Bush is forced to admit that
these non-Taiwanese factors “made but
a tertiary contribution to the democra-
tization of Taiwan” when compared to
the impact of Taiwanese reformers both
inside and outside of the Nationalist
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party. For better or worse, Taiwan’s de-
mocracy is completely homegrown.
To evaluate how Taiwan’s democracy
and the Sino-U.S. Cold War diplomacy
impacts relations today, Bush discusses
the four diplomatic communiqués and
congressional acts that have regulated
U.S.-PRC-Taiwanese relations, includ-
ing the Shanghai communiqué (1972),
the U.S.-PRC normalization communi-
qué (1978), the Taiwan Relations Act
(1979), and the U.S.-PRC communiqué
on arms sales to Taiwan (1982). The
commitments included in these four
“sacred texts” were not trivial and have
created fixed constraints on Washington’s
and Beijing’s behavior. Although neces-
sary to defeat the Soviets, these diplo-
matic agreements have often worked to
the PRC’s advantage in putting diplo-
matic pressure on Taiwan to accept its
“one country, two systems” formula.
As for what will happen in the future to
this “one China” conundrum, Bush
cautions that Taiwan’s recent demo-
cratic reforms have not given twelve
million voting Taiwanese their own seat
at the table in any future cross-strait
talks leading to Chinese reunification.
Democracy will make any satisfactory
political solution of the PRC-Taiwan
divide even more difficult to negotiate.
He cautions, therefore, that the “Tai-
wan and China positions are suffi-
ciently at odds that they cannot be
papered over. If the stalemate is to be
broken peacefully, either Beijing will
have to abandon one country, two sys-
tems, or Taipei will have to accept it.”
Since neither of these options appears
likely, one is forced to conclude that
PRC-Taiwan reunification can only be
accomplished as a result of war.
BRUCE ELLEMAN
Naval War College
Goldman, Emily O., and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. The
Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003. 415pp. $75
This book offers a rich collection of re-
search papers on very important top-
ics: the much discussed revolution in
military affairs (RMA), and the less dis-
cussed diffusions of new military tech-
nology and the accompanying changes
in military doctrine to other countries.
The authors were carefully chosen ex-
perts in history, political science, and
sociology, who address the very impor-
tant factors of national culture as they
affect the application of new military
technologies.
The product of a series of workshops,
this work owes a considerable debt to
the prodding of Andrew Marshall, Di-
rector of Net Assessment in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, who has
been encouraging scholarly analysis of
the full implications of the RMA.
Although recognizing the ambiguities
relating to the exact definition of such a
“revolution,” the book does not get
bogged down in the debate, but rather
directs its analysis to the sociological,
cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and
other processes by which such revolu-
tions are, or are not, replicated. Military
weapons may spread through arms
sales, the commercial development of
“dual-use” technologies, or by simple
imitation, but the military doctrines ap-
propriate to such new kinds of weaponry
sometimes do not spread so rapidly.
There are some very stimulating and
provocative historical case studies, in-
cluding the foreign penetrations of the
past five centuries into South Asia, the
development of “blitzkrieg” armored
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warfare in World War II, aircraft carri-
ers, and the Soviet impact on Arab ar-
mies (Soviet tanks were delivered, but
Soviet doctrine was not adopted). More
recent examples include the Soviet
approach to managing the Warsaw
Pact, the “special relationship” that
has existed since 1945 among English-
speaking democracies, and the patterns
of nuclear proliferation and the spread
of information technology.
This work is directed to both the social
scientist and the policy practitioner.
The chapters are well written and rich
in detail, with excellent footnotes, thus
making this a handy volume for anyone
doing research in these areas.
There are times when the unifying
theme of the diffusion of “technology
and ideas” becomes so broad that it
seems to include everything militarily
that has happened or that is going to
happen, for what else is there to a stra-
tegic confrontation but the weapons
owned and how they will be used? Yet
this work brings the subject into
sharper focus, revealing how ideas
about the appropriate use of weapons
do not always travel as well as the weap-
ons themselves. The introductory out-
line thus helps to maintain that focus,
and the concluding chapter by Emily
Goldman and Andrew Ross is extremely
valuable for sifting out the recurring
patterns that emerge from the evidence
presented.
Among the important conclusions
mentioned are that transformation
leaders do not long monopolize their
transformations; leaders are frequently
surpassed by followers; leadership ef-
fecting a military transformation is no
guarantee of victory; and wholesale rep-
lications of the innovations of a trans-
formation may not be necessary. Most
central to this work is the finding that
“software”(ideas and doctrine) does not
travel as well as “hardware” (physical
weapons). The explanation for this last
limitation is the basic theme of the en-
tire book.
Collections of conference papers often
do not hang together well, or when they
do, they typically do not wander far
enough away from a simple theme. This
book suffers from neither drawback,
being rich and eclectic in the materials
it offers, yet at the same time remaining
focused on an important set of ques-
tions. It offers a great deal for anyone
concerned with the military-technology
revolution.
GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland
Record, Jeffrey. Making War, Thinking History.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002.
216pp. $28.95
Jeffrey Record is professor of strategy
and international security at the Air
War College, Maxwell Air Force Base.
He is the author of four books and nu-
merous monographs on U.S. military
strategy and has extensive Capitol Hill
experience, including service as a pro-
fessional staffer for the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
This work assesses how the experiences
of Munich and Vietnam influenced
presidential decisions on the use of
force in every administration from
Harry Truman to Bill Clinton. Both
Munich and Vietnam are regularly in-
voked in current political debate in an
attempt to justify a viewpoint, espe-
cially since the Cold War foreign policy
consensus has broken down in recent
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years. The terms have become short-
hand for “appeasement” and “quag-
mire.” Yet the real influence of these
two cases on presidential decision mak-
ing about the use or nonuse of force
has been subtler, and has depended
considerably on the background of in-
dividual presidents and on the forma-
tive experiences they brought with
them into office.
For some presidents, historical analogy
was an explicit factor in their use of
force. After 1945, there was broad con-
sensus that “Munich is about whether to
use force and about what can happen
when force is not used.” Thus Truman
based his 1950 decision to intervene in
Korea on what happened, or more pre-
cisely on what did not happen, in Mu-
nich, noting that a president “must
make the effort to apply this knowledge
[of history] to the decisions that have to
be made.” John F. Kennedy was heavily
influenced during the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962 by Barbara Tuchman’s
The Guns of August (1962). Munich
was a powerful factor in leading both
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson into
Vietnam, on the basis of the imperative
to stop cross-border aggression.
Vietnam is a more complex matter. In-
deed, thirty years after Vietnam, there is
still little agreement on the lessons from
that conflict. There are many argu-
ments about how force should have
been used there, many implying that
the “right” use of force would have re-
sulted in a U.S. victory, or at least not a
defeat. Others argue that Vietnam
“teaches that force should have never
been used in the first place, thus ren-
dering moot discussions about the
amount of force necessary and how it
should have been employed.”
Record traces the predominant post-
Vietnam schools of thought that influ-
ence political discussion today. He
discusses major intellectual themes,
such as Caspar Weinberger’s six “tests”
for use of U.S. military force, later sub-
sumed by Colin Powell’s principle that
“winning meant going in with over-
whelming force, getting the job done
quickly, and getting out cleanly”—
though he notes wryly that the real
world is rarely that immaculate. An-
other policy discussed is the imperative
to avoid anything like Vietnam. Presi-
dents have been more willing to cut
their losses in places like Lebanon and
Somalia. “On balance, post-Vietnam
presidents have displayed significantly
greater risk aversion, and especially sen-
sitivity to incurring casualties, than
their predecessors. In this they have
been reinforced by an even more timid
Pentagon.”
The consequences have been great. In-
deed, the lessons of Munich were the
basis for U.S. Gulf intervention in
1990–91. “The haste with which the
Bush administration terminated the
war . . . reflected a Vietnam-driven
dread of involvement in postwar Iraq.
This fear of getting sucked into a
bloody Arab quagmire drove the Bush
administration to end the war prema-
turely,” with all the dire consequences
that follow today. Similarly, “U.S. be-
havior before and during Operation
ALLIED FORCE [in Kosovo] constituted
the most dramatic display to date of the
Vietnam syndrome at work and its op-
erational and political consequences for
American foreign policy.” Indeed,
Saddam was not wholly foolish to won-
der whether the United States would re-
ally invade Iraq in March 2003.
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Moreover, the continuing differences
within administrations over what Viet-
nam means has been actively harmful
to American policy. The deeply hostile
relationship between George Shultz and
Caspar Weinberger, based on their dif-
fering views of the post-Vietnam use of
force as a tool of American foreign pol-
icy, damaged the Reagan administra-
tion. Similar ongoing antagonism
between Colin Powell and Donald
Rumsfeld has done considerable harm
to U.S. post–11 September strategy and
policy execution.
Record briefly ponders whether the
1991 Iraq war constitutes a third semi-
nal case that could serve as a historical
marker, but then suggests not, because
it did not entail “bloody and soul-
searing foreign policy disasters.” Yet it
suggests another key issue, namely the
recurrent American failure to tie in a
war’s military ending with political and
strategic objectives. Examples include
the abandonment of Europe in the af-
termath of World War I; the failure to
take Berlin in April 1945, when doing
so might have forestalled some of what
was to come in the Cold War; and the
premature cease-fire ordered by George
H. W. Bush, which is not unconnected
with why we occupy Iraq today (which
in itself may yet become another
instance).
Reasoning by historical analogy has
many pitfalls. While analogy may be
helpful in making decision makers ask
the “right questions” in a current crisis,
“past employment and deployment of
the Munich and Vietnam analogies sug-
gest that they can teach effectively at the
level of generality, but are insensitive to
differences in detail.” Whatever the
utility of reasoning by historical anal-
ogy as a tool of policy formation and
implementation, it is clear that policy
makers will continue to be influenced
by past events and what they believe
those events teach. It is also clear that a
presidents’ (and key advisers’) knowl-
edge of history varies widely and that
reasoning by historical analogy is but
one of a host of factors at play in presi-
dential decision making, that “every
president’s knowledge of past events is
different and is subject to political
bias.” Perhaps the greatest actual effect
of historical analogy is how it frames
the worldviews of key protagonists, not
how it may lead to “the right answer” in
new situations.
The 2003 Iraq invasion and its after-
math make this book particularly inter-
esting and topical. While the cases
discussed end in the 1990s, surely the
“lessons” of Munich and Vietnam (and
likely the first Gulf War) influenced the
post-9/11 views of President George W.
Bush and other key actors about how to
react to al-Qa’ida and what to do about
Iraq and Saddam and other perceived
threats. In fact, one of the reasons the
Bush administration has come under
such fierce criticism in the national se-
curity realm is that its decisions and ac-
tions are so counter to the general run
of post-Vietnam American policy, as de-
scribed in Making War, Thinking History.
This book provides a good framework
for thinking about the vital security is-
sues the United States faces today.
JAN VAN TOL
Captain, U.S. Navy
Wright, Evan. Generation Kill: Devil Dogs,
Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of
American War. New York: Putnam, 2004. 354pp.
$24.95
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Generation Kill may be the best war
book to have such an interesting title
since The Naked and the Dead. The
book’s author, Rolling Stone contribut-
ing editor Evan Wright, was an embed-
ded journalist with 1st Recon Battalion
when it made its rush north into Iraq at
the head of the 1st Marine Expedition-
ary Force (I MEF) during the 2003 inva-
sion. The title might lead one to expect
a sensational account of young people
desensitized by video games and brutal-
ized by rap music engaging in random
acts of violence—a book perhaps com-
bining titillation and moral censure in
an uneasy mixture. It would be a mis-
take to pass up Wright’s book because
of its title. He has produced a thought-
ful, well written story that people in the
military should read. This book perhaps
belongs to the genre of “hip” journalis-
tic accounts of war like Michael Herr’s
Dispatches about Vietnam, or Bob
Shachochis’s The Immaculate Invasion
about Haiti. Lacking any military back-
ground, Wright proves to be a quick
study, as a good journalist must be. His
fresh viewpoint provides valuable in-
sights into the world of a Marine unit in
combat.
The title does betray one of the book’s
few incorrect assumptions, which is
that the generation of young men in
their late teens and early twenties who
fought in this war are different in some
essential way from the Marines of the
past. Wright says that the Marines of
Iraq belong to “what is more or less
America’s first generation of disposable
children,” but his observations about
the men of 2d Platoon, B Company,
1st Recon are similar to those made
by Phillip Caputo and James Web
about the Marines of Vietnam. Many
were dispossessed, underprivileged,
“disposable,” or abandoned. Wright
also marvels at the disparity in social
origin among the enlisted ranks. It was
ever so. A writer in World War II ob-
served that the Marine Corps seemed to
be made up of a combination of dead-
end kids and boys named Percival. The
language, music, and mores have
changed, but more continuities exist
than Wright appears to realize.
Just as the people who fought and are
fighting in Iraq now are both different
from and similar to those who fought in
previous wars, the conflict is both similar
to and different from those of the past.
The invasion of Iraq was distinguished
by a rapid advance into an enemy coun-
try, unexpected resistance by irregulars,
and a great preponderance of accurate
firepower on the part of U.S. forces.
None of this was exactly unique or un-
precedented, but all these factors gave
the war its tenure and feel for those in-
volved. Wright experienced all this, and
he lets us know again and again that the
sum of these characteristics was to
make problematic the notion and prac-
tice of rules of engagement (ROE).
Marines found themselves moving
quickly through unfamiliar and often
hostile territory, opposed by an enemy
who usually wore no uniform and who
was often unscrupulous about using ci-
vilians for deception and concealment.
These Marines had at their disposal
enormous firepower, and in general
they hit what they aimed at, but where
to fire and how much?
No one encountered these questions
more often than the men of 1st Recon.
Based on his observations, Wright
states that the ROE give the illusion of
order amid chaos, when in fact it is left
up to the individual or small unit leader
to make a determination in a situation
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that may be changing from minute to
minute. The decision will be based on
instinct born of training, individual dis-
position and character, and the percep-
tion of immediate danger. These
perceptions were often as limited as
those of soldiers in any war. For all our
new technology, the fog of war de-
scended as quickly and completely as a
desert sandstorm, and even on sunny
days and clear nights it could blank out
an individual’s surroundings beyond a
narrow range.
These are points worth having driven
home, and Wright’s descriptions of the
events he witnessed are vivid and often
moving. Some of the best writing is in
the quotations of the Marines of 2d
Platoon. When the Marines accidentally
shoot and kill an Iraqi child in her fa-
ther’s car at a roadblock, a corporal
later states, “War is either glamorized—
like we kick their ass—or the opposite—
look how horrible, we kill all these civil-
ians. None of these people know what it’s
like to be there holding that weapon.”
Wright’s book represents American war
writing in its maturity. He avoids the
pitfalls of glamorizing or moralizing.
Many of the Marines he writes about
are complex men. The staff sergeant
nicknamed “Iceman” is an efficient and
a somewhat emotionally remote profes-
sional fighting man who is also a sym-
pathetic figure. It would be easy for
Wright to dislike General James N.
Mattis as a man of a different genera-
tion and completely different outlook,
especially once Wright learns that he
and the rest of Recon Battalion have
been functioning as a diversion, a vir-
tual decoy, during the attack north. The
portrait of Mattis that emerges, how-
ever, is understanding and even admir-
ing. Wright has the common sense to
realize that sometimes leaders must risk
their own in war, and that he himself
must have the courage to accept his role
as a tactical pawn when his profession
as journalist requires it.
Recon units are different. They proba-
bly contain a higher percentage of the
“natural warrior” type than do other
Marine Corps units. These fine-tuned
combat thoroughbreds often come
across as sensitive and complex. Despite
the implications of the title, it is often
these young men, rather than the elders,
who display the greatest humanity and
restraint. The Marines of 2d Platoon
were sometimes surprised to find that
they preferred saving or preserving life
to taking it.
Make no mistake, these are the Marine
breed—“Generation M.” No apologies
are needed for the wars they fought. We
should be humbled and instructed by
their example. After the rush of combat
comes reflection, and after the battle is
the effort to restore and rebuild. Cour-
age will always be required of soldiers
in war, but it is also required of us to be
wise, if we can.
REED BONADONNA
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Saccone, Richard. Negotiating with North Korea.
Hollym International Corp., 2003. 215pp. $22.95
Perhaps the potentially most volatile
part of the world is North Korea. Talks
between the United States and North
Korea seem to be a series of impasses,
confrontations, brinkmanship, threats,
and blusters. The usual explanation for
this state of perpetual frustration for
U.S. negotiators is that they are dealing
with an enigmatic regime that has no
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regard for peaceful resolution of the
confrontations between it and the rest
of the world. This work provides an al-
ternate path for understanding and
working toward more successful negoti-
ations than has been the historical case
for over half a century.
Richard Saccone, retired U.S. Air Force,
alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate
School, has spent over fourteen years in
the Koreas. He has written six books on
Korea covering history, culture, tour-
ism, and business, and he is well quali-
fied to discuss the topic of negotiations.
He is a former representative for KEDO,
the Korean Peninsula Development Or-
ganization, building nuclear power
plants as required under the 1994
Agreed Framework between the United
States and the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea. Saccone currently
teaches international relations and na-
tional government at St. Vincent’s Col-
lege in Latrobe, Pennsylvania.
Saccone explains such concepts as Juche
(self-reliance), Kibun (spirit), and
Cheymyon (saving face) in a manner
that goes deeper than the caricature-
like definitions found in the common
press. Examination allows the reader to
appreciate that the concept of commu-
nication requires both sending and re-
ceipt of information and ideas by at
least two parties. When I was a college
student, I read an essay by the noted se-
manticist S. I. Hayakawa about denota-
tion and connotation. Negotiating with
North Korea reveals that American ne-
gotiators may have been concentrating
on the denotative aspects of communi-
cation and neglecting the connotations.
It gives me hope that negotiations can
progress beyond the cultural misunder-
standing and confrontational nature of
U.S.–North Korea relations.
Fully half the book concerns itself with
the tactics used by North Korean nego-
tiators. Saccone enumerates them in
forty specific categories, which include
threats, loaded questions, requests for
compensation, red herrings, and ap-
peals for fairness. This by itself is useful,
but the author offers specific examples
and provides countertactics that will
help negotiations go forward to a mu-
tually acceptable conclusion. The forty
specifics are grouped into eight general
headings: coercion, offensiveness, ma-
nipulation, assertiveness, confounding,
obstruction, persuasion, and coopera-
tion. Understanding and appreciating
the analysis and advice provided by
Saccone should allow U.S. negotiators
greater success.
For example, one category, labeled “Les-
sons of History,” points out that North
Korean negotiators are generally much
better versed in past meetings and ne-
gotiations than American negotiators,
who tend to be constantly rotated.
Saccone provides the following advice,
“The best counter to lessons from his-
tory is another lesson of history. This
requires considerable preparation.
U.S. negotiators are notoriously igno-
rant of history. If one is ignorant of the
record you cannot even be sure that
what the opponent is quoting is correct.
Do your homework and counter history
with lessons of your own choosing.”
Saccone’s advice appears obvious, but
the United States too often neglects to
heed the obvious.
This work should be required reading
for all who must deal with North Korea.
Saccone understands its negotiating be-
havior. He distinguishes between myths
and reality, and offers alternatives to
improve U.S.-Korea relations. How-
ever, this work should not be confined
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only to those involved with North Ko-
rea. Anyone involved in negotiations
will benefit from this book.
XAVIER K. MARUYAMA
Monterey, California
Betts, Richard K., and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds.
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor
of Michael J. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
210pp. $114.95
The essays in this collection were writ-
ten for an international conference held
in honor of the late Michael J. Handel
at the U.S. Naval War College. Handel
wrote several seminal pieces in the rela-
tively new field of intelligence studies,
and his colleagues are to be compli-
mented for producing this impressive
Festschrift. Betts and Mahnken put to-
gether an impressive group of practitio-
ners and academics to write on various
aspects of the work of intelligence
agencies. It begins with four articles of
a theoretical nature, followed by three
articles that focus on historic case
studies.
This volume appropriately opens with a
classic by Handel on strategic surprises,
published almost thirty years ago,
which serves as an excellent introduc-
tion to a book devoted to intelligence.
It is typical of Handel’s general thinking
on strategic affairs, pointing out several
paradoxes inherent to the potential for
strategic surprise that have become the
common wisdom of the intelligence
field. Handel claims that due to the
great difficulties in differentiating be-
tween “noise” and “signals” (relevant
information), all data amounts to noise,
making the collection of additional
information designed to clarify the
situation additional noise. Handel also
stresses the paradox of estimating risk.
The riskier a military course of action,
the less a rival anticipates and prepares
for it, paradoxically making its eventual
adoption less risky. Handel also sug-
gests that successive intelligence suc-
cesses increase not only the agency’s
credibility but also the risk of strategic
surprise, because its conclusions will
be less subject to critical questioning.
There is also the self-negating proph-
ecy. A warning of an impending attack
triggers military preparations that in
turn prompt the enemy to delay or can-
cel his plans. Such a scenario makes it
almost impossible even in retrospect to
know if the military preparations were
warranted. Another scenario that may
lead to a strategic surprise is a quiet
international environment that may
be used to conceal the preparations
for an attack. Following a fascinating
analysis of the problems of percep-
tion, the politics of intelligence, and
the organizational and bureaucratic
features, Handel reaches the realistic
conclusion that surprise is almost al-
ways unavoidable.
The second article, by editor Richard K.
Betts, starts with the unconventional
premise that politicization of intelli-
gence services is not necessarily bad,
and sometimes it is even advisable.
Betts presents two opposing models of
intelligence work. The first portrays
the intelligence agency striving to
achieve professional credibility by pre-
senting thorough analysis, while the
second depicts the intelligence organi-
zation stressing the supply of data that
is useful and relevant to decision mak-
ers. In the second case, the managers
of intelligence organizations make
compromises and tailor the information
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to influence the decision-making pro-
cess. Betts points out that there is inev-
itable tension between maximizing
credibility and utility, but he makes a
convincing case for reducing this ten-
sion by accepting a certain level of un-
defined politicization. Betts’s
recommended recipe for minimizing
the damage of politicization in the in-
telligence community is organizational
pluralism.
Woodrow J. Kuhns, a senior CIA offi-
cial, next points out that despite the
fact that a significant number of intel-
ligence failures have been docu-
mented, there is no clear track record
for estimates or warning judgments is-
sued by the intelligence community.
Moreover, there is no accumulated
knowledge for distinguishing between
failures attributed to collection, or to
analysis. Nevertheless, Kuhns still
tends to regard intelligence forecasts as
closer to science than to pseudo-
science, despite the methodological
problems in producing forecasts, and
suggests additional systematic research
to clarify the issues he has raised.
James J. Wirtz then discusses the theory
of strategic surprise and admits to oper-
ational difficulties. Wirtz claims that
every curriculum of the officers corps
stresses strategic surprise as a force
multiplier, and as such, military doc-
trine is predispositioned to carry out
surprises. Wirtz elaborates on the risk
paradox first mentioned by Handel,
pointing out the attraction of surprise
for the weaker parties of the conflict. At
this point, Wirtz argues that surprises
may produce only temporary spectacu-
lar results, leaving the general balance
of forces to finally determine the result
of armed conflict. Nevertheless, Wirtz
concludes that strong countries such as
the United States must do their best to
prevent unpleasant surprises—such as
9/11, for example.
John Ferris reviews the evolution of
British military deception during the
two world wars. He provides a detailed
narrative on the deception efforts that
were highly regarded by the British gen-
erals. Ferris argues that deception
benefits the stronger player in the con-
flict and the one holding the initiative,
but he displays skepticism of its final
utility. This article could have benefited
from heavy editing, as it is deficient in
organization and in the use of theoreti-
cal concepts.
Uri Bar-Joseph’s article addresses the
question of why some Israeli intelli-
gence officers—even at the highest
rank—erred in their estimates of the
probability of an imminent war in
1973. He argues convincingly that the
two officers most responsible for the in-
telligence failure were Y. Bandman and
E. Zeira, making the more general point
that organizations cannot transcend the
weaknesses of their personnel. How-
ever, Bar-Joseph could have made this
important point concerning the human
factor by explaining the lack of a strate-
gic warning before the 1973 war with-
out belittling other reasons for the main
misfortunes of the Israeli military in its
encounter with the Egyptian and Syrian
armies.
The final chapter, by Mark M. Lowenthal,
who is also with the CIA, looks at the
U.S. war-fighting doctrine that originally
emphasized information dominance
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), and subse-
quently more modestly aspired to supe-
riority only (2000). Lowenthal warns
against the belief that technological ad-
vances can remove the fog of war. Even
the best technologies need appropriate
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doctrine to be useful. He argues cogently
that advanced intelligence systems have
their own vulnerabilities, and that lacu-
nae of information are inevitable both
before and during war. Moreover, by
using examples from the American Civil
War, Lowenthal demonstrates that
good information about the enemy’s
moves and intentions is not enough for
winning the battle. It is generalship, the
human factor, that will continue to be
decisive in the outcome of a war.
This is an excellent introductory collec-
tion for students and the professional
reader to the gamut of issues with
which the field of intelligence grapples.
EFRAIM INBAR
Director, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Clancy, Tom, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and
Tony Koltz. Battle Ready. New York: Putnam,
2004. 440pp. $28.95
This excellent book documents the mil-
itary and postmilitary career of General
Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.). It should ap-
peal to any reader interested in the U.S.
military, the U.S. Marine Corps, and
national security affairs.
The book follows an engaging and
mixed style. Clancy and Koltz use short
biographical sections to introduce
phases of General Zinni’s career. At the
end of each phase, Zinni’s own words
(in italics) pick up the action. One has
the sense of being right there with the
general, sharing his experiences and
watching him develop into an excep-
tional military role model and leader.
The book actually begins with the end
of Zinni’s career. It is November 1998,
and he is halfway through his last
assignment as the sixth commander in
chief of Central Command. We are in-
troduced to the refined thinking of a
fighting soldier and leader, thinking
based on his extensive tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic experience in war,
conflict resolution, and peacemaking.
At that time, Zinni’s immediate focus
was Saddam Hussein and supporting
the UNSCOM (United Nations Special
Commission) inspectors under Richard
Butler. By mid-December, UN teams
began departing Iraq. What follows is
the four-day, preplanned attack of
Operation DESERT FOX. Although the
planning for the attack provides insight
into General Zinni’s war-fighting skills,
such as the importance and execution of
surprise, it is the introduction to his
breadth of strategic thinking that is most
interesting.
At the start of his command in August
1997, Zinni proposed a six-point strate-
gic program for Central Command to
President Clinton’s secretary of defense,
William Cohen. His objective was to
take a more balanced approach to a
wide range of evolving security issues,
not just Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Af-
ter presenting the program to Cohen
and senior members of Congress, Zinni
was politely told to “stay out of policy
and stick to execution.” That raises an
important point for military officers
preparing themselves for high com-
mand. Civilian control of the military
and selfless military service to the coun-
try are fundamental to our government,
going back to George Washington and
George Marshall. Based on the rest of
the book, it is apparent that Zinni con-
sistently struck that delicate profes-
sional balance between the truthful,
informed, and forceful advice and re-
spect for civilian authority.
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A further example of this followed
DESERT FOX. General Zinni asked him-
self what would happen if Iraq suddenly
collapsed. Who would pick up the
pieces and help rebuild the country? To
examine these questions, Zinni spon-
sored a war game called “Desert Cross-
ing” in late 1999, with a wide range of
government agencies and representa-
tives. In his words, “The scenarios
looked closely at humanitarian, secu-
rity, political, economic, and other re-
construction issues. We looked at food,
clean water, electricity, refugees, Shia
versus Sunnis, Kurds versus other
Iraqis, Turks versus Kurds, and the
power vacuum that would surely follow
the collapse of the regime (since
Saddam had pretty successfully elimi-
nated any local opposition). We looked
at all the problems the United States
faces in 2003 trying to rebuild Iraq. And
when it was over, I was starting to get a
good sense of their enormous scope and
to recognize how massive the recon-
struction would be.” Although the
game failed to stimulate government-
wide planning, the episode at the start
of the book is compelling. One wonders
at Zinni’s background, and how he de-
veloped the interest, knowledge, and
experience to conceptualize and deal
with such complex theater-level issues.
The general served two tours in Viet-
nam, where he suffered life-threatening
combat wounds and illnesses. His time
there was fundamental to his develop-
ment: “The biggest lesson, in fact, is
learning how to be open to surprising
new experiences and then turning that
openness into resourceful and creative
ways of dealing with challenges you
face.” Zinni builds on that insight along
with the sensitivity and ability to work
effectively within other cultures, a skill
he developed during his first tour as an
adviser with the South Vietnamese
marines.
Zinni’s rise to the rank of general in
December 1986 followed command,
staff, and professional military educa-
tion assignments, emphasizing opera-
tional competence. However, it is his
first assignment as general to deputy di-
rector of operations at the U.S. Euro-
pean Command in 1990 that impressed
upon him the nature of the rapidly
changing world following the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
The reader is taken through Zinni’s
subsequent assignments: director of op-
erations for Combined Task Force RE-
STORE HOPE in Somalia, commander of
the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
(I MEF), and commander in chief of
Central Command. After his retirement
from the military in the summer of
2000, Zinni’s experience and diplomatic
skills are further called into service for
peacemaking and conflict resolution
around the world, offering us further
insight into such complex, ongoing sit-
uations as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Battle Ready makes clear that Zinni has
the credentials, both professional and
personal, to present his forceful and
unvarnished opinions, honed by a life-
time of service to his country. This
book should be of particular value to
military officers of all services preparing
for higher command in this volatile
world.
HENRY BARTLETT
Naval War College
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Wildenberg, Thomas. All the Factors of Victory:
Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of
Carrier Airpower. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s,
2003. 326pp. $27.50
Admiral Joseph Reeves was an impor-
tant influence on the development of
American naval aviation during the
interwar period, but like many other se-
nior officers who served in peacetime,
he has not received the attention he de-
serves. Thomas Wildenberg, building
upon his previous work on dive bomb-
ing in the U.S. Navy prior to the Battle
of Midway, strives to honor Admiral
Reeves with a scholarly biography fo-
cused on his professional life and
contributions.
Wildenberg argues that Reeves’s back-
ground, attention to improved training
and doctrine, and ability to push inno-
vation within the existing organiza-
tional structure were key factors behind
the nascent idea of carrier strike forces,
which subsequently came to maturation
during the U.S. Navy’s Pacific opera-
tions in World War II. Like another
well known admiral, William Moffet,
Reeves was a true pioneer in naval avia-
tion. He was among the first to recog-
nize its potential and work out the
practical application of this new form
of warfare within the fleet.
Reeves followed a unique career pro-
gression. Wildenberg traces Reeves’s
scholastic and athletic achievements as
a young engineering naval cadet at
Annapolis; his combat experience dur-
ing the Spanish-American War; conver-
sion to an ordnance specialization;
various sea and shore appointments be-
fore reaching command of the battle-
ship USS North Dakota; time as a
student and tactical instructor at the
Naval War College; and his entry into
the naval aviation world at the age of
fifty-two. As Commander Aircraft
Squadrons, Battle Fleet onboard the ex-
perimental carrier USS Langley, Reeves
challenged his flyers to solve a “thou-
sand and one questions” to which even
he did not have the answers. He con-
centrated the squadrons for intensive
training and practice with new types of
aircraft then being delivered. After a
short stint with the U.S. delegation to
the 1927 Geneva Conference, Reeves
was promoted to rear admiral and re-
turned to lead naval aviation from an
experimental status to full-fledged inte-
gration into the fleet.
Wildenberg’s description of Reeves,
with entourage in tow, personally di-
recting the movement of planes around
Langley’s flight deck when a subordi-
nate officer named John Towers dared
to report that no more could be
crowded onboard, is priceless. The new
purpose-built aircraft carriers USS
Lexington and Saratoga provided the
means for Reeves to test novel concepts
of deployments in peacetime fleet exer-
cises on a larger scale—the turning
point being Fleet Problem IX in January
1929, when Reeves launched the mock
aerial strikes against the Panama Canal
described so well by Wildenberg at the
book’s opening. Thereafter, Reeves
quickly rose in responsibility before his
retirement as commander in chief of the
U.S. Fleet with the rank of admiral in
1936—the first naval aviator to hold the
appointment.
During World War II Reeves returned
to the Department of the Navy to coor-
dinate Lend-Lease activities on behalf
of Secretary Frank Knox, as well as to
act as U.S. naval representative on the
Combined Munitions Assignment
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Board alongside Harry Hopkins.
Having given so much to his country,
Reeves died on 25 March 1948.
Although a powerful speaker and ora-
tor, Reeves published very little and left
behind no personal papers. In writing
this biography, Wildenberg has done an
admirable job of detective work, col-
lecting together information from a di-
verse range of official and private
sources. He uses a 1943 Princeton Uni-
versity undergraduate thesis based on
interviews with Reeves, but little re-
mains known of the admiral’s family
and personal life, other than the im-
pression that he was a lonely man de-
voted full-heartedly to the navy. A
ruthless streak in Reeves’s character,
however, comes out in his treatment of
hapless Lieutenant Commander Robert
Molten—an episode to be repeated
during a run-in with a Royal Navy ord-
nance officer, Stephen Roskill, in Wash-
ington, D.C., during the summer of
1944. Wildenberg’s conclusions about
Reeves’s attitude toward the British
might have been tempered by closer
study of his wartime work on the Com-
bined Munitions Assignment Board.
No reference is made in the book to
Reeves’s working files from the Lend-
Lease Office of Record in Record Group
38 at the National Archive and Records
Administration, or the diaries of Vice
Admiral James Dorling, his British naval
counterpart on the Combined Muni-
tions Assignment Board at Greenwich’s
National Maritime Museum. In Reeves’s
second service tour, he facilitated
American production behind the global
war effort at sea and actually excelled in
office work and the numbers game.
Even though biographies are somewhat
out of fashion today and Wildenberg
shows a tendency to give a little too
much weight to the man than to larger
international trends in naval aviation at
the time, Reeves clearly pressed, with
single-minded determination, the exist-
ing technological and doctrinal limits of
U.S. naval aviation and prepared his
forces accordingly.
The book, which offers interesting in-
sights into experimentation and inno-
vation for future warfare in peacetime
navies, is highly recommended for spe-
cialist historians and interested general
readers.
CHRIS MADSEN
Canadian Forces College
Toronto, Ontario
De Kay, James Tertius. A Rage for Glory: The Life
and Times of Commodore Stephen Decatur, USN.
New York: Free Press, 2004. 237pp. $25
Accomplished historian and author
James de Kay captures the essence of an
age, as well as the spirit of a man, in his
biography of Commodore Stephen
Decatur. This finely written narrative,
aimed at a general readership, may lack
the scholarly apparatus expected of his-
torical monographs, but it certainly does
not lack the scholarship and analysis
that is the hallmark of de Kay’s work.
Yet if this book sometimes appears to
be a cross between an action-thriller
and a hagiography, there is a reason.
Decatur’s active quest for fame and
glory, as well as the deep sense of honor
that would clip short his thread of life
at age forty-one, earned the commo-
dore a place in the hearts of his coun-
trymen perhaps more appropriate for a
saint. His name still echoes in those of
some forty-five towns, five warships, and
numerous other pieces of Americana.
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Born amidst the upheaval of the Ameri-
can Revolution in 1779, Stephen
Decatur spent his youth steeped in the
twin influences of a national hubris
born of victory against the tyrannical
British Empire and a family tradition of
seafaring, usually against that same en-
tity (Dutch and French ancestry, and
the master of a privateer as a father).
His time as a midshipman during the
Quasi-War with France may have
lacked in naval action, but it certainly
imbued in Decatur the ethos of the
quarterdeck, that almost mystical tri-
umvirate of glory, fame, and honor that
not only defined a gentleman but all
too frequently forced recourse to the
Code Duello. It is de Kay’s analysis and
presentation of this triumvirate that is
the strength of his study of Decatur.
From 1801 through 1815, Decatur
earned a place in the pantheon of naval
heroes. His part in the burning of the
frigate Philadelphia at Tripoli in 1804
made him the darling of the nation.
Further daring actions against the Bar-
bary corsairs catapulted the young lieu-
tenant over the heads of other officers
to the rank of captain. In October 1812,
Decatur steered his United States to vic-
tory over HMS Macedonian, then
fought an even harder battle with
Washington for prize money. Trapped
in New London by a British blockade in
1813, he shifted his flag to the large
frigate President in 1814. Beset by a
British squadron shortly thereafter,
Decatur surrendered the largest Ameri-
can warship lost during the War of
1812. Exonerated by a court of inquiry,
he proceeded to regain his lost honor
by leading a squadron to thrash soundly
the Barbary corsairs in 1815. De Kay’s
portrayal of these actions is excellent,
using imagery appropriate to the con-
cepts of glory, fame, and honor, central
to the story. More importantly for gen-
eral readers, naval jargon of the era is
minimized; thus they do not become
lost somewhere between the gudgeons
and the mainsail clewlines.
The commodore spent his few remain-
ing years as a member of the Board of
Navy Commissioners. Then, on 22
March 1820, Stephen Decatur paid the
ultimate price for his honor. Fellow
captain and former mentor James
Barron and he exchanged shots on a
traditional dueling ground outside
Washington. Mortally wounded,
Decatur died a few hours later. Wind-
ing through de Kay’s last chapters in
the life of this American hero is a fas-
cinating conspiracy theory involving
the “bad boys” of the early U.S. Navy:
Jesse Duncan Elliot, Captain William
Bainbridge, and Captain James Barron.
In de Kay’s mind, there exists little
doubt that both Elliot and Bainbridge
contributed as much as Barron to the
death of Decatur. His arguments are
convincing.
Historians, particularly those familiar
with the era, may be somewhat disap-
pointed with this book. De Kay presents
a narrative driven by specific events;
thus, details such as Decatur’s contribu-
tions to strategic planning during the
War of 1812 are missing. On the other
hand, those souls less knowledgeable of
the U.S. Navy during the Age of Sail
will have little to disappoint them and
much to gain from reading this exciting
biography of a most famous American
naval officer.
WADE G. DUDLEY
East Carolina University
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Thomas, Evan. John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Fa-
ther of the American Navy. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2003. 381pp. $26.95
America seems to have lately rediscovered
its founding fathers, if recent best-seller
lists are any indication. As much as the
infant republic needed thinkers and
statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson, John
Adams, and Ben Franklin, it also required
those who were willing to fight and turn
their aspirations into reality. Francis
Marion, Daniel Morgan, “Mad” Anthony
Wayne, and even Benedict Arnold were
among the warriors who concretized fine
words and ideas into battlefield deeds.
One more name that belongs on this
fierce list is John Paul Jones, the father of
the American navy.
Thomas, a Newsweek editor and ama-
teur sailor, offers a marvelous portrait of
a proud, insecure, ferocious, and highly
ambitious figure. He convincingly sug-
gests that Jones was that most elemental
of American characters, the self-made
man. Although Jones most likely never
made the celebrated declaration “I have
not yet begun to fight” during the epic
sea battle between his Bonhomme Rich-
ard and HMS Serapis, he did possess an
unconquerable spirit. This is a splendid
biography of John Paul Jones.
The penniless son of a Scottish gar-
dener on the run from the law, John
Paul adopted the surname Jones and
sailed to America. Possessing an
unslakable thirst for glory, a genius for
seamanship, a combative nature, and a
Gatsby-like desire to be recognized as a
gentleman, Jones offered his services to
the cause of American independence.
Along the way, he accumulated many
grievances—some imagined, many not.
He did not feel appreciated or rewarded
by Congress. Jones watched desirable
commands handed over to corrupt and
incompetent hacks, and he suffered mu-
tinous crews and disloyal officers. In-
deed, comparison with Benedict Arnold,
another prickly sort, is instructive. Both
gifted men were at times disgracefully
ill used. The difference is that Jones ul-
timately placed duty over self.
In Thomas’s hands, the real-life story of
this courageous master and commander
is every bit as enthralling and humor-
ous as any Patrick O’Brien novel.
Thomas writes colorfully of black-
guards and mistresses, salty sea dogs
and young midshipmen, bloody quar-
terdecks and Parisian salons. He also
provides a thrilling description of
Jones’s apotheosis—the Bonhomme
Richard and Serapis duel. His depiction
of riding out a terrific storm is better
than the obligatory chapter found in
fictional yarns, as are the evocations of
the sights, sounds, and smells of ship-
board life in the age of sail. Simulta-
neously, Thomas perceptively evaluates
Jones as tactician, strategist, and leader.
Unparalleled at tactics, Jones was also
surprisingly advanced as a strategic
thinker who devised schemes to bring
the war to the British home islands
and foresaw the need for the United
States to field a blue-water navy. It is
only as a leader that Thomas finds
Jones wanting. Audacious, persistent,
and visionary, the brittle Jones lacked
what we today would call team-building
skills to inspire subordinates to consis-
tent greatness. Nevertheless, Jones’s leg-
acy is well summarized by the words
engraved on his tomb at Annapolis: “He
gave our navy its earliest traditions of
heroism and victory.”
ALAN CATE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
NASOH: THE JOHN LYMAN BOOK AWARD
Each year the North American Society for Ocean History (NASOH) presents the
John Lyman Book Award to authors who have made significant contributions to
the study and understanding of naval and maritime history. This year the award
for “Best Book in U.S. Maritime History” went to Captain Alex R. Larzelere, U.S.
Coast Guard (Ret.), a 1968 graduate of the Naval War College’s School of Naval
Command and Staff (as the College of Naval Command and Staff was then
known). Captain Larzelere’s The Coast Guard in World War I: An Untold Story
(Naval Institute Press, 2002) is the story of, in the prize committee’s words, “a
new service and how it gained its ‘sea legs’ in the cauldron of war.”
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FROM THE EDITORS
NEWPORT PAPER 21
A new title in our Newport Papers series, Latin American Security Challenges: A
Collaborative Inquiry from North and South, edited by Paul D. Taylor, has just
been issued in print and electronically. A senior strategic researcher at the Naval
War College and a former career Foreign Service officer, Paul D. Taylor served as
U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic and Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs. His new collection helps reopen the door to se-
rious analyses of the relationship between Latin American national security is-
sues and American strategic interests. The monograph consists of an
introduction and three substantive chapters analyzing specific issues facing
Latin America. The first chapter provides a solid introduction to the intercon-
nection of economic development and the national security threats facing both
Latin American governments and the United States. The second builds upon the
concepts of failed states and borderless regions to suggest how criminals and
perhaps terrorists can find refuge and perhaps support in localities outside the
control of states. The final chapter speculates on the interest of China in the re-
gion, with particular attention to the potential roles played by immigration and
Chinese ownership of firms charged with the operation of the Panama Canal.
Print copies (and free subscriptions to the series) are available from the editorial
office.
1948–2004 ARTICLE AND ESSAY INDEX
An omnibus index of all articles and essays from 1948 (the founding of the
journal) through the 2004 publishing year is available on compact disc. Acrobat
Reader is required for the compact disc (it can be downloaded free). For a copy
of the CD-ROM index, contact the editorial office. An online index, current
through the most recent issue, is also available. A print article/essay index
supplement for volume 57 appears in this issue.
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Statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 USC. 3685) of the Naval War Col-
lege Review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year at 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I.,
02841-1207, for Summer/Autumn 2004. General business offices of the publisher are located at the Naval
War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of publisher: President,
Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of editor: Dr. Peter
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